DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES



FUTURES

Graham Allison
Daniel Bell
Albert Carnesale
Anthony Downs
Robert Gilpin
John A. Hall
Jacob T. Schwartz
Merry White
Brian Winston

$5.00
SUMMER 1987

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOARD OF EDITORS:

David Apter, Daniel Bell, Isaiah Berlin, François Bourricaud, Herman Feshbach, Paul Freund, Clifford Geertz, Gerald Holton, Charles P. Kindleberger, Hans H. Landsberg, Martin Meyerson, Steven Muller, Carl E. Schorske, Judith N. Shklar, Jean Starobinski, Lewis Thomas, Robert Wilson

STEPHEN R. GRAUBARD
Editor of the Academy and of Dædalus

CAROL LEACH
Manuscript Editor

JUDITH TORTOLANO
Promotion Manager

ELINOR APPEL
Editorial Assistant

MARGARET A. THOM
Administrative Secretary

BETH T. INGRAM
Editorial Office Assistant

DAVID M. ZINN
Assistant to the Editor

Cover design by Ulrich Ruchti

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Futures

Summer 1987

Issued as VOLUME 116, NUMBER 3, of the Proceedings
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Summer 1987: Futures: Issued as Volume 116, Number 3, of the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Copyright © 1987 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 12-30299

Editorial Offices: Dædalus, *Norton's Woods, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138*

Dædalus (ISSN 0011-5266) *is published quarterly by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Subscription rate: $16, one year; $24, two years; $32, three years.*

All subscriptions and single copy orders and change of address information must be sent in writing *to the* Dædalus *Business Office, P.O. Box 515, Canton, Massachusetts 02021, U.S.A. (Tel) 617-828-8450. Orders for single copies must be accompanied with prepayment of $5.00.*

Printed in the United States of America
Printing Office: 2901 Byrdhill Road, Richmond, Virginia

Second-class postage paid at Canton, Massachusetts, and at additional mailing offices.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contents

v Preface

Daniel Bell
1 The World and the United States in 2013

Robert Gilpin
33 American Policy in the Post-Reagan Era

Graham Allison and Albert Carnesale
69 Can the West Accept *Da* for an Answer?

John A. Hall
95 Classical Liberalism and the Modern State

Anthony Downs
119 The Evolution of Democracy: How Its Axioms and Institutional Forms Have Been Adapted to Changing Social Forces

Merry White
149 The Virtue of Japanese Mothers: Cultural Definitions of Women's Lives

Jacob T. Schwartz
165 Dreamworld

Brian Winston
187 A Mirror for Brunelleschi

203 Notes on Contributors

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Preface to the Issue, "Futures"

In the summer of 1967, *Dædalus* published an issue entitled "Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress," an eclectic collection of ruminations about the future that drew heavily on the work of the Commission on the Year 2000, created by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences a few years earlier under the chairmanship of Professor Daniel Bell. That work, inevitably, is much in my mind as I reflect on the current issue, so different in purpose and spirit, and exuding a quality almost entirely absent in the earlier *Dædalus* volume. It would be easy (and wrong) to imagine that the 1967 volume is characterized by a facile optimism—a residue of the prosperous 1950s and of the excitements generated by the events of the early 1960s—only slightly attenuated by the blight of war in Asia, assassinations at home, and civil unrest. While there is a good deal in the Year 2000 study that makes it appear that *tout va bien*, that there are no insuperable problems for the United States or the world, the volume is not lacking in explicit warnings about conditions that require reform. Still, it seems positively sanguine when compared with some of the essays in this issue.

Given these differences, the temptation to compare the 1960s with the 1980s is very real; one reason for resisting it, however, arises from the fact that this preface is being written at a time when the work of yet another Commission on the Year 2000, this one appointed by Mayor Koch and chaired by Robert F. Wagner, Jr., President of the New York City Board of Education, lies at hand. This contemporary report, while dwelling on the problems of New York and its prospects for the future, is almost oblivious to the kinds of questions raised in the current issue of *Dædalus*. This statement is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not intended as criticism of the New York City report; it simply points out that the differences may express a profound and continuing division in this society between those who continue to believe that the United States can resolve its problems through the application of intelligence, will, and perseverance, and those who recognize that the world today is more diverse, possibly more recalcitrant, certainly more irrational than acknowledged in most conventional exhortations to reform.

The *Dædalus* issue, in dwelling on international conditions, does not simply argue for a theory that takes account of the limits on American choice; explicitly and implicitly, it uses a rhetoric significantly different from that which has been characteristically American for so very long—the sort of "boosterism" that early travelers to the country noted, and that still gives surprise today, though it is now greatly attenuated. While those who have written about New York do not minimize the gravity of many of the social conditions that obtain in that vast metropolis, and while they give considerable attention to the dissolution of community, the breakdown of family structure, large-scale abandonment of housing in certain neighborhoods, widespread youth unemployment, crime, and drug abuse, this does not preclude frequent flights into hyperbole: New York is represented as the city "ascendant" or "triumphant," a metropolis of such diversity that one seldom need leave the city to see all that life has to offer (a view that those familiar with London or Paris, two other "world cities," might find just a trifle exaggerated). Such flights of fantasy apart, the current Commission's emphasis on the reduction of poverty and dependency—on changing a situation in which one-quarter of all New York City residents and two-fifths of its children live in poverty, 15 percent of all citizens subsist on welfare, 39 percent of all children are born out of wedlock (in 1985), with the number in the nonwhite population exceeding 50 percent—it is reasonable that the report stresses the importance of keeping young people in school, providing better instruction for them, and "restoring" the schools "to their former greatness." The report is openly nostalgic, recalling that "New York's public school system was once the premier school system in the world"—a proposition that would be difficult to prove and is almost certainly false, but sits well with the equally mythic proposition that "New York has always been a middle-class city of middle-class neighborhoods and morés." New

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

York's Commission on the Year 2000 disdains all terms that might be considered pejorative; the word *underclass*, increasingly common today, does not much figure; nor, for that matter, is there any serious attempt made to show, in concrete terms, what the city's working class was like in 1940, 1914, 1890, or at any other time in its history. The Commission's report is too reticent, for all its purported alarm. It is also too parochial; it does not acknowledge that the city's future is intimately tied to conditions in the larger American society, and in the world beyond, that no one in the city can expect to control.

Yet these conditions may, in the long run, determine whether New York will achieve the "greatness" that is constantly called for, or whether its present "social pathology" will be exacerbated, becoming more grave, more humanly destructive. In this issue of *Dædalus*, Daniel Bell's introductory essay—a scenario of possible futures—treats both the world and the United States, and is explicitly described as *not* being an effort to predict the future. Rather, the concern is to suggest what *may* be impending, given the structural, political, and cultural circumstances now extant, and to do so in ways that do not require a description of the precise configurations of American or world society in the twenty-first century. While precision cannot be achieved through this approach, it is possible to identify "basic structural frameworks" that are emerging—that suggest, for example, that the Pacific Basin will be the center of economic power in the twenty-first century, and that this will have profound importance for those who are part of this Basin (including the United States and the U.S.S.R., Japan and China) and those who are not. If there is a decline of the "Euro-centered civilization and a shift to Asia," what will the political and social consequences of that change be? If we have already witnessed an "internationalization of capital" (a process that is likely to continue), will this mean that few countries, if any, will be able to control their own currency? How will this affect the power and influence of individual nations, even the most powerful? How may we expect the "third technological revolution," which involves the joining of computers and telecommunications (already underway), to affect geography? What will it do to markets, as they have been classically defined? What do space exploration and biotechnology promise to create in the way of new opportunities and new problems? Professor Bell asks whether we are not likely to soon discover that "the nation–state is becoming too small for the big

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life." This "mismatch of scale" is problematic. So, also, are certain demographic developments, which are causing a vast proliferation of gigantic cities, particularly in the Third World, where the populations are both large and young—so different from those characteristic of Europe or North America. The United States, confronting new population pressures from Mexico that are not likely to be resolved by conventional remedies, will be required to deal with issues no less complex than those affecting the Soviet Union, whose Muslim Central Asian population is growing rapidly while its European population declines. Both developments could have tremendous consequences, more politically and economically explosive than generally imagined.

It is the vulnerability of the United States—a new susceptibility to the shocks of world society—that is the chief concern of Daniel Bell. Aware of the importance of changes in the American economy, the work that individuals do, and the availability of work, Bell recognizes that there is also a need to consider the changed political–bureaucratic structure of both federal and state governments; the demographic and family changes that are occurring, and their implications for an aging population; and finally, how such changes may be related to a new configuration of social classes that is likely to include a permanent underclass of about 15 percent of the total population. Professor Bell's analysis, while based on much of the same data available to those who have interpreted New York City's problems, shows that the solution of such problems depends on integral change, the creation of new institutions, the abandonment of nostalgia for a world that is lost. Bell, in asking what is a "legitimate neighborhood function," in reflecting on what a "continental economy" involving the United States, Canada, and Mexico might be like, shows a talent for imagining something that is dramatically new, knowing all the while that the political, cultural, and social resistances to fundamental change are enormous. He does not predict such change; he simply provokes reflection about its possibility, indeed its necessity.

On a quite different level, the same purpose informs the essay of Robert Gilpin. Believing that the postwar era of international relations has ended and a new era has begun, Professor Gilpin writes with passion about the Reagan administration's policies in recent years. The United States, he says, "has been living on borrowed

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time—and borrowed money—for much of the last decade." In doing so, it has been able to "postpone the inevitable and painful adjustments to the new realities in global, diplomatic, economic, and strategic relationships." This is not going to continue. Reviewing the international scene as it existed immediately after World War II, and showing how the crises of that period led to a system of American alliances with Western Europe and Japan, Gilpin shows how the whole system depended on American hegemony, on the capacity of the United States to make its views credible and acceptable to its allies. Central to this "American System" was a shared perception of the nature of the Soviet threat. But this central unifying perception no longer exists; differences have grown regarding the kinds of defense commitments that all the allies should be willing to make. Linked to these differences are new perceptions of the economic strengths of the various alliance members, the relationships that need to exist between them, and the obligations that each should be willing to assume. There is, according to Gilpin, a major economic crisis in the alliance, and it affects both politics and defense policy.

The crisis began with the weakening of the American economy, whose long-term relative decline has been exacerbated, according to the author, by the policies of the Reagan administration. Given its diminished economic base, the United States is now vastly overcommitted in what it seeks to do in the world. Living beyond its means, having become the greatest debtor in world history, the country is dependent on foreign capital to maintain its prosperity and to honor its global commitments. This condition cannot continue. Though Americans blame the Japanese for their trade deficit, Gilpin maintains that it is caused by decisions made in Washington, D.C. With the accelerated deindustrialization of America and the doubling of the national debt, only the willingness of the Japanese (taking over for the Germans) to "underwrite" America's economic extravagances has kept the system intact. The United States cannot indefinitely postpone the attempt to deal seriously with its economic problems. Gilpin, in proposing economic reforms, is aware of how domestically contentious they are likely to be, how much they will depart from conventional wisdom, and how much certain of them will cause new resentments abroad. The United States, forty years after the end of the Second World War, will have to "acknowledge that its postwar commitment to a liberal, multilateral world economy is unrealistic."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It cannot go on pretending that this system is inherently good, that it is simply the recalcitrance of others that is causing the "open economy ideal" not to be realized. The United States will be obliged to determine who should be given priority in access to its markets: Europe, Japan, or Latin America. In Gilpin's view, it is urgent that the United States "give greater prominence to the developing world, especially Latin America and the Pacific Rim."

Does such a fundamental economic transformation counsel an analogous change in defense policy? Professor Gilpin, worried that too little attention is given to the vital and essential links between nuclear weapons and conventional arms, insists that the reduction of one ought only to occur *pari passu* with reduction of the other. There must be no arms control agreement that gives the Soviets an incentive to wage conventional war, believing that such limited conflict will not escalate into nuclear war. According to Gilpin, the "reindustrialization" of America must begin at once, and the United States must resolve to reduce the costs of its overseas commitments; America's allies must assume a greater part of those burdens. This, however, "must be done slowly and deliberately." If the reliance on nuclear weapons for defense is reduced—and it is reasonable that it should be—adequate conventional forces must be maintained; America's allies must contribute much more than they presently do toward defense. Such policies are not likely to win quick approval abroad. They are essential, however, if the country's economic, political, and strategic commitments are to be in greater consonance with its true economic capabilities; if the United States is no longer to behave as if its power and wealth are inexhaustible.

Robert Gilpin's views on nuclear deterrents and on arms control more generally, including President Reagan's apparent readiness to play down the value of the country's nuclear deterrent, contrast markedly with what Graham Allison and Albert Carnesale argue in their paper on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). According to Allison and Carnesale, the president's purpose is simply to accept what NATO originally agreed to in 1979: to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles while at the same time negotiating to eliminate them, along with Soviet missiles of the same kind. The NATO strategy, they argue, has in fact worked. Why, then, the heated debate of today, with so many questioning the wisdom of what the president is apparently ready to accede to? Allison and Carnesale believe that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

today's debate, properly interpreted, tells a great deal about opinion both in Europe and the United States. They suggest that too few in either place are correctly informed on what a satisfactory arms control agreement should be or what it should seek to achieve. The evidence, accumulated by the authors from statements made by opponents of the INF accords, suggests that America is unwilling to understand what the Soviet interest in any specific agreement might be, why no accord is possible which does not in some measure satisfy Soviet needs, why the value of any proposed agreement cannot be calculated in any single "currency" (military, political, alliance relations, or the like), and why the benefits and costs of an arms agreement must be uncertain at best. In these circumstances, it is easy and convenient to use a simple "rule of thumb" calculus, which invariably leads to a mistaken judgment on the worth of any prospective accord. The authors, in trying to distinguish between the kinds of arguments put forth regarding arms control, reflect on the nature of political debate in this country, but also on the penchant of Europeans to favor the status quo, whatever it is, if only because that can be said to be effective in preventing war, the supreme hazard of our time.

While those preoccupied with the military implications of the INF proposal are particularly vocal concerning its disadvantages, they are not the only ones to raise a hue and cry. Allison and Carnesale, responding to such arguments, insist that the military balance will not be unfavorably affected. More than that, they emphasize the proposal's positive utility in eliminating an entire category of weapons in which both sides have invested considerable economic and political capital. They call it "an unprecedented act in arms control," and obviously believe that it can be the basis for other more substantial reductions. They do not believe, as others do, that it will reduce NATO cohesion or fuel distrust between the United States and Europe. As for the idea that the INF proposal is an American surrender, a "nuclear Munich," or that it is a deal that substantially favors Moscow, the authors argue that the agreement's most important result may be that it will instruct both superpowers in how negotiations with the other can proceed. While acknowledging that it is "but a single step toward improved U.S.–Soviet relations," they see it as having potentially great symbolic significance. In domestic politics, while the proposed agreement is certain to generate new

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discord, it may also do something to "legitimate arms control" in all quarters, and may even contribute to a greater realism in the arguments used to define an acceptable arms control agreement. For the long term, both argue, there can be no question as to the agreement's utility. It needs to be embraced enthusiastically.

While there is no comparable insistence on the urgency of taking specific action to guarantee some kind of stability in a world whose political economy is so obviously disordered, John Hall's essay resembles the others in one very important regard: it is a call for abandoning some of the ideological pieties that have guided policy-makers since 1945, and that seem compelling (to some) even today. The idea, for example, that modernization can be achieved easily, without *Sturm und Drang*, should be discarded. While liberals may both disdain and regret the savageries generally required by rapid industrialization, Hall sees no substitute for them. Whether the model for development be state socialism or authoritarian captialism, there will be repression and violence, and it cannot be guaranteed that there will be a perceptible softening of the regime after the transition to industrial society has been achieved. It all depends on what happens to the world economy, and how skillful the new political elites are. State power seems to be essential to economic growth; while it may be useful to draw the kind of contrast between despotism and liberal constitutionalism that was common in an earlier day, another dimension seems even more important: "the extent to which the state can actually penetrate and tax society and organize it and provide it with services, from education to justice." This capacity, which the despotic state can rarely claim, is the *sine qua non* for the state that shows itself capable of building a social infrastructure that can survive in a competitive and harsh world economy.

In advanced capitalist societies, at least today, some argue that the "market" can again regulate economic activity, as it putatively once did. Hall does not believe this; for him, economic success for such advanced societies depends on "corporatism" combined with welfare and openness to the world market. Japan, Sweden, Austria, and Switzerland are his model societies; he has no equal confidence in the Britain of Margaret Thatcher. Nor does he believe much in the contemporary rhetoric of the United States, with its insistence on maintaining a system that guarantees free trade among nations. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system always called for a hegemonic power, and Hall is not at all certain that the United States is able to perform that role, even assuming that it still wishes to do so. The American hegemony that existed from World War II to 1971 was endorsed by allies who expected to benefit from it. Since 1971, that hegemony, according to Hall, has been imposed; it has been resented by many as a sort of domination. In recent years, the world has suffered from an American "geopolitical naiveté" that sees all issues defined in terms of East–West conflict. While the Western power remains paramount because of its abundant capital and widespread markets, there is increasing friction between the United States and its allies, who "wish that it would better recognize the nature of regional political dynamics—not least the revival of Islam in the Middle East." Hall sees three possible scenarios for the future of the world economy: "a continued and increased American hegemony by domination"; alternatively, "a fundamental geopolitical and economic change resulting from a completely new perception of the United States' role in world affairs" (this would make sense, Hall argues, if the United States chose to reorient itself to the Pacific Rim); or, finally, a policy of "pure hegemony," leading the United States to see Third World problems in a wholly different way, and calling for kinds of cooperation not now contemplated.

If Hall's recommendation for the future is a reorienting of all thinking about the nature of development, and of political economy more specifically, with consequent changes in all international relations, Anthony Downs's interest is to describe the evolution of democracy by illustrating how democratic systems of government have changed since the end of the Second World War. An image of democracy once dependent on an understanding of American, British, and white Dominion institutions can no longer be sustained as adequate. Today, even in the classic democracies, there have been major alterations in the principles of individual liberty, equality, and citizen participation. With the extension of the franchise has come pressure for new political agendas, but also for more extensive political consultation; this is true even when (as in the United States) great numbers choose not to exercise their right to vote. The equality principle, which has provided the rationale for the "welfare state"—a taxing of the more affluent to help the less privileged—has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

incontestably shifted economic resources downward, increasing economic equality. The effects that these changes have had on personal liberty have been substantial, though not always in ways anticipated. The broadening of the domain of equality has generally increased the need for central government, a development that has become a matter of contention in most democracies today. The ambiguity of the term "equality" has generated controversy, as has every attempt to define "inalienable rights." What, for example, is "decent housing"? Are there uniform definitions for such goods? Who is entitled to them? Who will pay?

How democratic governments cope with such problems will always be determined, at least in part, by whether majority opinion rules or whether those who govern attempt to be responsive to as many people as possible. The consensual model of democracy, with its aim of satisfying all sizable groups in the society, generally implies a wide citizen participation and a resolve not to allow any minorities to feel left out or neglected. Whether a democracy opts for the majoritarian or the consensual mode reflects the social and cultural conditions of the society. Where the United Kingdom and New Zealand come closest to expressing the values of majoritarian democracy, the political agenda tends to concentrate heavily on economic issues: how incomes should be taxed and distributed, what resources should be devoted to social services. In societies partial to the consensual model, religious or cultural–ethnic issues are most likely to be paramount, with urban–rural conflicts being common. In these societies, which are often cleavage-ridden, any exclusion of large groups is certain to raise fear, to foment disorder. In such democracies, attention to the views of minorities is virtually mandatory, with less power being concentrated in the hands of the majority. Switzerland, Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands are prime examples of consensual democracies in Europe. It might be thought that societies with relatively homogeneous populations are best suited to majoritarian institutions, while pluralistic societies with many diverse subgroups and intensely-held beliefs are best suited to consensual institutions, but an examination of the evidence suggests that this notion is much too simple. In fact, it is the intensity of feelings—about socioeconomic, religious, and other issues—that largely governs whether the consensual or the majoritarian form is most appropriate. The size of the nation, the character of its constitution,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the number of major rival groups, the intensity with which opinions are held, the degree of trust that subsists, determine political behavior; the social traits of the society influence its decisions on what institutional forms are chosen. Because many nondemocratic societies consist of heterogeneous populations with deep cleavages among hostile groups, some imagine that democracy can be achieved only when there is a greater homogeneity of views, values, and loyalties. Anthony Downs, adopting some of the ideas of Arend Lijphart, argues the opposite, claiming that consensual democracy can indeed accommodate great social and cultural diversity. Still, he cannot fully accept Lijphart's theories, if only because he knows that the postcolonial elites, who instituted authoritarian forms in so many new states, did so because it guaranteed the consolidation of their power as democractic institutions would never have done. This, however, does not mean that new institutional forms will not be invented to accommodate the particular social and geographic conditions of a society. There is no reason, particularly today, to believe in a theory of political convergence.

Nor, for that matter, is there any reason to believe in theories of social convergence. The essay by Merry White, superficially dealing simply with Japanese mothers, is in fact a remarkable exploration of the possibility that industrial society may spawn more various social norms than has been generally thought possible. Forty years after the end of the Second World War, in two of the most advanced industrial societies of the world, the conditions, aspirations, and habits of women are markedly different. Why? Merry White's analysis of the life of a thirty-year-old Japanese mother of two, who lives in Osaka, dwells not only on the particular patterns of courtship, marriage, and childrearing, but also—and perhaps more importantly—on how she sees her life, and why it cannot be thought simply a variant of the American middle-class life. Nor, for that matter, does the lifestyle of this young woman's mother, aged fifty, seem at all redolent of life in the United States. The satisfactions common to these women are not at all those known by many women elsewhere in the industrial world. Indeed, basic to all the differences are values that are culture-specific, that are in no sense universal, that have to do with "deep differences in the motive forces in societies and communities." In Japan, the spheres of work and authority differ for men and women, and women accept these differences, fully aware of the social value that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attaches to what they do. Japanese boys and girls, particularly in the middle class, are brought up differently; it is taken for granted that the boy, as man, will work outside the home, and the girl, as woman, will run the household. Fully in charge of the family domain, the Japanese woman, knowing that her role is socially valued, takes for granted that she will prove herself as wife and mother. Japan, believing that its most vital resource is its children, that the most important task is their education, has invented a social model that makes the care of children and the protection of family life a prime responsibility of all, but particularly of women. Everything is done to help the mother learn how to help her children to achieve the kind of success that the society values. That such a system does not make for universal happiness is perhaps so obvious as not to require elaboration, but the overall satisfaction with these conditions needs also to be acknowledged. These women, with their specific cultural values, cannot be judged by the norms of today's industrial West.

The idea of convergence, which once seemed so compelling in all study of industrial society, is scarcely sustained by the Japanese experience. For example, in Japan, *hierarchy* is not associated with domination or exploitation as it is in the West; likewise, *cooperation* has a quite different meaning and significance in the Japanese context. To cooperate is not to give up one's autonomy; in Japanese eyes, it is simply a way of enhancing oneself. The American emphasis on freedom of choice baffles most Japanese; they cannot comprehend its putative virtues. Does this imply that the contemporary Japanese social pattern will survive for a long time? It is impossible to say. What is clear is that American social idioms—with their emphasis on equality, individualism, freedom of choice, and personal autonomy—are not the preferred idioms of modern Japan, for women or for men.

An issue of *Dædalus* devoted to "Futures" cannot completely ignore the major changes in technology that are now impending or, more significantly, that can now be perceived. Jacob Schwartz's "Dreamworld" is an attempt to analyze the uses that may be made of the computer in the forseeable future. While understanding that his projections are in no sense predictions, Professor Schwartz envisions an informational environment fundamentally different from any that now exists. His is a "dreamworld" with huge implications, particularly in the sphere of education, for any society that embraces it. The basic technology that already exists can be used, in his view, to create

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"an astonishing new artistic and educational medium." This, however, will call for "the inspired and sustained efforts of gifted artists, educators, and scholars." Schwartz suggests what lessons in ancient history, arithmetic, and geometry might be like by presenting several hypothetical lesson scenarios. He does not envision computers principally as labor-saving devices in education, but as means for giving a kind of skills instruction that cannot be achieved by human agency. Moreover, he sees that this use of computers presupposes a kind of student involvement that is pedagogically useful. Making use of video, sound, and computer graphics, Schwartz imagines instruction in the natural sciences and the social sciences that will go beyond anything now available. In his view, a multimedia electronic environment can convey all the basic elements of education: the acquisition of facts, the learning of procedures for reaching significant goals, the understanding of methods through which these procedures are composed, the development of criteria that teach the student how to apply particular methods. "To reach higher levels of creativity," Schwartz writes, "one must become aware of many examples illustrating the use of specific methods and procedures, and come to perceive analogies between situations in which particular methods can be applied, and between methods themselves."

Does this imply that the move from small-scale laboratory experiments with electronic multimedia environments will soon find general public acceptance, attracting the interest of able scholars, educators, and artists? Schwartz has no answer to this; it all depends on whether profitable business opportunities for the use of such materials develop quickly. This will happen, he believes, if a powerful corporation sees the possibilities inherent in the system or if there is substantial governmental involvement. Schwartz clearly believes that such systems can be made to pay. This does not imply that other problems may not present themselves, including a lack of enthusiasm for such methods among educators and an unwillingness on the part of teachers to use them or even to learn how to use them. Still, more can be expected in the near future, particularly if modest smaller-scale opportunities are successfully pursued.

The "Dreamworld" essay provides an admirable introduction to Brian Winston's "A Mirror for Brunelleschi," which inquires into the impact that technology has had on the arts in recent times. While accepting that the electronic media, computing, videotape, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

like "have made it possible for artists to develop forms of expression that were previously inconceivable," that this has led to an expansion of our vision as human beings, that there are indeed new ways of seeing and hearing, Winston acknowledges another view—a more pessimistic one—that holds that machines are beginning to master humans, that true artistic creativity is being inhibited by them, that the art produced by machines is "soulless" and needs to be carefully monitored. Looking at both arguments—that of the utopians and that of the apocalyptists—the author dwells on a series of facts about technology that are too rarely acknowledged. To begin with, contrary to common opinion, the progress of technology is rarely very rapid. A great deal of time generally elapses between the invention of a process, even its patenting, and the actual commercial exploitation of a new invention. Why is this so? Essentially, Winston argues, because new technologies are not generally introduced into a society until a time when they are unlikely to disturb preexisting arrangements of all kinds. Technological change is generally slow, and it is not likely that it will soon speed up. The putative effects of new technology, so often exaggerated, are less substantial than is commonly believed. Because this is so, the implications of new technology for the arts may be somewhat less cataclysmic than pessimists anticipate.

Professor Winston offers six slogans that ought to guide those who are involved in what technology is doing to the arts. All emphasize that technology should not be viewed as an absolute, with insufficient regard given to societal conditions. Technology ought to be used in the arts, but there is no advantage to be gained from exaggerating its potential for change or for doing everything at once. Technology need not be seen as existing in some sort of opposition to the arts. It has always been useful to the arts, and will continue to be so. In this connection, it is important that not only the most novel technologies be taken into account; the more traditional ones must also be considered. The division that some perceive between the arts and technology is artificial and serves no useful purpose.

This *Dædalus* issue, more than many others, is characterized by a large concern with scenarios—with what may be, can be, but will not necessarily be. There is no intent here to prophesy the future, only an attempt to project futures that are reasonable to envisage and useful to explore. There is much in the contemporary world to suggest that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the period known in the West as "the postwar age" is indeed ending; the question for many is what is now likely to follow. Responses from a variety of perspectives are offered in this issue, tentatively in some instances, more assertively in others. The objective of them all, however, is the same: to understand the present better by thinking about possible futures.

In the last issue of *Dædalus*, "Past and Present," we published an essay by Dr. Lincoln Chen on "The AIDS Pandemic." Given the increasing prominence of the theme and the extent to which it preoccupies many who reflect on what may be impending, not least because of the rapid spread of the disease, we had expected to publish additional materials on the matter in this issue. It is a comment on how rapidly thinking on the subject is changing, and how much a new sensibility is developing in respect to the moral, political, social, and economic dimensions of the subject, that we have concluded that it would best be considered in a special issue of *Dædalus*. We are now exploring the possibility of publishing such an issue in the near future.

S.R.G.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Daniel Bell

The World and the United States in 2013

A Prefatory Note

THIS PAPER IS A CONCEIT in a double sense. The date 2013 is arbitrary, with no particular significance except that it is sufficiently distant in time to transcend immediate and particular issues. Second, this paper is an effort to identify significant *structural* changes in world society and the United States so as to provide a framework for analysis. It is *not* an effort to predict the future.

I assume that social analysis proceeds on three different levels: the *structural* (social arrangements rooted in demographic, technological, and economic institutions); the *political* (both the internal constellation of forces as well as the alliances and rivalries between nations); and the *cultural* (the ideologies and passions, the religious identifications and philosophical ideals that give meaning to people's beliefs). The three are not strongly linked, for society is not a "system" wherein a set of changes in one sector has determinate consequences in all others. Yet they are interdependent in strong or loose fashion. History looms behind all three in providing both the traditions and the immediate configurations that may or may not persist.

One begins with the structural level of social analysis to identify a matrix of activities that frame the renewable and reciprocal exchanges and transactions between peoples and that provide a set of anchorages that tend to give some degree of stability. Yet one must be mindful of several factors: changes in structural arrangements do not determine changes in other sectors, but pose questions that have to be responded to primarily by the political order, the control system of

Copyright © by Daniel Bell.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

any society today; changes in demographic and technological patterns tend to be quite disruptive, though on different time scales. While the structural changes are embedded in a *world* economy, the political orders are still *national*. This tension between those two, and the efforts of the nation-state to cope with the strong tides of the international economy (e.g., the internationalization of capital and its movements about the world in "real time"), frame the policy issues of the next twenty-five years.[1]

INTRODUCTION: A CAUTIONARY TALE

Can we predict the future? If we mean by that the exact configuration of world society, or even of the United States in 2013, not likely. The imponderables are primarily the political–ideological currents that are too complex and not easily charted.

Consider: Few analysts before World War II predicted the collapse of the old colonial systems—the British, French, Dutch empires—and the rapid emergence of the Third World and the vast number of new nations that are today relevant actors on the world scene. Few writers a decade ago predicted the rise of Khomeini and the transformation of Middle Eastern politics, or the use of terrorism as an instrument of national policy.

[1]This memorandum continues a practice of sketching scenarios at intermittent intervals of structural changes in world society. This exercise began twenty years ago in the work of the Commission on the Year 2000 of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, whose first reports appeared as a special issue of *Dædalus* (Summer 1967), which was republished, edited by myself, as *Toward the Year 2000* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969). In 1977, as the U.S. government representative, I prepared an extensive briefing paper for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development project *Interfutures*, entitled "Social Forecasting—A Matrix: 1978–2000." That paper lays out a basic methodology and a number of structural frameworks that form the background for the present paper. In that paper, there is an extensive analysis of security, military, and ideological questions that are eschewed in this paper. An essay based on that paper, entitled "The Future World Disorder: The Structural Context of Crisis," appeared in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1977) and is reprinted in my book, *The Winding Passage* (Cambridge, MA: Abt Books, 1980). In the book, I would call attention to the discussions on "Debt and Protectionism" and on the double bind of welfare and growth (pp. 214–19) as somewhat prescient.

The present exercise was commissioned by Gerald Rafshoon as the basis for a look at identifiable problems that lie ahead, and I am grateful to him for permission to publish it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The future: What will happen in Cuba after the demise of Castro? Will it be like Ghana after the passing of Nkrumah? Does anyone remember Nkrumah today? Yugoslavia lapsed into a lethargic Balkan state after the death of Tito. Will this be true of other autocratic states? Spain negotiated the difficult transfer to democracy after more than forty years of rule by Franco. Will this be true of Brazil or Argentina or Chile? Most important, perhaps: Can Gorbachev modernize and even liberalize the Soviet Union? We do not know.

Realignments: We tend to project the present configurations onto the future. But, by the mid-1990s and the year 2000, will there be a closer unity of the two Germanys and a realignment with the Soviet Union? This happened in Rapallo, in 1922, when the Soviet Union and Germany made a pact, and the Russians retrained the German army in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. And there was a Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939. Some such possibility is at least conceivable for two reasons: the Russians would benefit enormously from German technology; Germany, losing out in world markets, would have a huge customer in Russia, taking Russian raw materials in exchange. On the political level, this would certainly break up NATO (which is, in any case, becoming sclerotic) and give the Russians a security zone. Possible? Perhaps. Impossible? Not so.

One can do forecasting when one has an algorithm (a decision rule) that tells us into which "slots" phenomena may go. There are no algorithms in politics. The close monitoring of each state by informed persons may give us a better assessment of developments, such as the national security assessments made by the CIA, but the multiple interactions of all these situations are difficult to draw. The world society is like a set of giant Calder mobiles, shifting in uneasy balances in accordance with the winds of change, but the exact configurations are difficult to capture—especially for twenty-five years from now.

What, then, can one do? Presumably there are a few constants. Some individuals will take trends—demographic, resources, economic—and project these. In theory, we ought to know how many people will be on the earth in the year 2013, or what the state of our resources may be. Again, we cannot know. The difficulty is that few projections hold steady on a "straight-line" basis. Some changes do run on what is called a "logistic curve"; that is, an S-shaped curve characterized by rapid swarming at the start (as in an epidemic, when individuals infect one another), then tapering off after the midpoint is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reached (the "point of inflection") and the rate of growth slows in somewhat the reverse proportion of the earlier exponential growth. But social changes rarely run in as "smooth" a fashion as do physical phenomena. Consider the estimates of the U.S. population. Twenty-five years ago demographers projected a U.S. population of anywhere between 300 and 320 million by the year 2000, taking the baby boom of the post–World War II years as the norm. That birthrate, however, began to drop off. Today, it is more likely that the U.S. population will be approximately 265 million by the year 2000. World population, which has been growing rapidly, is already beyond the "point of inflection" and is tapering off in its rate of growth. We have no sense of what may be happening to the death rate in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa, where one out of ten persons is estimated to be carrying the AIDS virus.

You may well say, Enough—what, then, is it possible to do? Within a limited frame—yet, I believe, one challenging enough—one may be able to identify *basic structural frameworks* that are emerging, that form the matrix of people's lives. In the past, an obvious one was the change from an agrarian to an industrial society. At the turn of this century, almost half the population of the United States (the grandparents of many persons still alive) were born on farms; one-third of the labor force worked on farms. Today fewer than 4 percent of the labor force work on farms, and many of these people do not make their living exclusively from farming. The major reason for the change was the huge increase in agricultural productivity during World War II and after, when the introduction of chemical fertilizers and pesticides raised agricultural productivity between 6 and 9 percent a year. As a result, about 25 million persons left the farms. A large proportion of these were blacks who had been sharecroppers. Sharecropping was virtually eliminated, and blacks moved north into central cities such as Chicago, Saint Louis, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles. As a result of chemical technology, a large number of America's rivers were polluted by the runoff of fertilizers and pesticides. One can see, *in nunc,* how a small "social system" of interlinked changes works.

What *can* one say about the world and the United States in 2013? This memorandum is in two parts: the first deals with changes in world society; the second, with changes in the United States. Though an effort at forecasting, it is still a cautionary tale in the face of the technological

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"gee-whiz" and the kind of "future schlock" that has us hurtling into the future without a sense of the recalcitrances of people and the constraints of institutions that create turbulences in the winds of change.

THE WORLD IN 2013

I. STRUCTURAL CHANGE

1. *The Shift to the Pacific Basin*

The major question is whether, by the year 2013, the Pacific Basin will be the center of economic power. If so, the East Asian countries, led by Japan and China, the Southeast Asian nations, and the United States and U.S.S.R., will be the major economic players in the world.[2]

This is a change of extraordinary historical proportions. Historically, Europe has been the center of economic development and of civilization. The initial matrix was the Mediterranean Basin. After the seventeenth century, this shifted to the Atlantic rim and the Northern European countries. Since 1970 the shift has been to the Pacific. Today the great expansion in U.S. trade is with the Pacific Rim countries.

If there is an economic shift, which is probable, will there also be a political shift? And, if so, is it possible for a country to be a major political power without also, in time, becoming a major military power? Unlikely. What, then, of the reemergence of Japan, of the emergence of China, as important military powers?

The major "line of economic force" is from Japan to Australia. Japan has few natural resources and produces little food of its own. Australia has large deposits of coal and uranium; it is a major granary. We could have here, in a new form, the resumption of the old Japanese "East Asian Co-Prosperity Scheme."

There are questions about each of the major economic powers:

Japan. The country will have a very large aging population (more than 20 percent above age sixty-five). This may be the major constraint

[2]Though it is often forgotten, the Pacific Rim also touches eleven Latin American countries, six island nations (including Fiji, Papua–New Guinea, the Solomon Islands), six Asian countries (including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand), three newly industrialized countries (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong), and the five advanced industrial societies of the West, outside of the Soviet Union and China.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on its power. Also, there is the issue of whether the traditional elite structures, which have held the society together, will persist.

China. Much depends on whether Deng's policies will have continued. The major lines of China's historic emergence are clear. With more than a billion people, it may become the largest and strongest country on earth. There are two questions: whether so large a society can be managed effectively; whether large regional disparities between the rapidly developing coastal and delta regions and the more arid, poor western regions may not create new internal political difficulties.

Soviet Union. The major question regards its ability to manage the transition from a rigid planning system that is unresponsive to a complex economy. Politically, *in re* Asia: the question is whether Vietnam is viable, since the huge U.S.-built base at Cam Ranh Bay, one of the largest in the world, is now occupied by the Russians and will presumably remain under their control. With a large Soviet navy sitting athwart the Japan–Australia lifeline, we have a major explosive possibility.

United States. The question is one of economic strength and national will. The problems of the United States form a separate section, following this one.

Further: Political stability in Korea (can it manage a Brazil-like transition?) Political stability in Indonesia (potentially one of the most important countries in respect to numbers of people and resources, yet corrupt and subject to large communal strains).

Problematic issues are, of course, primarily political. The relations between China and India, China and Vietnam. A possible rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union. *N.B.: If the Soviet Union were able to weld a Eurasian bloc, from Germany to China, as the internal heartland of the world, this would be the major geopolitical change of the twenty-first century.* Possible? Perhaps.

The major point remains: we have the decline of the historic Euro-centered civilization and a shift to Asia as the matrix of activity in the twenty-first century.[3]

[3]The taste for large-scale historical speculation on this order is today out of fashion. Yet it is instructive to go back to writers of an earlier generation to read their ruminations. One of the most interesting commentators in this geopolitical mold was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2. *The New International Division of Labor*

The old division of labor, which shaped the world economy for the two hundred years from 1780 to 1980, created a set of *core*

Brooks Adams, the brother of Henry Adams, and in his own right a shrewd analyst of his day. In a number of books, Brooks Adams sought to chart the course of empire, using as his primary index the control of metals and minerals as the basis for military and economic power. In a book published in 1900, *America's Economic Supremacy,** Adams, after noting the passage of economic dominance from England to the United States, turned his attention to Asia—and Russia—as the next phase. He wrote:

> Americans seem, at last, to realize that the economic centre of the world is moving westward and has already probably entered the United States. . . . As a result of our high fortune Europe is steadily sinking into an economic inferiority, an inferiority especially marked in minerals which are the core of modern industry. For the first time in human experience a single nation this year leads in the production of the precious metals, copper, iron and coal; and this year also, for the first time, the world has done its banking to the west and not to the east of the Atlantic.

Pointing out that the major unexploited resources lay in Shansi and Hunan in eastern and central China, Adams then turned his attention to China as the focus of American–Russian rivalry:

> Not only from her geographical position, but from the magnitude of the stake she has at issue, Russia must play a leading part in the future of Asia. . . . The Russians have overflowed Persia, laid hands on [K]orea, and all signs pointed in the early spring to their design to occupy Peking, thus commanding Shansi and Honan. These provinces lie to the west and south of the capital, distant only some three or four hundred miles from ports, and containing the richest mines in the world.

Following a long discussion of the economic and political difficulties of Russia, Adams indicated the dilemmas Russia faces and speculated on the consequences of a possible move by Russia to dominate China:

> Such phenomena point to the conclusion that Russia must either undergo a social reorganization which will put her upon a cheaper administrative basis, or she must obtain fresh property which she can mortgage; that is to say, she must expand.
>
> What a social revolution Russia would portend transcends human foresight, but probably its effects would be felt throughout the world.
>
> Were the Russians and the Germans to coalesce in order to dominate Northern China . . . to the exclusion of the United States, a strain of a very serious nature might be put upon America.
>
> Our geographical position, our wealth, and our energy preeminently fit us to enter upon the development of Eastern Asia, and to reduce it to part of our economic system. And, moreover, the laws of nature are immutable. Money will flow where it earns most return, and investments once made are always protected. Evidently Americans cannot be excluded from China without a struggle. . . . The Chinese question must, therefore, be accepted as the great problem of the future, as a problem from which there can be no escape; and as these great struggles for supremacy sometimes involve an appeal to force, safety lies in being armed and organized against all emergencies.

---

*Brooks Adams, "Russia's Interest in China," in *America's Economic Supremacy* (New York: Macmillan, 1900), pp. 93–94; 217–18; 221–22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

manufacturing societies (the United Kingdom and Germany, then the United States, then the U.S.S.R. and Japan), together with a *periphery* of countries, principally in the Third World, that provided raw materials and primary products for the core countries. This is now breaking up and no simple, single pattern has emerged. Yet basic industrial manufacturing of standardized mass-production products is being "pulled out" of the Western world and located in East Asia and, to a lesser extent, in Brazil and the Mexican–Caribbean region.

The United States and Japan have become postindustrial societies; the predominant sectors are the service and high-tech sectors. By 1990, almost 75 percent of the U.S. labor force will be in services. The word "services" conjures up images of fast-food, low-wage employments. This is misleading. (In fact, the expansion of those sectors is in almost equal proportion to the decline of doing things at home, especially as more women go to work). The major services are financial services; professional and design services; human services (health, education, and social services); and, at the low end of the scale, personal services. The core of the postindustrial society is its professional and technical services.

There are, in effect, three kinds of manufacturing: first, a materials-based, standardized, low value-added operation in which labor costs are important; second, a flexible batch-production, specialized and customized, high value-added type of production; third, information-based industries (computers, telecommunications, scientific instruments, pharmaceuticals).

Illustration: The steel industry in the United States was in trouble because it was largely a standardized, low value-added based industry, making sheets, flats, bars, and rods for construction (buildings and bridges) and the manufacture of automobiles. First Japan and then Korea pulled these markets away. The strategy play in steel today is the production of specialty steels used in aircraft and missiles, or the operation of mini-mills capable of quick batch-production of customized orders.

In the new manufacturing, the proportion of raw materials steadily diminishes as a percentage of use and costs. In the advanced countries, the basic change is a move away from heavy, materials-intensive products and processes: one hundred pounds of optical fibers in a cable can transmit as many messages as one ton of copper wire.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Raw materials diminish in importance, not only because of miniaturization (e.g., chips) and the reduction of energy requirements, but also because of the revolution in materials science. One asks less for specific materials—tin, zinc, copper—and more for the properties needed (e.g., tensility, conductivity) and the material combinations that can provide those properties.

If the first change is in the multiple centers of manufacturing, the second is in the centers of finance: the United States becomes a headquarters economy for large parts of the world. London, halfway between New York and Tokyo (in time), becomes a financial services node.

The chief point is the *internationalization of capital.* This was foreshadowed before the end of the century by the vast hoard of "stateless" Eurodollars (dollars held by banks and countries outside the United States) that was not subject to U.S. financial regulation.

The existence of this vast hoard meant that banking and corporate groups could direct their capital in search of higher returns, even when such action went against the domestic interests of individual countries. *This means that few countries, if any, are able to control their own currency. There is a loss of one of the main levers of power and influence.*

The crucial question is what kind of international monetary system will now come into operation.

From the end of World War II until the mid-1970s, we had the Bretton Woods system: a gold-backed, dollar-based set of exchange rates. This was broken when the United States (first under Lyndon Johnson and then under Richard Nixon) "exported" U.S. inflation—created by the Vietnam War—to the rest of the world. When France began demanding gold instead of dollars, Nixon and John Connally (secretary of the treasury) reneged, breaking the link. Gold soared and the dollar alone became the international reserve currency, creating wild swings in prices for most countries when the dollar moves erratically. (Most prices—oil, for example—are denominated in dollars.)

Some new international monetary systems will have to emerge to form the backbone of the new international economy. Gold is a simple solution: prices are dominated in gold; gold is fungible. Yet, it is also subject to manipulation; it cannot function easily as an independent standard outside political controls. The Soviet Union

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and South Africa are large gold producers and are able to skew the standard. Also, gold is too rigid, largely unavailable to most of the smaller, less-developed countries.

Two other possibilities: a "basket" of major currencies, or a "basket of commodities" in which countries deposit commodities and draw credits for them. A far-out solution, yet rational: an international Federal Reserve–type system, as a supercontrol for the national central banks, performing a "Paul Volcker role" against the Treasury authorities, as proposed by Richard Cooper.

All this may seem esoteric; yet, without some new international structural arrangement, the world economy will remain erratic and unstable. A new monetary system does not rule out instabilities, but makes these more manageable within national contexts.

Three further points:

(a) Though we see the free movement (and volatile movements) of capital internationally, raw material prices—especially for metals—have been depressed, and may remain so until the end of the century, rising only slowly, thereby limiting the ability of many countries (particularly in Africa) to build a capital base for their own development.

(b) The "hidden iceberg." Though capital is able to move freely, most people do not. If jobs are being dispersed around the world, will people follow the jobs? In some countries they can. *Today there are 25 million young Filipinos at work abroad.* But how many Englishmen will move? How many Frenchmen? How many Americans?

(c) Will Europe become a genuine continental economy? The European community is a skeletal structure. The ecu is a European currency unit. As an integrated economy, Europe would match the Pacific Basin countries in production and output. The question is one of political will, and that is outside the scope of these assessments.

In short, we may see large knots of unemployment (in the United Kingdom today, it is about 11 percent). The unemployed are not easily absorbed, cannot move, and the problem may dissipate only slowly as the population ages.

3. The Third Technological Revolution

By 2013 the third technological revolution—the joining of computers and telecommunications (image television, voice telephone, data

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

information computers, text facsimile) into a single yet differentiated system, that of the "wired nation" and even the "world society"—will have matured.

The first technological revolution, two hundred years ago, was the application of steam power to transportation (railroads, steamships), to deep-shaft mining (steam-driven water pumps), and to factory machine production.

The second technological revolution, one hundred years ago, was the spread of electricity (e.g., coded messages on wires, telegraph, and telephone; lighting, transforming our sense of night and day; power for turbines and elevators, allowing construction of skyscrapers) and of chemistry, which for the first time allowed men to make products outside nature (e.g., synthetics, petrochemical products, plastics).

The third technological revolution will be aided by natural language communications, machine translation, and certain expert systems. We will have widespread robotics, electronic mail and messages, information retrieval on call, services organized through interactive terminals. The range of possible and probable changes is enormous; they have already (too often in "gee-whiz" fashion) filled many a television program.[4]

[4]A technological revolution "matures" when one can chart its diffusion rates and then track the social changes that are reworked because of the technology involved. There are three kinds of technologies in respect to their impacts: *Transforming technologies,* which replace previous modes (as the motor replaced the horse, or the transistor replaced the vacuum tube), creating large structural changes; *domain technologies,* which extend existing technologies' range of uses (e.g., cellular telephones); and *niche technologies*, which do specialized tasks. In looking ahead, one can identify three major technological changes in the offing, each moving ahead in the innovation–production–diffusion cycle:

(i) *Optical systems.* These are primarily domain technologies, such as fiber optics replacing copper in transmission, or optical (i.e., laser) disks competing with electronic systems in information storage and retrieval.

(ii) *Materials science.* Primarily ceramics, again a domain technology.

(iii) *Superconductivity.* Potentially a transforming technology. If some of the technological difficulties can be solved, we may see a huge change in our use of energy. Today, in many areas of the country (e.g., California or the South), utilities need large standby capacity to take care of peak loads, as in the summertime. (In California, electricity costs twenty cents per kilowatt hour in the summer and four cents per kilowatt hour in the winter, to the companies.) With large magnetic coils, one could store electricity in regions and in homes; more importantly, one could transmit electricity with little cost. Thus one could have a large number of windmills in Montana (or Canada) and transmit the electricity they generate to other regions of the country, where it could then be stored for seasonal or peak usage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Since I am looking at a macrosocial canvas, let me indicate the kind of change in the offing—the elimination of geography as a controlling variable. To illustrate: The changing nature of markets.

What is a market? Historically, a market was a *place* where roads crossed, rivers crossed: merchants and caravans stopped en route, farmers brought their food, artisans their skills. In the new economy this is no longer true. Take the spot oil market. It is called "the Rotterdam market." The reason for this is that tankers with capacities above their contracted deliveries, with oil to be sold "on the spot," would come to Rotterdam because of its wide, protected port and large storage capacity. There, brokers would make their deals and reroute the tankers to the new destinations. It is still called the Rotterdam spot market for oil. But it is no longer in Rotterdam. Where is it? Everywhere. It is a telex–radio–computer *network*. Brokers are all around the world, making their trades through the network and redirecting ships on the high seas to new destinations.

Work increasingly becomes detached from place, operations from their central headquarters (CitiBank Visa in Sioux Falls, American Express in Fort Lauderdale). Communications networks, interactive in real time, with bursts of data speeding thousands of miles, mean the breakup of old geographical habits and locations. Thus we see a change of extraordinary historical and sociological importance—*the change in the nature of markets from "places" to "networks."*

4. Frontiers

The major frontier, of course, is *space*. The Paine Commission in the United States has proposed a forty-year program for the exploration and *colonization* of space. It is possible that there may be permanent space stations in orbit by 2013.[5] It is even possible that there will be, as in the Antarctic, some outposts on Mars. There are many projects for advantageous manufacture in space (e.g., pharmaceuticals). There are designs for solar panels to redirect energy from the sun, just as most satellites in space will be powered by solar reflectors.

Biotechnology: the control of organisms through genetic rearrangements. We are still far away, factually and commercially, from

[5]The construction of a space station was planned by NASA for 1993 or 1994, based on a cost estimate of $8 billion, but a study completed in 1987 indicates that the cost would probably be $16 billion. How this may offset the timing is problematic.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a biotechnological "fourth" revolution. Most of the energies in biotechnology today go into agriculture (where gluts have halted work) and into drugs. The advances in medicine and in diagnostics are certain. Beyond that are the more difficult questions about such issues as changes in genetic constitutions (e.g., growth hormones), fetal genetic identifications, *in vitro* births, cloning.

5. Time Bombs: Polity and Demography

So far, the thrust of this memorandum has tended to be—cautiously—on the positive side, because of the underlying technological possibilities. Yet the realization of these may be thwarted by two perhaps intractable difficulties. Most people have tended to focus on problems related to resources (food, energy, water, metals and minerals). I think their fears, as I will try to show briefly later, are somewhat misplaced. There are, however, two *structural* problems that constitute threatening time bombs. One is the political structure; the other, a peculiar and somewhat hidden time bomb, derives from demography. Both merit discussion.

Time Bomb 1: Polity. We have today an international economy, heavily interdependent and almost integrated, tied together in "real time." With some major changes in transportation, it could be tied together physically as well. Consider the possibility of supersonic ballistic aircraft. The Concorde today is limited in its speed; but the development of ballistic aircraft would mean that the distance from New York to Tokyo, or from London to Tokyo, would be about five hours. The distance from Tokyo to Sydney would be about three hours; from New York to Sydney, about five hours. The world is being banded together by communication, possibly by transportation.

Yet while the international economy is increasingly integrated, many polities are fragmenting. The process is accordion-like, expanding and contracting at particular moments. In Belgium the fragmentation is linguistic and national; in Canada it is linguistic; in Northern Ireland it is religious; in Spain it is based on local nationalism; in Nigeria it is tribal. In any of these nations the divisions follow the historic "fault lines" of these countries. But because it seems to be happening in so many different places, one ought to suspect a common underlying structural problem. It is, I believe, this: *the*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nation-state is becoming too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life.

It is too small for the big problems of life because there are no effective international mechanisms to deal with the problems of capital flows, commodity imbalances, the loss of jobs, and the several demographic tidal waves that will be developing in the next twenty years.

It is too big for the small problems of life because the flow of power to a national political center means that the national center becomes increasingly unresponsive to the variety and diversity of local needs, and local centers lose the ability to effectively control resources and make their own decisions.

In short, there is a mismatch of scale.

A historical retrospect: What was the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt? For some it was "creeping socialism," for others it was "saving capitalism." Perhaps so, but not the central point. In effect, and without much forethought and planning, *it was a response to a change in scale.* From 1900 to 1930, there was a growth in national markets and in national corporations. But the effective economic and countervailing power remained in the hands of the states. What the New Deal did was to create effective national mechanisms to deal with national economic problems: a Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate financial markets; a National Labor Relations Board for collective bargaining; a national social security system; federal help for unemployment assistance.

There is no such matching of scales today. And, given the multiplication of national sovereignties as a result of the breakup of the old colonial system, it is not likely to happen soon. The United Nations is ineffective; the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and the International Labor Organization are even more so. In short, there are few, if any, effective international economic or coordinating agencies to match international economic power. And the national political state becomes increasingly ineffective in coping with this problem. *So we see international economic integration and national political fragmentation.*

What have I left out? The future of U.S.–U.S.S.R. relations, the United States and Latin America, the Middle East, Africa as a "basket case," South Africa and the potential for political explosion, rising ethnic tensions around the world, nuclear proliferation. . . .

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Enough, you say. Fair enough. But let me point out again the logic of what I am trying to do. I am not trying to provide a comprehensive overview of world society. My purpose is to identify relevant frameworks in which one may see emergent *structural* changes in world society. Most of the tensions I have listed are primarily political, and subject to a different kind of analysis.

Time Bomb 2: Demography. World population today is about 5 billion persons. Given present projections, it could double in forty years, to about 10 billion. By the year 2000 it would be 6 billion. Can we feed all these people? Will there be sufficient jobs? These are the ways the questions are usually put. I suggest that both the estimates and the questions are misplaced. They are projections, and for a large variety of reasons, they will not hold. (They are not holding, for in the logistic-curve plotting, the rate of growth is already tapering off.) The question of food (see below) is equally misplaced.

Are there, then, no problems? Not at all. There are several distinct problems, one of which, in fact, will constitute a threatening time bomb in the next twenty years.

One should say, first, that we have to disaggregate growth figures. In Europe there will probably be an absolute decline in population. This is already happening in West Germany and in Hungary, and will soon occur in a few other countries. In Africa, and to a lesser extent in Latin America, populations are still surging ahead. The problem in these countries derives less from total numbers—in Africa the ratio of people to land available for cultivation is still manageable—than from the fact of *urbanization,* the crowding into cities.

Thus, one crucial problem is the growth of the megapolis. We know of the huge urban agglomerations in the New York metropolitan area, in Tokyo–Yokohama, and in London, where clusters contain about 20 million persons each. It is in the Third World cities that there is likely to be a problem: Mexico City (30 million by the year 2000); Shanghai (25 million); Bombay and Jakarta (about 17 million each). In these cities the problems of infrastructure and services will be severe, as they now are in Cairo and Calcutta.

Still, even that is not the main time bomb. It is this: *the widening gap between the age cohorts in different parts of the world.* To break down the jargon: In all of Africa, the proportion of young people under fifteen years of age is between 40 and 50 percent of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

population. In almost all of Latin America—in particular, in Central America and the Caribbean—the proportion of young persons is about 40 percent of the population. In most of Asia, the proportion is between 30 and 40 percent. In the United States and Canada, the proportion is about 22 percent. With the exception of Ireland, in Europe it is about 20 percent or below.

These population imbalances mean that, in the next twenty years, we will see demographic tidal waves sweeping the world. In the heavily weighted countries, this will mean more than a doubling of the rates of entry into the labor forces.

Consider Mexico. Mexico today has a population of 80 million, 42 percent of whom are under fifteen years of age. What will happen to these young people? Unemployment is effectively at roughly 20 percent (including underemployment). The capital stock cannot be expanded easily. Inflation has been rampant. Logically, there are only three things Americans can do to help the Mexicans:

(a) give them money (capital)—which they cannot now absorb because of a heavy past debt;

(b) buy their goods—which may take jobs away from Americans;

(c) take their people—which we have already done to some extent, though many are illegal aliens.

In the quarter-century after World War II, Europe had the same problem. Yet because of an expanding economy, the northern countries took "guest workers" from Yugoslavia, Turkey, southern Italy, and Greece. Today some countries are trying to expel these workers or their children, while large clusters remain (such as the Turkish populations of Berlin and Munich). The children born in Germany of Turkish parents, never granted German citizenship, are today vulnerable.

Mexico, then, is but one example of a major worldwide problem. Less than a year ago, because of a fall in oil revenues, Nigeria expelled somewhere between half a million and a million Ghanaians within a two-week period (no one has precise figures). The world paid little attention, yet the situation may be repeated endlessly.

Schadenfreude (a German word that means glee over someone else's misfortunes—in this case, the Soviet Union's). The European part of the Soviet Union follows the pattern of a declining population

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

growth. The Central Asian sections are spurting ahead at an almost 3 percent annual increase. Those areas are largely Muslim. By the turn of the century, the Russian population will probably be a minority in the Soviet Union. Given the age distributions, perhaps 35 percent of the Soviet Army will then be Muslim.

The Soviets are in a bind: whether to take populations from Asia into their European land mass, very difficult because of the lack of housing and services, together with the prospect of the multiplication of ethnic tensions; or to allocate large resources to expand economic activities in the Asian areas, to provide jobs for a young population. This requires a diversion of present resources; also the possible loss of some political control of those regions. (This may provide one reason for a Soviet move toward rapprochement with Germany.)

To repeat: There is a demographic problem, but not the one that is usually given. However, the one described above may be much more devastating, far more explosive.

An addendum: To the extent that population is power—or poverty—by the year 2000, 70 percent of the Third World populations will be concentrated in eight countries only: China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Mexico.

II. RESOURCES

By "resources" I mean food, water, energy, metals and minerals, forests and wetlands, the ozone problem. Contrary to received and popular opinion, these are not crucial shock areas, or even major constraints. I shall have to be abrupt, and even preemptory: The simple point is that all the estimates, from the Club of Rome's to Global 2000's, are based on projections; they overestimate the demand side and are often wildly wrong on the supply side.

Take one example as indicative of the logic and its shortcomings. The Club of Rome achieved notoriety with its "Limits to Growth" studies in 1973 because its publications coincided with the oil shock, and thus the fear of running out of oil. Its first candidate, however, was copper; it predicted the early exhaustion of that resource. Within a few years, however, the price of copper doubled. At that high price, Israel, Panama, and Zaire opened long-dormant mines (dormant in Israel since King Solomon's time), and with new techniques began to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extract a large supply of copper from low-grade ore (porphyry copper). Also, with copper at that high price, users began to substitute plastic for copper tubing and to find other substitute materials. The price of copper broke. A few years ago, Sohio bought Kennicott Copper, and Arco bought Anaconda, thinking that copper prices might rise again. They broke badly. The reason: the substitution of optical fibers for copper. AT&T today is sitting on the biggest copper hoard in the world. Arco and Sohio have taken losses of several billion dollars each. There is today a glut of copper. The Monetary Fund Index of metal prices was, in 1987, some 40 percent lower than in 1980. Thus the cautionary tale.

Food. Ten years ago there were only about five major exporters of cereals and grains: the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, and, marginally, one or two other countries. Today, almost every country in the world is just about self-sufficient in food, and seeking export markets. India is a prime example. The only major importer of grains today is the Soviet Union, and that too may change.

Two points: Global 2000 concluded that the world demand for food would increase steadily for twenty years, that food production would fall in the developed countries, that real food prices would double. This was in 1980. But global food production has increased everywhere, particularly in the United States, where farmers went deeply into debt to expand their acreage. Today we have a worldwide glut.

How about famines? Until the twentieth century, a famine was recorded almost every year somewhere in the world. Today famines are rare. The one in Ethiopia and surrounding regions was caused by a combination of drought *and the destruction of the small-trading storage system* by the political authorities.

This is the key point in almost all instances: the problems of food production are *political.* In Ethiopia, Mengistu destroyed the old system in order to resettle populations; a famine that might have been averted, spread. Burma, traditionally a rice-exporting country, has had to import rice since the military dictatorship of Ne Win; yet the topography of the country remains the same. The wheat-growing areas of the Soviet Union are geographically akin to those of the North Dakota–Saskatchewan region; we produce gluts, they import. The reason (weather aside) is that collectivization does not work, and the Russians are trying slowly to get out of that bind.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While famine is not a "problem," malnutrition surely is; but this derives from poverty, and the failures of economic growth; those are political and cultural.

Energy. Whether we will "run out" of oil by the year 2013 is problematic. Present projections indicate an oil crisis in the early to middle 1990s. We do not know what new sources may be available directly (e.g., China) or through better extraction (shale, geothermal). That is not the issue. Better management and conservation have been the most effective means of utilizing energy. By the year 2013, there will be new technologies on the horizon: light-emitting diodes, which will replace light bulbs and traffic lights; superconductivity, which will enlarge power grids, possibly through windmills and solar panels.

Water. A growing problem, especially in the United States, but largely a problem because of waste and mismanagement and pollution. Again, not a resource problem primarily, but an economic and political one: the need for better management of scarce resources.

III. A SUMMATION

Can one draw an integral, coherent picture of the world in 2013? Given simply the political imponderables sketched here, the answer is probably no.

Can one identify major policy issues? If one wishes to concentrate on the principal problems, the most explicit ones would be the demographic, age-cohort imbalances. The most diffuse yet crucial one would be the political fragmentation. Of the structural changes, the rise of the Pacific Rim is clearly the major change in the offing, and it is of extraordinary historic and economic importance.

THE UNITED STATES IN 2013

The outlines of the United States in 2013, and its problems, can already be seen from the *chiaroscuro* sketch of the world in 2013. We are not self-sufficient or self-sustaining. We are not immune to the shocks of the world society. *In fact, we are ever more vulnerable—and that is the most obvious starting point.* Most of the earnings of the major corporations depend on investments and sales abroad; large amounts of foreign capital are now invested here, inextricable from domestic capital; the capital markets are international; increasingly, most U.S. enterprises abroad will not be multinational, but will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be joint ventures with foreign companies. In this memorandum, I will deal, necessarily briefly, with five topics: the changed character of the U.S. economy (implicitly, where people will work and the kind of work they will do); the administrative–management structure of the U.S. political system; demographics (basically, the changed plural character of the society, and the role of an aging population); family structure; and, finally, a four-tiered class structure.

I. THE NEW ECONOMY

Geographically, we are becoming a bicoastal economy. The sixteen coastal states contain 42 percent of the nation's population today. In the 1980s, this grouping accounted for 70 percent of the real growth in wages and partnership income.

This framework will continue: in effect, the Midwestern states, with two exceptions, may be stuck in an economic "long wave" and sit in the trough. The reasons are obvious: the decline of standard manufacturing, of farming, and of energy (Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma).

Think of it, however, in more historical and graphic terms. Historically, almost all major cities were located near water, since water was the basis of bulk transportation and of roads that circumvented hills and mountains. (Can one think of any major city not located on an ocean, lake, or river?) The location of cities in an industrial society was determined by an interplay of water transport and resources. Look at a map of the United States and zero in on the industrial heartland around the Great Lakes region—Superior, Huron, Michigan, Erie, Ontario—with the Saint Lawrence River moving out to the Atlantic, and, below, the Ohio River flowing into the Mississippi.

Resources. There was iron ore in the Mesabi range above Lake Superior, and coal in southern Illinois and western Pennsylvania. The combination of iron ore and coal gave us steel, and from that followed auto production, manufacture of rubber products, and other industries.

Look again at the map; the industrial heartland of the United States is defined by the major cities of that region: Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, Pittsburgh. They are all in danger of decay unless

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they can transform themselves into financial or high-tech concentrations. Pittsburgh is doing well, with Carnegie-Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh as resources. Chicago is a great transportation hub. Detroit and Cleveland have real problems.

Consider the locations of cities, industries, and services. Central cities exist for glamor and status reasons, but operations decentralize. AT&T and IBM build highly visible office buildings in New York, but IBM is still largely concentrated in Westchester County, and AT&T in northern New Jersey. Many of the Fortune 500 companies, once located centrally in New York, have moved away: General Electric, General Foods, Nabisco, and American Airlines are a few examples. Banking and financial services have taken up the slack.

In the Midwest, there have been two significant exceptions to the decline. One is the Minneapolis–Saint Paul region, which has been a center for high-tech and computer technology. The other is the forty-mile strip from Detroit to Ann Arbor, where two-thirds of all robots and computer-aided tools are now made by *small* firms (two thousand machine shops) and nine graduate engineering schools (with five hundred research and development centers).

Look at the new patterns. Route 128, a circumferential route around Boston, with its major new firms (Digital Equipment, Wang, Prime Computer, Data General) located around the rim, and the software firms still in the center, close to the universities. Silicon Valley, stretching from San Francisco to San Jose. In New Jersey, Route 1, from Newark to Trenton, with Princeton at its center, is the fastest-growing region in the United States.

To the extent that the new communications technology makes interaction easier and less costly, we may also see the breakup of existing work patterns (e.g., more people working part-time at home, new patterns of hourly work). The idea of "cottage industries" is too slick and simple. There will be many more-variegated patterns.

The 1980 U.S. Census has a new definition of a metropolitan area: it is characterized not only by central cities but by "commuting webs." People—especially those with children—move yet farther out to get more space.

New England has been the model of transition. Historically, it was a light manufacturing center, basically producing textiles and shoes, but these industries are lost. Today it has become a major high-tech center. Can other regions do the same? That depends on the world

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economy and international political stability. There are huge markets for the new technologies—simply to "wire" most nations. Yet who can say whether political stability can be achieved in the Middle East, or Africa, or Latin America?

One point worthy of repetition: most of the high-tech developments center around university complexes: MIT–Harvard; Stanford; Princeton; Ann Arbor; Minneapolis; Pittsburgh–Carnegie Mellon. The health and vitality of these large university research complexes, now multiplied because of the health sciences and biotechnology, should be a focus of concern.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE ANACHRONISM

The great strength of the United States is its political stability. Defeated candidates do not take up arms; armies do not rule; presidents leave office. Foreign investors, particularly from Latin America or the Middle East, invest here for obvious reasons of safety and stability.

Yet, to refer back to a previous theme: *the national state has become too big for the small problems of life.* The New Deal was adaptive in its time. The need now is for effective decentralization. Without it, the United States in the year 2013 is in disarray.

Successive administrations, from Nixon to Reagan, have talked of returning functions to the states and counties. But what sense does this make? We are a nation of fifty states. In Texas, the distance between Brownsville in the south to Amarillo in the northwest, or from Amarillo in the northwest across the state to Texarkana in the northeast, is the same as the distance between Brussels and Moscow! Yet we also have small states: Delaware, Rhode Island, Connecticut. The population of New York is greater than the populations of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland combined. The population of California will soon be greater than that of the Benelux triad.

States are supposed to be the units for health-care cost containment, but health complexes split across, say, the Georgia–South Carolina line and are compelled to go to two different legislatures with differing guidelines. In many states, there are fourteen levels of government, from village to state, that voters have to decide on. The New York metropolitan area has more than fourteen hundred local

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

governments—villages, townships, park districts, sewage districts—each with some degree of administrative power.

There are three thousand counties in the United States. Most of those in the Midwest were laid out on a twenty-five-square-mile grid, so that anyone could go from any part of the surrounding country to the county seat, where the courthouse was located, in one day by horse and buggy. There are fifty thousand school districts in the United States, many (again, in the Midwest) with few pupils, who are bused to other districts; yet these districts are still eligible for the equality of government grants.

All this is a "dull" subject. Yet the problem of providing services to people in an effective way, of being responsive to the diversity of needs—from care for the elderly, concentrated in some areas, to the needs of minorities in other places—becomes increasingly difficult to manage. And the costs mount dreadfully.

Clearly, no one is going to do away with the states, and for good traditional and emotional reasons. Yet various bistate compacts and regional forms of organization must be worked out so that we do not become too lopsided and rigid in our structures.

III. DEMOGRAPHICS

Again, "dull." Again, crucial. Again, the basic frame for all subsequent analysis.

1. Aging

Today some 28 million Americans are sixty-five years of age or older, making up 12 percent of the population. Given the "bulge" of the baby boom years, by the year 2020, the elderly will number about 60 million and make up about 20 percent of the population. Not only will there be more Americans; they will, of course, live longer. In 1960, a sixty-five-year-old person could expect to live few years more. Today, he can expect to live almost seventeen more years. By 2013, we have no exact sense, given the uncertainties of medical advances, what the life expectancy may be—but it is obvious that increased longevity is likely.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A new problem: People over the age of eighty-five now make up only 9 percent of the elderly population. By 2013, this may grow to 17 percent. Thus, we may easily see four- and five-generation families!

The consequences of these changes are varied but visible. At one end of the scale, increased chronic dependency and greater health-care needs of the elderly, with a growing burden on the young; at the other, a greater proportion of working-age persons to retired persons (more older persons will work, since Congress has now suspended even the compulsory retirement limit of age seventy).

2. *The New Immigrants and the New Minorities*

The United States has always been a nation of immigrants. Today the mix is changing. Half the increases in population will be coming from immigrants. Given the changes in the laws, the majority are from Latin America; a small but important number are from from Asia.

By the year 2013, the older white population will be about 74 percent of the total population of about 265 million. Blacks will make up about 13 percent, with 35 million; Hispanics about 10 percent, with 25 million. As a group, the fertility of Hispanic women is 60 percent higher than the U.S. average. The Hispanic population has grown by about 40 percent since 1970 because of fertility and immigration.

Seventy percent of all Hispanics reside in four states: California, Texas, New York, and Florida. But "Hispanic" is too loose a designation for a population that consists mainly of three different blocs with three different problems: Mexican-Americans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans. There is also a smaller number of Hispanics from Haiti and Central America. Three-fourths of all Mexican-Americans live in California and Texas; 60 percent of the Cubans live in Florida; 60 percent of all Puerto Ricans live in New York and New Jersey. The Hispanic population is very young: the median age is twenty-three as against thirty for the United States as a whole. Hispanics tend to marry earlier. By 2010, the majority of the population in California and Texas may be Hispanic. Except for the Cubans, educational and income attainments are low for Hispanics. Thirty-five percent drop out of high school; only 3 percent are employed as professionals.

The mix in the cities is changing rapidly. Since 1960, New York City has lost 276,000 non-Hispanic whites. In that same period, it has added 415,000 Hispanics and 145,000 blacks. Consider these figures:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cities and Minority Populations (1985)
(in millions)

	Total Population	Minority Population	Minority as % of Total
New York	7.3	4.0	55
Philadelphia	1.3	.690	53
Baltimore	.715	.379	53
Chicago	3.08	1.875	61
Detroit	1.3	.809	62
Cleveland	.545	.301	55

Given the bunching of young among blacks and Hispanics, given the relative lack of education (only 9 percent of blacks and 8 percent of Hispanics have college degrees), given the breakup of families and the rate of illegitimacy (see below), *as of today*, one can gain some sense of the magnitude of the problems ahead.

IV. THE FAMILY

Dramatic, but confusing. The last thirty years have seen a sensational set of changes in family structure and patterns. What will the family be like in 2013? Given the magnitude of the shift that has already occurred, one can only predict a continuation of the present pattern. Consider these statistics:

(a) In 1950, a man at work with a wife and two children at home was representative of 70 percent of the labor force. Today that figure is 15 percent.

(b) In 1950 only 21 percent of married women were working. By 1980, that figure had risen to 50 percent. Among married women with children, the rates are higher. In 1979 (the most recent figures) 60 percent of married women with children aged six to seventeen were working.

The instability of contemporary families: it is not only the high divorce rates, but the pattern of divorces. Younger couples not only divorce more readily, they do so earlier in their marriages.

(a) Among women in their mid-fifties, one-fourth of the marriages had broken up by the time the women (on average) had reached age

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forty-three. Among women today in their mid-thirties, one-fourth of the marriages had ended by age twenty-nine. Thus, increasingly, many children spend part of their youth in single-parent families, and then in "blended" families with stepparents and stepsiblings.

(b) What does this foreshadow? Fifty-six percent of first marriages by women aged between thirty-five and thirty-nine in 1985 are projected to end in divorce some time before the end of their lives.

Illegitimacy. Already a national scandal. In 1984, unmarried women gave birth to 770,000 babies, or 21 percent of all births that year. Among blacks, the figure was 58 percent.

Structure. With more children born to unmarried couples, or those whose marriages dissolve when they are young, 50 percent of all black children and 15 percent of all white children live in fatherless families. Black six-year-olds will live almost 60 percent of their youth with only one parent (as against 22 percent in 1970). The white six-year-old will live 30 percent of his or her time in a fatherless or one-parent family, as against only 8 percent of the time for whites now in their mid-thirties.

One would have to devote considerable space to an elaboration on the full implications of these statistics: the consequences for the cost of natal care, of welfare and dependency, of education, and so on.

V. THE FOUR-TIERED CLASS STRUCTURE

Statistics again, as the skeletal structure for understanding. (I am following the census distributions and categories of 1980.)

	No. in Millions	% Black
Managerial and Professional	22.6	5.7
Technical, Sales, Administrative Support	30.8	8.0
Service	13.6	17.5
Farming	3.0	7.7
Skilled Craft and Repair	13.5	7.2
Semiskilled and Laborers	20.0	14.3
Unemployed	8.0	20.0

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The most striking figures, of course, are in the first two categories. More than half the labor force is in white-collar, middle-class, and education-requiring categories. The semiskilled are roughly 20 percent.

What can one say about the future? The basic blue-collar class, which today is about 20 percent of the labor force and concentrated in manufacturing, will decrease to about 10 percent by the year 2013 as manufacturing employment goes down. The growing classes are managerial and professional, and service—services here being food, cleaning, personal (barbers, etc.), and security—which all together rose 50 percent in the decade!

Given the basic economic and technological trends, one other crucial point is clear: since we are becoming a service economy, the growths are at the two ends: professional services (of the kinds described earlier; i.e., financial, professional, design) and services of the kind noted above. The biggest growth in employment has come in small businesses rather than in large corporations, and this will continue. (From 1970 to 1980, 14.3 million new jobs were created in services, and almost no net increase occurred in manufacturing employment.)

To stand back, however, and draw the picture more sharply, I suggest that there will be a four-tiered system, taking this shape:

(a) an upper middle class of professional and managerial workers, comprising about 25 percent of the population;

(b) a middle class of technical, administrative support, and skilled workers, representing 35 percent of the population;

(c) a service class, being about 25 percent of the population; and

(d) an underclass of about 15 percent, comprising individuals with no steady employment, doing odd jobs, menial labor, and the like.

This class structure also reflects racial divisions. The largest proportion of service jobs, and of the underclass, will be black and non-Cuban Hispanic. The concentrations in the several states and the central cities also will provide an explosive mixture politically.

Historically, political theory has been grounded in the proposition that the "have-nots" would be the major proportion of the population, always threatening the "haves." Marxist theory recalibrated this notion to stipulate a majority of workers, who would be the lower class. Both propositions are now false. Yet the problem remains.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We may have, occupationally and psychologically, a majority of "haves." Will they wish to support the "have-nots," especially those who are problems of welfare and dependency? The working class may shrink as a significant group, but the rise of a new service class, with an underclass, will provide new tensions.

The cutoff points are the educational attainments. And here again, the blacks and Hispanics are at a disadvantage. One might be able to start a small business in the service lines (cleaning, personal, and similar types) without much education, but even running a small business today requires some skill in the use of business machines. The larger number of new-type service employments (i.e., in professional, computer-related, and design services) are surely above the cutoff point in their clear-cut educational requirements.

In broad: traditional class tensions may be replaced by racial and ethnic tensions. (Yet while blacks and Hispanics are a minority in the United States, whites are a minority worldwide, and that too may be an explosive problem.)

Sociologically, the most significant development is the breakup of the idea of the middle class. The term "middle class" was always amorphous, yet possessed a psychological reality in the self-definition of most persons in American society. But there are fewer anchorages today for such self-definition. The breakup of the traditional family has meant that the real incomes of the middle class have become skewed; these divergences will continue. Home ownership, the most important anchorage of the last forty years, has become difficult to achieve. The rising costs of services, particularly for working women, raise questions as to what is a "middle-class" standard of living. Cultural and social identifications may become more important than occupational status (except for those at the top of the four-tiered structure) as a source of cohesion and psychological identity.

We may see, equally, a new politics whose dimensions cut across each other and make continuing groupings difficult. The most important social change in this regard is the new role of women. On the professional level, women are concentrated more in the health and teaching and public sector professions than are men, and employment in those areas is highly dependent on public funding. Generational politics becomes more important: the elderly are now an increasingly cohesive bloc whose interests are largely untouchable. The increasing mobilization of the minority groups is more certain.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Regional issues will become more salient. The polarization of society based on educational cutoffs may increase populist sentiments. The down-sizing of the manufacturing corporation and the spread of more small businesses will increase the hopes and the expectations of independence for many persons, yet the short half-life of many small firms and the upheavals in corporate structures will intensify the insecurity of employment and incomes.

Sociology, which once could give us intelligent reportage, today has narrowed into minute quantitative research with little resonance or capacity for generalization. Yet the traditional social structure of the United States is breaking up, and we have little mapping of the present and fewer guides for the future.

VI. A SUMMATION

I have sought to provide some facts and some analysis. I have not been prescriptive, though some directions are implied by the formulation of the problems (e.g., calling for a more functionally regional set of administrative structures to carry out the necessary decentralization of government activities in the United States).

The key variable is *scale.* Societies work (under normal circumstances—not, as in the Middle East, where irrational passions rule) when the scales of institutions match—particularly economic and political institutions. Increasingly, these are out of sync. On the international canvas, we need the creation of new institutions, politically, that can match the new scale of economic activities, beginning with the monetary system. At the domestic end, we need a better definition of what kind of governmental activities and resources should be committed, and at what levels, to make government responsive to services that people need. What is a legitimate neighborhood function? Should it be entrusted to a larger entity? Many services now performed by government for historic or political reasons can probably be better performed by the market. Some market activities have spillover effects that may require better government frameworks. These are problems that call for political skills and political management.

I have said little of Europe, or Africa, or Latin America—which may lead to the false conclusion that I see them as now outside the stage of history. Not at all. Apart from the overriding political issues,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which stretch beyond the scope of this exercise, one may speculate that for a North American (as well as for natives of other regions), the very nature of the structural economic issues may force a movement toward *continental* economies as the new units of trade and management.

Consider the North American continent: Canada has the resources (timber, energy, metals), the United States the technological skill and educational resources, and Mexico the labor for such a new structure. Treating the area as a common economic region certainly would not solve all problems, but it would be a start—certainly preferable to protectionism. For Canada, there would be the risk of a further erosion of national identity, since it is a country three thousand miles wide and only one hundred miles deep. Greater economic integration with the United States might also lead to a new kind of fragmentation, with Nova Scotia becoming most directly tied to Boston and the New England region, Toronto to the U.S. Midwest, and Vancouver and British Columbia becoming entwined with Seattle and the Pacific Northwest. South of the border, we could see Mexico spilling over into southern California and southwest Texas, perhaps in the process creating new bilingual and binational strains. Here, as in so many instances, the economic logic is confounded by the political and cultural.

The vision of Europe as a single economic and cultural entity has long been the dream of many—particularly as an economic and political counterweight to both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and now also to the Pacific Basin. In the instances of Western Europe and Japan, the economic issues have been subordinated to security and military issues, as both areas have largely been under the Soviet gun and the American shield. If security and military tensions were to diminish, the economic and cultural logics might have freer play: the possibility of a European community could be a reality by 2013.

Regionalism, equally, has been the hope of many Latin Americans, a hope that has been stretched taut by Argentina's failure to develop at one end and Brazil's lopsided development at the other. But these hopes are also mired deep in political tensions, desperate poverty, and population pressures (except in Argentina) that threaten to roil that continent for the next twenty-five years.

If scale is our key variable, the social and political side of it is the move away from bigness and bureaucracy. If there is a universal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consensus in Western societies, it is on the idea that individual and local community choice in as many matters as possible is a desirable value. It is the basis for the reaction to centralized planning, or *dirigisme* in the socialist countries, and the reaction to rigid welfare state programs and bureaucracies in the democratic countries. Privatization in the economy and provision of resources for communities to make their own decisions about social needs and welfare actually go hand in hand, though one is regarded as conservative and the other as socialist. Whether the encrusted bureaucracies can be cracked—the central planning ones in the Soviet political system and the administrative ones in the American political system—is another question. The nature of the new production technologies does favor a new kind of artisan–entrepreneur system exploiting niche technologies and specialized markets. The American constitutional system, protective of liberty, is itself a mechanism of change. But all this is a segue from the analytic to the wishful.

As one reflects back to the kinds of predictions made by our rash forebears—the eschatological optimism of Marx, the racial doomsday prophesies of Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the hardheaded geopolitical forecasts of Karl Haushofer— one is mindful not only of the contingency of events created by the roles of powerful personalities and powerful ideas, but also of the dashing of hopes as new elites consolidate power and privilege and frustrate the dreams of people to create more equitable and just societies. A disciplined effort to identify structural changes—in the face of the overwhelming weight of political and cultural imponderables, let alone the irrational tides of hatred and anger—leads one to a sense of the futility of such "rational" efforts. It is like holding a small candle in a hurricane to see if there are any paths ahead and how to go forth. But if one cannot light and hold even a small candle, then there is only darkness before us.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Robert Gilpin

American Policy in the Post-Reagan Era

THE POSTWAR ERA of international relations has ended and a new era has commenced. The intensity of the Cold War, begun in 1946 with the conflict over the futures of Poland and Germany, was considerably lessened at the Helsinki Conference in 1975. While the East–West confrontation in Central Europe continues, American interests in the Pacific, the Middle East, and other areas have become more and more important. Political, economic, and strategic relations have been transformed during the past decade and a half. Today, an increasingly nationalistic and regionalized world economy is displacing the liberal world economy based on American leadership and free trade. Although the American alliance system and bilateral American–Soviet negotiations continue to be of concern, issues of a multipolar world are rapidly overtaking them.

The importance of these changes in international affairs, and their implications for America's place in the world and for its policies, have not yet been sufficiently appreciated. Policymakers generally assume continuity in international affairs and base their actions on this assumption. Indeed, the Reagan years have masked the profound developments that have occurred and the challenges they have posed. The United States has been living on borrowed time—and borrowed money—for much of the last decade; this has enabled the United

This article, in a slightly modified form, was originally presented on May 30, 1987 at a symposium at the University of Washington, sponsored by the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and the Henry M. Jackson Foundation to commemorate the 75th birthday of the late United States senator. The author's most recent book, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton University Press, 1987), develops many of the themes in this article.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States to postpone the inevitable and painful adjustments to the new realities in global diplomatic, economic, and strategic relationships.

In order to appreciate the magnitude of the changes that have taken place, especially during the Reagan tenure, and the challenges posed for the United States, one must understand what I shall call the American System; that is, the political, economic, and security ties forged between the United States and its major European and Japanese allies in the early postwar era. This System is in serious trouble. In the short term, decisive actions are required by the United States to shore up the System. In the long term, the United States and its allies undoubtedly must move beyond the System, at least in its present form, to more stable political and economic relations.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM

The United States emerged from the Second World War with a clear vision of the new international order that it wished to create: a universal economic and political system. The United Nations, and in particular the Security Council composed of the five permanent members, would be responsible for guaranteeing the peace. A constellation of novel institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)—that is, the Bretton Woods system—would administer an open and multilateral world economy. The victors would build the peace that had eluded mankind after the First World War.

Within a brief period, the American conception of "one world" was shattered. The American–Soviet confrontation over the territorial settlement in Eastern and Central Europe destroyed the wartime spirit of collaboration. The ideal of a reunited world economy collided with the realities of the economic devastation wrought by the war and what would become known as the Cold War. The United States set about the task of formulating a new foreign policy and of fashioning an economic and political bloc that would restore the economies of its allies, provide military security, and contain the expansionist Soviet Union. The American System emerged from this effort.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After four decades, the economic and political structure created by the United States and its allies between 1946 and 1950 still stands, having survived numerous severe crises and intense conflicts of national interests. The trauma of the Vietnam War, the dramatic reversal of American foreign economic policy by President Richard Nixon in 1971, and periodic clashes over nuclear strategy and arms control have strained Allied unity. The foundations of the American System have seriously eroded, although it still constitutes the dominant feature of world politics. It is a weakened structure, one unprepared to withstand the earthquake that is bound to come in the post-Reagan era. If it is to survive or to be transformed in a way that conforms to American interests, the United States must construct a new and more secure foundation for its relations with other countries, especially its allies.

Components of the System

The American System has had two basic components: the American relationship with Western Europe and American ties with Japan. Although these two quite separate alliances have certain common features, they also have several differences that have become more pronounced over time, causing strains in the System, and making it more difficult for the United States to reconcile these tensions.

The American–West European component. As relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated after 1945, the United States realized that there were fundamental problems related to Western Europe that required solution. The most pressing need was to assist the revival of the West European economy while also finding a way to guarantee the military security of the West Europeans against the threat of the Soviet Union. To achieve an American commitment to the pursuit of these goals, the American people had to be linked psychologically to Western Europe. A retreat into isolationism, like that which followed the First World War and contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War, had to be prevented.

The Marshall Plan (which encouraged intra-European cooperation) and the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC, or Common Market) were together regarded as the solution to the economic problem of a devastated and fragmented Europe. The creation of a huge market in Western Europe would give the West

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europeans the strength to resist native communist parties and the blandishments of the Soviet Union. Although the Common Market represented a violation of the American ideal of a multilateral world and entailed discrimination against American exports, American policymakers assumed that the Common Market, with its external tariff and protective Common Agricultural Policy, was a necessary stepping-stone to an eventual multilateral system rather than an end in itself. It was expected that once Western Europe had regained its economic strength and confidence, it would lower its external barriers and participate in the open world economy envisioned by the United States at Bretton Woods in 1944. Meanwhile, the United States required an economic quid pro quo in the form of access to the EEC for American multinational corporations. Thus, the United States tolerated what it assumed would be temporary discrimination against American exports in order to rebuild Western Europe and thwart Soviet expansionist designs.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 to link the two sides of the Atlantic and bring Western Europe under the American nuclear umbrella. Through the strategy of extended deterrence, the United States communicated to the Soviet Union that an attack on Western Europe would be tantamount to an attack on the United States itself. The stationing of American troops on European soil has been a visible sign of this commitment. The NATO Treaty identified and legitimated for Americans and West Europeans alike the linking of their security.

The American–Japanese component. In Asia, the United States also found itself facing a political, economic, and strategic challenge because the Second World War and its aftermath had strengthened the position of the Soviet Union in East Asia. The Red Army had gained advanced positions in the region, the Japanese economy had been even more devastated than had initially been appreciated, and North Korea and China had become communist and part of the Soviet bloc. The traditional markets of Japan were now in hostile hands. There was thus an intense concern that the forces of economic gravity would pull Japan toward the Soviet Union and its Chinese ally. Today, it is difficult to understand that thirty-five years ago American officials despaired over the problem of ensuring Japanese economic survival.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States wanted to integrate Japan into a larger framework of economic relationships and thereby remove the attractiveness of the communist-dominated Asian market. However, there were no large neighboring noncommunist economies to which the Japanese economy could be attached. In order to overcome this problem of an isolated and vulnerable Japan, the United States took several initiatives. One was to expedite the decolonization of Southeast Asia; after all, one cause of the Pacific War had been that European colonizers had closed Southeast Asian economies to the Japanese. The United States also sponsored Japanese membership in the "Western Club." Despite strong West European resistance based on intense fear of Japanese economic competition, the United States secured Japanese participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and other international economic organizations. In addition, the United States gave Japan relatively free access to the American market and American technology without an economic quid pro quo, although it did require strategic concessions (i.e., air and naval bases) from the Japanese.

In order to guarantee Japanese security, the United States also spread its nuclear umbrella over Japan. The American–Japanese Mutual Security Treaty (MST), however, differs fundamentally from the NATO alliance. Under the NATO treaty, an external attack on any member obliges the others to consider measures of mutual defense. In the MST, the United States agrees to defend Japan if it is attacked, but the Japanese are not obligated to defend the United States. Also, whereas the NATO agreement applies only to the territory of its members, the MST refers to the outbreak of hostilities in the entire Pacific region. Through this agreement, the United States obtained the right to use air and naval bases in Japan to defend and secure its position in the Western Pacific. The Japanese were given access to the American market; in exchange, America gained the right to anchor its strategic East Asian position in Japan.

Foundations of the System

The United States is the fulcrum of the American System; the American–West European and the American–Japanese components of the system have little to do with one another. The lines of cooperation run through Washington, D.C. Although Japan and Western Europe are equal participants in the annual "Western"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

summits, Japanese–West European diplomatic relations are primarily a function of their ties to the United States. In the economic area, Japanese–West European commerce is relatively minor compared to the commerce of either with the United States. While the Japanese would very much like to expand these commercial relations, the Europeans prefer to keep the Japanese at bay. With respect to security, almost no military connections exist between Western Europe and Japan, despite Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's pronouncement at the Williamsburg Summit in 1983 that Japan is part of the Western security system. Soviet stationing of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Asia and the increasing deployment of the Soviet strategic missile force in and around the Sea of Okhotsk could, however, change this situation significantly. For the moment, in security as in diplomatic and economic relations, the American System rests squarely on American leadership, or what many scholars call American hegemony.

Common interests and understandings have enabled the structure to withstand innumerable attacks from without and serious differences within the alliances themselves, even though important differences between the United States and its allies have existed from the very beginning. International conditions have changed dramatically, and the basic assumptions upon which the American System was founded have become less valid. What one might call the internal "contradictions" within the System have grown, and the foundations have eroded. The differences among the allies over the nature of the Soviet threat, over nuclear issues, and over economic problems have increased and threaten to cause a rupture of the System.

A shared perception of the Soviet threat has been central to the unity of the System. The Western policy of containment was based on the assumption that the West faced an expansionistic and monolithic Communist bloc. It was also generally believed that diplomatic resolution of East–West differences could not be achieved until the Soviet Union and international communism were transformed. The Western "negotiation from strength" position meant that serious negotiations had to await Soviet recognition of Western military superiority. The United States assumed that there was a global communist military threat; its allies tended to consider the problem more of a regional political challenge.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Differences in perception among the allies have grown over the years due to political and economic changes. The unified Communist bloc no longer exists, West European communist parties have ceased to be a serious problem, and the Soviet Union faces an independent and potentially dangerous China in the East. Despite its military might, the Soviet Union's serious economic problems and the economic strength of Western Europe have reduced the fear that the Eastern market might ensnare the West Europeans. The Helsinki Agreement (1975) reduced the confrontation in Central Europe and commenced what many Europeans believe (or want to believe) is a gradual internal "liberalization" of the Soviet Union, a belief fostered by the diplomacy and reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev.

These and other changes have accentuated inter-allied political differences between the United States and Western Europe. In the words of Denis Healey, former British minister of defense, "it is difficult [for Europeans] to believe that the Soviet superiority is sufficient to tempt the Kremlin into a deliberate attack on Western Europe. . . ."[1] West Europeans resist the American desire to extend the scope of the NATO alliance, arguing that NATO applies only to the security of its members and cannot be extended to the Middle East or other regions, despite U.S. pressures for strong actions against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and Soviet support of Marxist regimes elsewhere. Powerful groups in Western Europe hope for an easing of the division of Europe as a result of Gorbachev's policies; some consider Western Europe to be only a middleman needed to moderate the clash between two equally irresponsible superpowers. Although the West Europeans remain committed to the alliance, interests have diverged considerably and the political tie has surely been attenuated.

Differences among the allies on the issue of defense have also grown. The American commitment to the defense of Western Europe, assumed to be temporary, was never intended to result in the stationing of tens of thousands of American troops in Western Europe or to reach an annual cost of over $100 billion forty years after the founding of NATO. The Europeans were expected to be able to defend themselves, at least in the conventional sphere, and the United States to be able to reduce its commitment; this crucial assumption was undermined by the unanticipated growth of Soviet power and by European refusal to finance the necessary conventional

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

buildup because of its costs and because of concerns that a buildup might weaken the American nuclear guarantee. The Europeans alternate between worrying that the immature and pugnacious Americans will trigger a fight with the Russians on European soil (as they did when the intermediate-range missiles were deployed in the early 1980s) and fearing that the United States will abandon them. This latter concern has increased as the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations over the removal of these same weapons. Meanwhile, American citizens are more and more frequently asking whether they are really willing to put their own society at risk in order to deter an attack on West Europeans, who are unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to defend themselves.

The Chinese conventional threat and the Soviet nuclear threat were the foci of security concerns in East Asia. The American rapprochement with China and the Soviet nuclear, naval, and conventional buildup in that strategic theater have transformed that situation. American–Japanese political relations have greatly improved because the Japanese no longer fear that the United States will drag them into an American–Chinese conflict. However, with the growth of Soviet power in Asia, the United States has become increasingly impatient over the Japanese "free ride" with respect to their security and their resistance to extensive rearmament. American pressure on the Japanese to rearm more rapidly has caused great resentment in Japan. The Japanese vehemently resist a linkage of economics and security; the United States, on the other hand, links past economic concessions to increased Japanese cooperation in the security realm. Intensification of the defense/economic conflict has stimulated nationalistic reactions in the Japanese and a tendency for Americans to feel that they have been "used."

Economic ties have complemented the political and security foundations of the American System. Even though the trading and monetary system established at the end of the Second World War has facilitated an unprecedented era of economic growth and world commerce, differences over economic matters have always existed among the allies. Important changes in economic strengths and relationships during the past decade and a half have accentuated inter-allied economic conflicts and today seriously threaten the stability of the international economic system.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United States and Western Europe have very different conceptions of the European Economic Community. The United States tolerated EEC discrimination against American exports primarily for security reasons and assumed that the Europeans would soon reopen their markets to American exports, thus creating the multilateral trading system. For many Europeans, the EEC, with its tariff barriers and its agricultural price supports, constitutes an end in itself. This concept of Western Europe as a protected regional bloc has been strengthened as the number of nations in the Community has grown. Although the United States initially gained politically and economically from the creation of the EEC, the economic costs to American businesses and farmers have greatly escalated in recent years.

The other assumption on which the postwar world economy was established was that Japan was economically vulnerable. How could an overpopulated archipelago devoid of indigenous resources possibly survive? The American policy (described earlier) of supporting Japanese economic development has been so successful that Japan, after Canada, has become the primary economic partner of the United States; the American–Japanese economic nexus has become a central economic relationship for both countries. With the growth of the Japanese economy, the United States has demanded a more open Japan and the same access for American firms to the Japanese economy that Japanese firms have to the American economy. These pressures for greater liberalization, however, run directly counter to important aspects of Japanese society and have become a major source of conflict. Despite its competitive strengths and huge capital accumulation, Japan remains a highly vulnerable economy. It has no large, developed neighbors with which it can trade and it continues to be overly dependent on the American market; it has yet to find a secure niche in the world economy. So, for their own reasons, the United States and Japan have formed a close but basically unstable symbiotic relationship.

Erosion of the economic foundations of these Atlantic and Pacific relationships is the most problematic and troublesome of the issues now affecting the American System. Because the economic differences among the allies raise immediate and fundamental challenges for American domestic and foreign policy, this essay will stress the economic dimensions of this complex alliance structure and examine the potential for serious conflict in this area among the allies. Yet all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

foundations of the System are intimately joined and affect one another. For example, the continued stationing of large numbers of American troops in Western Europe and the building of a 600-ship Navy are contributing factors to the problems of the American economy. This analysis of American policy will begin with a careful look at the economic crisis of the System.

THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POWER

The economic crisis of the American System is a consequence of the long-term relative decline of the American economy and, more immediately, the policies of the Reagan Administration. Although the American economy is still the largest and most powerful in the world, it has declined relative to its competitors and, most importantly, with respect to what Americans and others expect from it. At the same time that the United States has assumed the largest portion of the burden of financing the American System and of confronting the growth of Soviet power, the American people have demanded both an ever-rising standard of living and improved government services. Government expenditures have risen faster than the gross national product (GNP); these expenditures have financed Social Security (including Medicare), congressional "pork barrels," and weapons systems. American leaders, Democrats and Republicans alike, have failed to educate the American people to the stark choices confronting the nation and the trade-offs that we face. Instead, Americans have simultaneously had a massive defense buildup, expensive programs like Social Security, and rising domestic consumption.

In the early 1950s, the United States accounted for approximately 40 percent of the gross world product; by 1980 the American share had dropped by half to approximately 22 percent. Whereas the United States produced 30 percent of world manufacturing exports in the early postwar period, by 1986 its share had dropped to a mere 13 percent. American productivity growth, having outpaced the rest of the world for decades, declined dramatically from a growth rate of 3 percent annually in the early postwar years to an incredible low of .8 percent in the 1970s.[2] As American productivity growth has fallen behind that of other economies, particularly Japan, West Germany, and the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of East Asia, the economy has become less competitive and the American standard of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

living has been lowered. In capital formation, technological leadership, and the quality of the labor force (human capital), the United States has not kept pace. Sadly, the international competitiveness of the U.S. economy is increasingly based on "cheap labor." If this trend is to be reversed, the United States must increase its level of investment in plants and people in order to raise its rate of productivity growth.

In the closing decades of the twentieth century, the United States faces an imbalance between its commitments and its decreased economic base. To keep pace with what it considers to be expanding Soviet military power, the United States has assumed increased costs to maintain its global political and military position; simultaneously, the rise of new industrial competitors and the loss of dominant positions in energy, technology, and agriculture have decreased the capacity of the United States to finance its many commitments. With a decreased rate of economic growth and a low rate of national savings, the United States has lived far beyond its means and has also maintained domestic and international commitments that it can no longer afford.

THE REAGAN LEGACY

Despite its superficial success, the Reagan administration has failed to reverse the relative decline of the American economy. On the contrary, the long-term problem of relative economic decline has been greatly compounded by its policies—policies that have largely been abetted by Congress. The administration's theory of supply-side economics, its military buildup, and its massive tax cut were geared to restore American power and prestige (after the humiliations of the Carter years) by rebuilding American military power and renovating the American economy, while simultaneously achieving domestic prosperity.

Despite its notable achievements in restoring self-confidence in the American population, reducing the rate of domestic inflation, and reviving economic growth, the Reagan administration has not solved the important problems of the relative decline of the American economy and of a nation living beyond its means. Instead, the policies of the administration have masked the underlying problem of the weakening economic foundations of American power. Indeed, its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policies have further undermined the competitiveness of the American economy, transformed the United States into the greatest debtor in world history, and made the United States increasingly dependent on foreign capital to maintain its domestic prosperity and global position. In the short term, this transformation of the American economic position has profound implications for America's relations with its allies, especially the Japanese. In the long term, it will force the United States to make drastic changes in its economic and foreign policies.

The primary force behind these developments has been the massive tax cut and the resulting budget deficit. Anticipating the need to finance the deficit, American interest rates rose and led to a large capital flow into the American economy; this in turn raised the value of the dollar. With an overvalued dollar, American exports dropped and imports rose dramatically. The primary beneficiaries of this radical shift in macroeconomic policy were American consumers and foreign exporters, especially the West Germans, the Japanese, and the NICs of East Asia. These economies prospered as they shifted to an aggressive strategy of export-led growth, while American industry lost markets everywhere. The rapidly expanding American market in Latin America was destroyed because of the debt crisis, the severity of which was accentuated by the rise of global interest rates; these countries had to restrain their economies and cut back on American imports. The Reagan administration's economic policies have resulted in the loss of foreign markets for American exporters, the deindustrialization of the economy, and the decline of the United States to the status of a "net debtor" nation (i.e., its international liabilities exceed its international assets).

This shift of the United States from creditor to debtor nation is an event of immense historical significance because of its effect on American trade, industry, and power. The budget deficit and the resulting greatly-overvalued dollar reversed the favorable trends of the late 1970s. The American trade balance deteriorated and, by the mid-1980s, the annual trade deficit had reached the unbelievable figure of $170 billion. The huge net earnings on foreign investments ($34 billion in 1981) have been greatly reduced. Although foreign protectionism and the economic policies of other countries have been partially responsible for the deterioration of the American trading and payments situation, the basic explanation for this turnaround is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be found in simple economic relationships, which tell us that the budget deficit *is* the trade deficit.

American macroeconomic policies, resulting in a greatly overvalued dollar—not the machinations of the Japanese—constitute the underlying cause of the trade deficit. The trade deficit is caused in Washington, D.C., and it is there that the problem must be solved. A distinguished economist and expert on these macroeconomic relationships states:

> Macroeconomics impinges on the trade deficit through two laws of economic arithmetic. First, our net national dissaving—that is, the shortfall of savings in relation to the demand for them at home—must be financed by funds generated at home or abroad. Second, our account deficit equals the net capital inflow from abroad. This simply says that if the money foreigners get by selling us goods and services is not being spent to buy goods and services from us, then it must be spent in buying our assets [real estate, securities and Treasury bonds].
>
> If, at the prevailing exchange rates and interest rates, people's willingness to buy and sell, borrow and lend, is not compatible with these two equations, then the prices will change until the balances are restored.
>
> The U.S. has a large national dissaving because the public-sector dissaving (the Federal budget deficit) exceeds the net saving of the private sector. This raises our interest rates until foreign funds flow in to close the gap. That, in turn, raises the value of the dollar and increases our trade deficit by an equal amount.[3]

In oversimplified terms, the causal relationship between the budget deficit and the trade deficit is as follows:

Budget deficit → Need to finance deficit → Rise in interest rate → Capital inflow → Overvalued dollar → Decreased exports, increased imports → Trade deficit

The macroeconomic policies of the administration not only had a devastating impact on American trade, but also failed to raise the rate of national savings and domestic investment; indeed, both declined dramatically, and the ratio of total debt to GNP has reached an unprecedented and disturbing level. Between 1980 and 1985, the necessity of financing annual budget deficits of $200 billion or more caused the American savings rate to drop from approximately 17 percent to 12 percent; during this same period the personal savings

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rate plunged to postwar lows of 4 percent and less. (In contrast, the Japanese national savings rate has continued to be closer to 20 percent and, by some estimates, as high as 30 per cent.) This approximately $200 billion reduction of national savings per year has been balanced by reduced domestic investment and by foreign borrowing.

The budget deficit also means a relative decline in capital accumulation and domestic investment.[4] As the deficit has absorbed more than half of all national savings, it has raised interest rates and "crowded out" domestic investment; the rate of capital accumulation declined from about 17.5 percent of the GNP in 1979 to 16.2 percent in 1985. The long-term effect of the $1.6 trillion decline in capital accumulation has meant "a loss of $160 billion a year in perpetuity."[5] It should be pointed out that throughout the postwar period, the United States has invested at home far less than its competitors; in contrast to 17 percent or so for the United States, the West German rate of domestic investment is close to 25 percent and the Japanese rate is well over 30 percent.[6] Lowered capital accumulation has meant lower productivity growth and accelerated deindustrialization of the American economy; it portends a significantly lowered standard of living in the future. In effect, Americans have been able to consume more in the 1980s by paying lower taxes and by borrowing abroad, but they will one day have to pay the bill through increased exporting, higher taxes, renewed inflation, or (most likely) some combination of the three.

During the first five years of the Reagan administration, the national debt doubled, exceeding the $2.0 trillion level.[7] By the year 1990 the debt could reach approximately $2.3 trillion, or 40 percent of the GNP; assuming 1986 interest rates, the interest payments will increase by $200 billion and take 40 percent of all personal income taxes by 1990.[8] At 1987 exchange rates, the foreign debt (net obligations to foreigners) is $200 billion and will be approximately $800 billion by the beginning of the next decade.[9] The United States has been mortgaging its future to a degree unprecedented in world history.

The level of private, public, and foreign debt of the American people and the costs of servicing this debt have become, in the words of the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "threatening to the financial stability of the United States and the rest of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The World Economic Cycle Under the Reagan Administration



Copyright © 1987 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission.[11]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world."[10] Like other declining powers in the past, the United States has been indulging itself in overconsumption and underinvestment for too long. The result of this profligate behavior is the decline of the United States to the status of "net debtor" (as indicated in the lower right-hand box in the Figure on page 47). It cannot be overemphasized that the United States' shift from being the world's foremost creditor to being its largest debtor occurred in less than five years!

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with foreign indebtedness; the United States was a net debtor internationally prior to the First World War. However, that foreign debt was accumulated to create the productive assets with which the debt could eventually be repaid. The problem with the rapid descent of the United States into debtor status during the Reagan years is that the inflow of capital has heavily financed private and public consumption (including the military buildup) rather than domestic investment. The result of this extravagance will be a substantial lowering of the American standard of living. Repayment of the debt will have to come out of future consumption, investment, or both.

The experiment with Reaganomics has failed to address, and has actually aggravated, the fundamental financial problems of the United States. It did not substantially reduce governmental demands on the productive economy, but between 1980 and 1985 it "shifted about 1.5 percent of GNP from non-defense spending (excluding Social Security) over to defense with basically no net impact on the deficit."[12] Failing to adjust to changed economic circumstances, Reaganomics has made the long-term structural problems of the American economy still more difficult and is leaving behind a burdensome legacy.[13]

Nevertheless, the Reagan administration has appeared successful because of an unusual alignment of its own interests with those of certain capital exporters. Japan has been the most important of those nations willing to finance the budget deficit. The United States has been able to finance its defense buildup and reduce taxes at the same time because it has been in Japan's interest to finance American power and domestic prosperity. Japanese capital flows to the United States have tripled from $20 billion in 1982 to $60 billion (annual rate) in 1987.[14] The Japanese, having found a ready market for the output of their factories, have in effect loaned the United States money to sustain Japan's strategy of export-led growth, to maintain

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a high level of domestic employment, and to help finance the American military buildup on which the security of Japan rests.

As the economic and financial positions of the United States and Japan have been reversed, the political and economic relations of these countries have been transformed. Each, for its own reasons, has entered into an intimate relationship in which the Japanese have become the principal underwriters of President Reagan's policies. If Japanese capital flows were to stop, there would be a devastating impact on the American economy. In fact, it would be very difficult for the United States to fight another war on the same scale as the Korean or Vietnamese conflicts without Japanese permission and financial support of the dollar. However, this crucial symbiotic relationship between the United States and Japan, which has developed during the Reagan years, is highly vulnerable. When it disappears or is at least attenuated, both the United States and Japan will be faced with difficult choices.

The global "good times" generated by the Reagan budget deficit appear to be over. American capacity and willingness to tolerate a massive trade deficit, borrow funds to pay for imports, and plunge deeper into national debt have resulted in a potentially serious deindustrialization of the American economy and a historically unprecedented national indebtedness; now there is a threat of a congressional revolt through protectionist actions. As the United States retreats from its role as the primary engine of growth for the world economy, growth rates everywhere are slowing and the specter of a worldwide recession looms. The United States must quickly reverse its continuing economic and political decline.

The dollar has been the keystone of the American world position; as the dominant currency in the international monetary system, it has cemented the American System of global alliances and has been the foundation of American hegemony. With the dollar providing the base of the monetary system, the United States has been able to fight foreign wars, maintain troops abroad, and finance its hegemonic position without placing substantial economic costs on the American taxpayer. This crucial role of the dollar and the "exorbitant privileges" (to use the term of Charles de Gaulle) that it has conferred on the United States (e.g., to fight the Vietnam War by printing dollars) have required a foreign partner to help support it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the early postwar period, the American position in the world and the support of the dollar were based on American and British cooperation; this "special relationship," begun in the interwar years, had been solidified by World War II. Together, the Anglo-Saxon powers framed the Bretton Woods system and reestablished the liberal international economy. In 1967, the decline of their economy forced the British to devalue their currency and pull away from the United States.

West Germany replaced Great Britain in the late 1960s as the foremost economic partner of the United States and supporter of the dollar. Throughout the Vietnam War and into the 1970s, the Germans supported American hegemony by holding dollars and buying American government securities. This special relationship was weakened in 1973 by its inflationary cost to the Germans; it was dissolved in 1979 when the Germans refused to support the expansionary economic policy of President Carter.

During the Reagan administration, the Germans have been replaced by the Japanese, who have provided the financial backing for President Reagan's economic and military policies. Today, this special American–Japanese relationship is under severe strain due to American pressures on the Japanese to stimulate their economy, the devaluation of the dollar, and protectionist legislation in Congress. A collapse of this relationship would destroy a crucial underpinning of American power and domestic prosperity; its fragility makes it imperative for the United States to put its financial house in order, and to do so quickly.

POLICY PROPOSALS

The Reagan years have been years of lost opportunity. The belief that "America is back" (to quote the president in one of his more exuberant moments) is simply not true and never will be—at least not if this means that the United States has regained the unchallenged preeminence it enjoyed in the early postwar years when the American System was established. America, and by implication its allies, must adjust to new economic, political, and military realities. Such adjustments have been made more difficult by the extravagant and debt-driven policies of the Reagan administration, but they are not yet impossible. To succeed, the United States must adopt new economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and foreign policies. In the short term, it must arrest the rapid deterioration of the American economy. In the long term, it must address the larger problems of the American economy, and of America's relations with its allies and other countries.

Restore Fiscal Solvency Through a Temporary Surcharge on American Imports

The United States must restore fiscal solvency as rapidly as possible. Unless this is done quickly, the economic and political consequences of protectionist efforts in Congress will be devastating. Putting America's financial house in order will require the solution of three problems that have been attacked separately, but that are, in reality, closely linked: the federal budget deficit, the trade deficit, and repayment of the accumulating foreign debt. Let us briefly examine current proposals and their limitations before proposing a workable solution.

Raise taxes and reduce expenditures. The most sensible solution to these problems is to raise taxes substantially and cut federal spending drastically. The resulting elimination of the budget deficit, which will be approximately $130 billion in the next fiscal year, would in time lead to the gain of a trade surplus and the foreign earnings needed to repay the debt. Unfortunately, this solution appears to be unfeasible for domestic political reasons: neither major political party wants to bear the onus of advocating higher taxes, or major cuts in defense spending or Social Security.

Elimination of the "Growth Gap." The position of the Reagan administration is that these fiscal and trade problems would go away if only West Germany, Japan, and some other countries adopted supply-side economics and followed the example of American economic success. If these other countries stimulated their economies, opened their markets, and thereby imported more goods, the American trade deficit would disappear. Such actions on the part of other economies would surely help, but they would have only a small impact on the trade imbalance as long as the American budget deficit persists. More importantly, the growth option is largely irrelevant: for domestic economic and political reasons, neither the West Germans nor the Japanese are at all likely to increase their rates of economic growth sufficiently.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Devaluation of the dollar. While this has been a crucially important step, it has been too little and too late relative to the rapid growth of protectionist pressures in Congress. Moreover, for it to be effective, the dollar's value would have to fall substantially below its present level, perhaps as low as 120 yen to the dollar. Such a drastic devaluation would be strongly (and probably effectively) resisted by other countries that pursue export-led growth policies. While the devaluation of the dollar over the past year or so has had an impact on Japanese export, it has not adequately affected the exports of other countries that also have a huge trade imbalance with the United States—countries such as Canada and South Korea, which peg their undervalued currencies to the dollar.

Voluntary export restraints. One of the worst solutions to the trade deficit, this is also the most popular. It raises the price to American consumers for imported goods and greatly benefits a small number of American and foreign firms. While it may reduce the trade deficit somewhat, it does nothing about the budget deficit and debt problem.

Bilateral balancing. Congressman Richard Gephardt's 1987 proposal to retaliate against countries that have a large trade surplus with the United States (such as Canada, Japan, and South Korea) would seriously damage both America's economy and its foreign relations. While some relief might be achieved through imposing import restrictions or forcing open other markets, this policy would have only limited effect and would not eliminate the true cause of the American trade imbalance (i.e., the budget deficit). Its major consequences would be to (1) shift the trade surplus to different exporters, (2) eliminate Japanese financing of the American budget deficit, and thereby (3) raise interest rates and slow the American economy.

Protectionism. Many in Congress seem to consider outright protectionism, particularly against the Japanese, to be the most attractive solution. While high tariffs and import quotas would benefit a few American industries, the closure of the American economy would invite foreign retaliation and worsen all the other problems afflicting the American economy, such as the productivity slowdown and decreasing international competitiveness. Equally important, as with the Gephardt proposal, capital imports from Japan would decline and—unless the budget deficit is solved—inflation and interest rates

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would escalate with a devastating impact on the economy. Protectionism would also destroy the economic foundations of the American System and isolate the United States from its allies.

Attack the cause of the problem. The problem with all the above proposals (except the first) is that they do not really address the crux of the problem: the American budget deficit. The solution to the trade problem must begin with the realization that it is primarily a consequence of American macroeconomic policies. Although the economic policies and protectionism of European nations, Japan, and other countries are also factors, they account for only about 20 percent of the trade deficit.[15] Americans must realize that the trade and payments deficits are primarily of their own making; with the tax cut and resulting budget deficit, the United States has achieved the impossible: an unprecedented trade deficit with almost everyone.

However, it is simply not the case, as many popular journals and commentators allege, that the American economy has become inherently noncompetitive and must therefore be protected. We must remember that the United States had a current account surplus in 1981 and that the devaluation of the dollar and other economic measures were then showing results. The United States had recovered from the balance-of-payments difficulties of the 1970s, American exports were expanding, the income on foreign investments was substantial, and American industry was beginning a major structural adaptation. While the United States was running a trade deficit in consumer durables, especially with Japan, it had a growing trade surplus in agricultural products and high-technology industries. The industrializing less-developed countries (LDCs), particularly those in the Pacific and Latin America, were becoming increasingly important markets for American exports.[16] The American economy was competitive; it will be again when the dollar is sufficiently devalued for a long enough period. Unfortunately, Reaganomics and the global debt crisis destroyed the promising developments of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Impose a temporary import surcharge on certain imports. The simplest, fastest, and, most politically feasible way to move toward a solution of the budget and trade deficits, as well as to stop the accumulation of foreign debt, would be to place a temporary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

surcharge of approximately 20 percent on American imports (excluding, perhaps, component parts and raw materials), similar to the one President Nixon imposed in 1971.[17] In effect, this would be a revenue-raising or taxation measure that would reduce the budget deficit. It would also bring down global interest rates, thereby helping the LDC debtors and stimulating American exports to those countries. It would cause a further devaluation of the dollar, which would give another boost to American exports. The trade deficit would be reduced and eventually eliminated. American businesses, workers, and farmers would be benefited. On the negative side, it could trigger inflation if monetary growth is not controlled; American consumers would obviously suffer. But every conceivable solution to the economic plight of the United States risks inflation and necessitates a relative reduction in the American standard of living; having lived beyond their means on other people's money for so long, the American people must of necessity suffer the consequences. While a surcharge would be resented abroad and might even invite retaliation, its impact on foreign exporters would be somewhat moderated in that it would apply equally to all countries, would lower global interest rates, and would be presented as a temporary expedient. It would be a stopgap measure that would buy time and provide an opportunity to turn things around through tax and expenditure changes. It could easily be removed once its purpose of restoring an internal and external fiscal balance in America's accounts had been achieved.

While a surcharge should be the first and most important step in restoring fiscal responsibility, the United States must also take strong measures to liquidate its huge accumulated foreign debt. This task will require a trade surplus of approximately $100 billion annually.[18] William Branson points out that in order to create this trade surplus, the dollar would have to drop below its 1981 level relative to other currencies. This severe devaluation is necessary because the United States, by becoming a debtor, has lost earnings on foreign investment; it therefore requires a sufficiently large trade surplus to compensate for these lost foreign earnings while also servicing its debt. The high dollar's long-term effect on the competitiveness of American industries necessitates an additional devaluation.[19]

An American trade turnaround of the magnitude required to achieve these objectives would cause serious difficulties abroad and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would raise questions as to where export markets would be found and whose exports would be displaced. It would produce powerful reactions in countries that have been pursuing export-led growth policies, such as Japan and West Germany. The adjustments they would have to make as they shifted to a domestic-led growth strategy would be huge and difficult, which explains their strong resistance to stimulating their economies in response to present American demands. Any American policy to reverse its trade deficit and repay its debt could easily trigger a severe trade war. Yet the United States must eliminate its huge trade deficit and foreign debt, lest the service charges weigh it down and further undermine American economic strength. The choices facing the United States and its allies are stark, and the range of choices is narrowing.

Until and unless the United States reduces its federal budget deficit and eliminates the deficit's effects on the value of the dollar, it will find itself in a debilitating dilemma. On the one hand, an overvalued dollar means a massive trade deficit, continued industrial decline, and further descent into debtor status. On the other hand, the devaluation of the dollar means higher interest rates, rising inflation, and a slowing of economic growth. If Congress and the president are unwilling to raise taxes or cut expenditures to remove the deficit, then the only practical solution is a temporary import surcharge. It should be enacted quickly before more foolish remedies are tried—and once it has achieved its purpose of restoring fiscal solvency, it should be just as quickly removed.

Deemphasize the Goal of Global Multilateralism and Emphasize the LDC Economies

The United States must also acknowledge that its postwar commitment to a liberal, multilateral world economy is unrealistic. Recent efforts of the administration to achieve this through pressures on other economies have become increasingly counterproductive. American foreign economic policy should be based on realities: increasing regionalization of the world economy, politicization of economic relations, and the waning of the liberal trade regime of the postwar era. However, the Reagan administration and most American economists cling to the Bretton Woods ideal of an open, multilateral trading system. The concerted attempts of the United States to force open West European, Japanese, and other economies to American

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trade, investment, and multinational corporations are of limited utility. These countries, responding to American demands, reluctantly entered the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Uruguay Round of trade negotiations on agriculture and services (e.g., insurance, finance, and telecommunications). However, chances for success in these complex negotiations are minimal, the potential benefits for American industry are small, and the probable political costs to relationships among the allies are substantial.

American foreign economic policy should deemphasize its efforts to create a multilateral system and acknowledge that both the EEC and Japan are and always will be relatively closed economies. They have never accepted the American commitment to an open, liberal system or the goal of a multilateral system. Instead, each prefers state control over trading relations and close state–business relations, as in the case of the European Airbus or the Japanese practice of "administrative guidance." Each is becoming the focus of a developing regionalized economy. Moreover, the Europeans have never wanted extensive trade with Japan; this, of course, intensifies Japanese export pressures on the United States. Furthermore, the larger LDCs will not accept the American position. The world economy will be based increasingly on bilateralism or trilateral negotiations among the world's centers of economic power rather than on global multilateralism.

The EEC is not a stepping-stone to a global multilateral system, but an end in itself. The intra-European alliance is based on economic, political, and security ties that its members will not surrender: West German subsidies for French agriculture, assurance of continued West German–French friendship, and a combined weight that enables the West Europeans to counterbalance the superpowers. West Europeans believe that the costs to domestic social peace of competing against the low-wage NICs and the high-technology Americans and Japanese have become too great. The EEC, having expanded from six to a dozen members, is now a more self-contained economic bloc, and it will resist any American effort to weaken it.

Japan does not accept the Western liberal ideal of an open economy in which the government severely limits its intervention in market relations. U.S. demands that the Japanese adopt American economic practices, open their economy to American corporations, and deregulate their economy are deeply resented and are stimulating

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

powerful nationalistic reactions. Whereas the United States quite correctly regards these aspects of Japanese culture as barriers to commerce and exerts pressure on the Japanese to eradicate them, the Japanese, in the words of one Japanese business executive, also correctly regard these American demands as "tantamount to raising objections to Japan's social structure"; he continues, "there is little possibility that those requests will be met."[20] Intensification of resentment on both sides will be the primary outcome of this political and cultural impasse, in which the Americans see the Japanese as the principal cause of their economic problems and the Japanese see themselves as scapegoats because American leaders will not eliminate the budget deficit.

This argument does not imply that the United States is virtuous in trade matters. In important respects, it is even more protectionist than the Europeans or the Japanese: witness its extensive use of voluntary export restraints. Rather, the argument is that current attempts by the United States to force open and reform West European, Japanese, and other economies have been counterproductive, and a new approach to international trading relations is required. For example, it would be far better for the United States to follow the West European example of protecting specific industrial sectors than to attempt to force open the Japanese economy. As two leading American experts on the Japanese economy have pointed out, the Japanese could more easily learn to live with such so-called "sectoral protectionism" than with external pressure to open their economy.[21] A return to the extensive liberalization effort of the early postwar era is not a real alternative; intensification of Japanese nationalism is the most likely consequence.

In place of the present strong emphasis on the GATT ideal of global multilateralism, the agreements of the so-called Tokyo Round (1973–1979) of trade negotiations could provide the basic framework of trading relations.[22] These agreements apply to a world in which bilateral arrangements, government intervention, and domestic policies have become increasingly important determinants of international economic relations; they attempt to establish codes of conduct governing a more politicized world economy. While this effort has just begun, it is more promising than the path of multilateral negotiations chosen by the Reagan administration.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As the world economy moves into an era of intense trade competition and negotiated arrangements, the United States will have to decide with whom to ally itself economically and to whom priority access to the American market should be granted. Should it be the Europeans, the Japanese, or perhaps America's near neighbors? The United States has given such "political economy" questions very little attention, but it must find answers soon. The United States would be wise to avoid the temptation of favoring one component or the other of the American System. In classic balance-of-power terms, the maneuverability and leverage of the United States in economic negotiations will be greatest if it continues to give approximately equal weight to its European and Japanese allies.

The United States does have to give greater prominence to the developing world, especially Latin America and the Pacific Rim. As noted above, the interdependence of the United States and these countries was rapidly expanding until Reaganomics and the debt crisis. If this potentially huge market for American agriculture and manufactures is to be revived, the global debt problem must be attacked more aggressively. The administration's approach of encouraging growth in the debtor nations has failed miserably. How can a Latin America that has become a net exporter of capital possibly grow? Whatever the solution to this exceedingly difficult and complex problem, it must entail the recommencing of capital exports to these economies. The recent Japanese initiative proposing a $30 billion transfer of capital to Latin America is a modest but important step in this direction.

Link Nuclear Disarmament, Conventional Disarmament, and Political Agreements

The third immediate issue facing the American System is raised by the negotiations over the removal of intermediate-range (and possibly other) missiles from Western Europe. The crisis in alliance relations caused by these American–Soviet discussions arises from the fact that postwar Western security and disarmament policies have been based on a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, the defense of the American System, primarily for economic reasons, has been based on the use of nuclear weapons to counter the Soviet geographical advantage and its perceived superiority in conventional forces. On the other hand, the highest priority in disarmament and arms control

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

negotiations from the Baruch Plan (1946) to the present has been the elimination of this nuclear deterrent. This inherent conflict between Western security needs and arms control policies was of little consequence when the Soviet Union engaged in meaningless propagandistic proposals for total disarmament. However, Gorbachev's shift (now that his concern over SDI has apparently diminished) to a strategy of eliminating specific nuclear systems, beginning with intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe, confronts the West with the consequences of this contradiction.

In general, the disarmament policy of the West has ignored lessons from prior successful arms reduction agreements such as the demilitarization of the Great Lakes (1817) and the Washington Conference (1922). In these agreements, political differences were settled in conjunction with arms limitation. In the mid-1970s the United States (under President Nixon) and the Soviet Union followed this pattern when they agreed to SALT I as part of the larger effort to settle East–West political differences that culminated in the Helsinki Agreement (1975). Steps can and should be taken to reduce the risks of accidental war; yet there is danger in pursuing policies that lead to disarmament prior to the settlement of the political disputes that are responsible for the armaments in the first place.

The arms control effort has rested on a questionable and perhaps even dangerous premise. From the Surprise Attack Conference (1958) to the present, it has been assumed that the risk of a nuclear war arises mainly from the mutual fear of a nuclear attack. The emphasis in negotiations, therefore, has been to reduce this risk through such measures as restrictions on the size and composition of nuclear forces. The problem with this fixation on nuclear weapons, however, is that it ignores the greatest danger in the contemporary situation: the possibility that a political crisis and conventional confrontation could escalate into a nuclear one. Unfortunately, little has been done to reduce this possibility. The Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament have dragged on for years and have been given a very low priority. Ironically, arms control in the nuclear area might actually increase the probability of a conventional conflict, and a conventional war between the superpowers could easily escalate into a nuclear conflict. The nuclear, conventional, and political realms are intimately linked; they must not be separated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The West could actually compound the problem if it accepts extensive nuclear disarmament agreements, such as the removal of all short-range or battlefield nuclear weapons from Western Europe, without commensurate reductions in conventional armaments and prior to a settlement of those political differences that could lead to a conventional conflict. As long as it is overly dependent on nuclear weapons and as long as political differences exist, the West should be wary of agreements that strip Western Europe or other areas of nuclear weapons. The elimination of nuclear weapons should be tied more closely to reduction of Soviet conventional forces and establishment of political agreements reducing potential sources of conflict. If not, the military balance in Western Europe and elsewhere will shift against the West, and the risk of a nuclear war resulting from the escalation of a conventional conflict in Europe or other regions will increase.

Reverse Industrial and Productivity Decline

The United States must also reverse deindustrialization and the severe decline in productivity growth, and begin the long-term process of reindustrialization. Some scaling-down of America's traditional industrial base was inevitable with the shift toward high technology and the postwar revival of other economies. However, the budget deficit and high interest rates depressed domestic investment and accelerated the decline of many industries; the 60 percent appreciation of the dollar during President Reagan's first term is estimated to have caused a 13 percent reduction in manufacturing employment.[23] In addition, the high dollar shifted American consumer tastes toward imported goods; this "leakage" of domestic demand to other countries further decreased investment in American industrial plants and encouraged foreigners, especially Japan and the NICs, to produce goods in which the United States formerly had a comparative advantage. It also encouraged American firms to set up production facilities abroad to serve both American and foreign markets. To compensate for all this, the United States must accelerate domestic investment in order to modernize its plants, reverse its productivity decline, and develop new industries for domestic and export markets.

As Lester Thurow has convincingly argued, the decline in the growth of productivity is a critical weakness of the American economy.[24] As a result, competitiveness has disappeared from many

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industries where America was once the world leader; the great American automobile no longer exists but is a mélange of imported components. While there are many causes of this industrial decline, the most important, according to one recent study, is a drop in capital investment in the United States.[25] The United States has also failed to understand that a key component of Japanese economic success has been Japan's emphasis on an educated and skilled work force. The United States has underinvested in education, as well as in civilian research and development, relative to its major economic competitors. While some spillover does take place from military projects into commercial applications, military research and development more frequently drive out civilian work. Indeed, if the Strategic Defense Initiative is not properly managed, it could have a strong negative impact on American industry.

Reduce the Costs of Overseas Commitments

The other long-term problem for the United States is to reduce the costs of the American System and thereby scale down its defense expenditures. It must face up to the hard fact that the maintenance of the American System has imposed a heavy burden on the American economy. The deterioration in the economic position of the United States relative to its domestic and international commitments will force the United States to make some difficult choices. If the United States cannot continue to borrow abroad to finance its military power and social programs, will not decrease domestic consumption, and can no longer afford to slight capital formation, then it will have no other choice than to reduce the costs of its overseas commitments in Western Europe, East Asia, and elsewhere. Unless major efficiencies are achieved in the Pentagon, as foreseen by Richard Halloran and other reformers, the United States will be forced to cut back its commitments.[26] Expenditures for maintenance of the American System will have to be reduced in order to balance national resources with national objectives.

Opportunities for scaling down these costs appear to exist. Consider, for example, the situation in Europe. While the Soviet Union continues to have a preponderance of conventional forces, the capacity of the West Europeans to resist has increased and the likelihood of a successful attack is low.[27] West German tank and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

antitank forces are considerable; battlefield nuclear weapons constitute a formidable deterrent to a conventional attack. Modernization of the British and especially the French nuclear deterrents is revolutionizing their significance; they will soon pose a much more serious threat to the Soviet Union. In the words of one study, "the levels of damage approach, if they do not exceed, the 'assured destruction' criteria set for U.S. strategic forces in the 1960s."[28] This qualitative change in the European nuclear balance may be a significant factor in renewed Soviet interest in arms control, beginning with the intermediate-range missiles deployed in Western Europe. While the Soviet conventional challenge continues to be formidable, these changes permit one to question whether the United States still needs to keep its forces in Western Europe at their present level in order to maintain the credibility of its nuclear umbrella. Meanwhile, greater cooperation among the three major West European powers should be encouraged.

While the precise expenditures to be reduced obviously cannot be addressed in this essay, the general approach can be. The primary responsibility for the security of America's allies must be shifted from the United States to them; they are no longer impoverished. How this shift is to be accomplished cannot be spelled out here either, but it must begin with a change in attitude on both sides. The United States should cease behaving as if the security of its allies is primarily an American responsibility. In the decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles, and on other occasions, American policy has been counterproductive; it has reduced the incentive for its allies to take greater responsibility for their own security. It is worth noting that the decision of the United States to negotiate the removal of these same intermediate-range missiles from Western Europe has greatly concentrated the attention of West European leaders on the need for defense cooperation.

Whether or not Gorbachev's ostensible desire to reduce armaments through arms control agreements also provides an opportunity for the United States to cut back its commitments and defense expenditures cannot be determined at this juncture. For reasons that cannot be discussed in detail here, strategic nuclear and conventional forces probably cannot be cut drastically through arms control agreements without a simultaneous settlement of the serious political and ideological issues dividing the United States and the Soviet Union. On the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other hand, it is imperative that the search continue for ways to reduce the burdens imposed on the American economy by its costly global commitments. This must be done slowly and deliberately, either through unilateral steps taken by the United States or, preferably, through agreement with America's allies. Considering the relative decline of American economic power, if the reduction of American commitments does not take place through a planned and orderly retrenchment, it could one day be forced upon the United States by a major fiscal crisis.

Keep the Deterrent But Decrease Reliance on Nuclear Weapons

It is nothing less than insanity for the United States to rely on a military strategy committed to the inevitable use of nuclear weapons, which could mean the end of American society and perhaps of all higher forms of life.[29] In the long run, the United States must reduce its postwar overreliance on nuclear weapons at the same time that it keeps the nuclear deterrent. Such a controversial departure from current American policies would obviously be difficult and would take many years to achieve, but steps toward such a change should be taken.

The primary purpose of the American nuclear deterrent should be to prevent an attack on the United States or its allies. The idea that nuclear weapons can be used to fight wars is extremely dangerous. Rather than restrict ourselves to the objective of deterring a war with the Soviet Union, we have become overly dependent on nuclear weapons for war-fighting and have integrated them into almost every aspect of the defense of American interests around the world. This nuclear-first strategy has involved the United States' dispersion of nuclear weapons into every potential theater of war and down the chain of command to very low levels, thus increasing the possibility of their theft by terrorists, their inadvertent employment, and the escalation of any conflict into a major nuclear war.

Reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons would require several initiatives. The most important would be to increase the capacity of the West to defend itself with conventional forces; this would obviously require a much greater effort by America's allies. Conventional and nuclear weapons must be separated more completely than at present, and the latter must be placed under centralized control that is directly responsible to the president of the United States. While the United States should not foreswear the possibility of the first use

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of nuclear weapons to "communicate" a threat or to deter aggression, military strategy must be predicated on the exercise of maximum discretion regarding use of the nuclear option.[30]

A deliberate policy of reducing the American nuclear umbrella over Western Europe and Japan would obviously lead to intense resistance, especially by the Europeans. There is no way, however, that Western Europe or Japan will assume a greater responsibility for its own defense if the United States continues to base its military strategy almost totally on nuclear weapons. If it is believed and proclaimed that Europe can never be defended with conventional forces and therefore must always depend on American nuclear weapons, the Europeans will strongly resist doing anything to reduce their dependence on the American nuclear guarantee. This self-reinforcing situation must be changed.

While a deemphasis on nuclear weapons is a long-term objective, the nuclear deterrent itself constitutes a necessary basis of world peace and must be maintained. From this perspective, it is ironic that Ronald Reagan may one day be seen as the American president who did more than anyone else to undermine the nuclear deterrent. As Robert W. Tucker has pointed out, the president's Strategic Defense Initiative challenges the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and signifies a loss of faith in nuclear deterrence as the principal means of keeping the peace.[31] The president's agreement with Gorbachev at Reykjavik to eliminate all nuclear missiles (however impractical this may be) and his decision to remove from Western Europe the intermediate-range missiles that he had earlier worked so hard to place there, are further indications that his commitment to the utility of the nuclear deterrent is shifting. Nevertheless, until the political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are greatly decreased, the nuclear deterrent will help maintain the peace and must be kept at the ready.

CONCLUSION

Despite the cries of a few Cassandras, the indebted prosperity of the Reagan "economic miracle" and the soaring stock market have hidden from the American people the reality of their situation and the fact that they have been prospering, in part, on other people's money. The country has failed to appreciate the historic meaning of the relative decline of American power, the long-term corrosive effects of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the budget deficit, and the severe implications of these developments for American domestic welfare and the United States' place in the world. While these problems need not cause despair, both immediate and long-term solutions should be implemented.

This essay has put forth several proposals that would facilitate adjustment to the reduced economic and political position of the United States. Their purpose is not to abandon the principle of collective security or the goal of an open world economy, but to place these objectives on a more firm and realistic basis. The choices before the United States are unpleasant, and the proposed solutions would cause immense difficulties with America's allies. Both the West Europeans and the Japanese would react bitterly to an import surcharge. They would tenaciously resist any American effort to achieve an export surplus, rebuild its industrial base, and acquire the earnings with which to repay the accumulated U.S. foreign debt. These economies have pursued a mercantilist, export-led growth strategy for over a decade. The internal adjustments that would be required of these economies to reduce their exports, increase their imports, and become more dependent on domestic-led growth would cause serious political and social upheavals in their societies. Deemphasis of the seemingly futile effort to create a liberal, multinational world economy also holds dangers and could cause a decrease in global wealth and living standards.

The West Europeans and Japanese are extremely reluctant to assume greater responsility for their own defense. The associated costs would mean reduced domestic prosperity and increased political dissension in these societies. Unless the Soviet Union is willing to play a more constructive role in solving international political problems and to scale down its large conventional forces considerably, reduction of the American commitment in Western Europe and elsewhere could lead more countries to develop their own nuclear deterrents. This disturbing scenario might stir the Soviet Union to settle its differences with the West and to negotiate conventional disarmament more earnestly.

Perhaps the economic, political, and strategic adjustments required in the relations between the United States and its allies can be made, and differences resolved through negotiations and compromise. If not, the United States must take action unilaterally. Its choices will narrow as the relative decline of its economy continues and as it goes

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deeper into debt. Whatever the process by which these changes are effected, the United States can no longer afford to pay the heavy costs of maintaining the American System in its present form. The goal of American policy should be to establish a new relationship among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan that reflects contemporary political, economic, and strategic realities.

The postwar era is over, and the conditions underlying American policies for several decades have dramatically changed, partially as a result of American success. Although Western Europe remains militarily vulnerable and suffers from some real economic difficulties, the effort that began with the formation of NATO and the Marshall Plan has largely succeeded. Japan, despite its economic success, does continue to be vulnerable and overly dependent on the United States, but it no longer faces a hostile China. In East Asia, the Soviet Union confronts a quasi-alliance of the United States, Japan, and China. What was once seen as a monolithic Communist bloc has disintegrated, and the economic failure of the Soviet system is forcing it, however slowly and reluctantly, to abandon many of its abhorrent features. The United States continues to behave as if its power and wealth were inexhaustible. However, the fact of relative decline can no longer be denied; new policies must be shaped for a world in which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is an unchallengeable superpower. The multipolar world foreseen by President Richard Nixon appears, at long last, to be coming into existence.[32] If the United States is to assume its rightful place in this multipolar system, it must act to solve the problems posed by reduced power and extended commitments.

ENDNOTES

[1]Denis Healey, "A Labour Britain, NATO and the Bomb," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (1987), pp. 716–29.
[2]Isabel V. Sawhill and Charles F. Stone, "The Economy," Chapter 3 in *The Reagan Record: An Assessment of America's Changing Domestic Priorities*, John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), p. 73.
[3]Avinash Dixit, *New York Times*, 15 July 1985, p. A18.
[4]Martin Feldstein, "The Future of Economic Policy." (The Janeway Lectures, Princeton University, unpublished), pp. 2–3.
[5]Ibid., p. 3.
[6]Uwe E. Reinhardt, "Enjoy the Party—For Tomorrow Somebody Will Have to Pay," *Princeton Alumni Weekly* (25 February 1987), pp. 13–19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[7]*New York Times*, 22 September 1985, p. E5.
[8]Feldstein, "Future of Economic Policy," p. 2.
[9]Martin Feldstein, "Correcting the Trade Deficit," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (1987), pp. 795–806.
[10]E. Gerald Corrigan, "Public and Private Debt Accumulation: A Perspective." Federal Reserve Bank of New York, *Quarterly Review* 10 (1985), pp. 1–5.
[11]Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 146. Original source: *White Paper on International Trade—Japan 1985* (Tokyo: Japan External Trade Organization, 1985), p. 8.
[12]Feldstein, "Future of Economic Policy," p. 7.
[13]Robert O. Keohane, "The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism," Chapter 1 in *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Economy of Western European Nations*, ed. John H. Goldthorpe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 37.
[14]William H. Branson, "Capital Flows from Japan to the U.S.: Another False Alarm." (Unpublished, 16 March 1987), p. 1.
[15]Gerald Marks, *New York Times*, 18 April 1987, p. 19.
[16]William H. Branson, "Trends in United States International Trade and Investment Since World War II," in *The American Economy in Transition*, ed. Martin Feldstein. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980) pp. 183–257.
[17]For the economic rationale for a surcharge, see William H. Branson and J. Pearce, "The Case for an Import Surcharge." (Unpublished, March 1985).
[18]Feldstein, "Future of Economic Policy," p. 4.
[19]William H. Branson, "The Limits of Monetary Coordination as Exchange-Rate Policy." (Unpublished, 3 and 4 April 1986).
[20]Quoted in Murray Sayle, "Victory for Japan," *New York Review of Books* 32 (1985), pp. 33–40.
[21]Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, "The End of Eras? Japan and the Western World in the 1970–1980s." (Unpublished, 1983, p. IV.)
[22]Gilbert W. Winham, *International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
[23]Branson, "Limits of Monetary Coordination," p. 3.
[24]Lester Thurow, "A Time to Dismantle the World Economy," *The Economist* (9 November 1985), pp. 21–26.
[25]William J. Baumol and Kenneth McLennan, eds., *Productivity Growth and U.S. Competitiveness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
[26]Richard Halloran, *To Arm a Nation: Rebuilding America's Endangered Defenses* (New York: Macmillan, 1986).
[27]John J. Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Western Europe," *International Security* 9 (1984–85), pp. 19–46.
[28]John Prados, Joel S. Wit, and Michael J. Zagurek, Jr., "The Strategic Nuclear Forces of Britain and France," *Scientific American* 255 (1986), pp. 33–41.
[29]Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
[30]Morton H. Halperin, *Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987).
[31]Robert W. Tucker, *The Nuclear Debate: Deterrence and the Lapse of Faith* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985).
[32]Richard M. Nixon, quoted in *New York Times*, 7 July 1971, p. 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Graham Allison and Albert Carnesale

Can the West Accept *Da* for an Answer?

QUIZ

1. To present "eliminating all nuclear weapons"[1] as an objective that can be achieved without fundamental changes in the character of international relations (as both President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev do) is:
   (a) realistic and farsighted.
   (b) unrealistic and dangerous.
   (c) politically motivated and misleading.
   (d) irrelevant.

2. Arms control negotiations and agreements are primarily about:
   (a) reducing numbers and types of arms to control the arms race.
   (b) managing numbers and types of arms to reduce the likelihood of their use.
   (c) controlling public demands for (a) while pursuing (b).

3. If the Soviet Union says *da* (yes) to a NATO proposal, the West should reconsider because:
   (a) the proposal must give the Soviets some unilateral advantage that we missed.
   (b) the proposal must leave some loophole that would enable the Soviets to circumvent its provisions.
   (c) the proposal must not be sufficiently verifiable.
   (d) if not (a), (b), or (c), then the proposal must contain some other fatal flaw.

4. Eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons perceived to have substantial military value (e.g., medium-range missiles) and in which either or both superpowers have made major investments would be:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(a) unprecedented.
(b) nonnegotiable.
(c) absurd.
(d) bad.
(e) all of the above.

5. If the United States and the Soviet Union agree to accept NATO's zero–zero option to eliminate medium-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles, the West's arsenal of nuclear weapons in Europe will be reduced to:

(a) zero.
(b) approximately 100 weapons.
(c) approximately 1,000 weapons.
(d) approximately 5,000 weapons.

6. An arms control agreement that eliminates a 3 to 1 Soviet advantage in warheads on medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and a 120 to 0 advantage in shorter-range nuclear missiles in Europe should be acceptable to the West only if:

(a) the Soviets agree also to eliminate their advantages in conventional and chemical forces.
(b) the Soviets agree also to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan and halt military aid to Nicaragua.
(c) the Soviets agree also to make significant domestic reforms in the area of human rights.
(d) the Soviets agree also to solve the problem of acid rain.

7. An agreement between NATO and the Soviet Union to eliminate medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles in Europe would:

(a) significantly weaken the ties that couple U.S. and European security, stimulating European doubts about the credibility of the American nuclear commitment.
(b) significantly strengthen the ties that couple U.S. and European security, reassuring Europeans about the credibility of the American nuclear commitment.
(c) have little or no effect on the ties that couple U.S. and European security or on the credibility of the American nuclear commitment.
(d) one of the above, but no one knows which one.

8. The elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles in Europe would significantly:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(a) increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used in Europe.
(b) decrease the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used in Europe.
(c) increase the chance that any use of nuclear weapons will be limited to Europe only.
(d) decrease the chance that any use of nuclear weapons will be limited to Europe only.
(e) increase the risk of conventional war in Europe.
(f) decrease the risk of conventional war in Europe.
(g) none of the above.

I

The prospect that the U.S.–Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) will result in agreement on eliminating all medium-range (600 to 3,000 miles) and shorter-range (300 to 600 miles) missiles in Europe has caused a clamor. Most of the multiple choice answers listed under the preceding questions are confidently asserted by participants in the current debate. In a setting illuminated by such pyrotechnics, even informed observers can lose their bearings. Particularly puzzling is the shrill reaction of groups and individuals who have spent six years urging the Reagan administration to be serious and to speed up the negotiation of an arms control agreement; many of them now exclaim in horror, "But you can't agree to that!"

And what is "that"? An agreement that would achieve the objectives stated by a Democratic administration in 1979 when NATO unanimously took the "dual-track" decision. That decision called for the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe on the one hand, and negotiation to reduce both U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles on the other. The decision embodied a strategy: by matching the Soviets' new SS-20s with equivalent NATO medium-range nuclear forces, NATO would give the Soviet Union an incentive to eliminate both. The strategy worked. The "zero option" advanced by the Reagan administration in 1981 has been accepted by Gorbachev. But as Gorbachev says *da* to an American proposal that has attracted widespread bipartisan and NATO alliance support,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prominent members of the national security establishment, expected to applaud, have instead risen in opposition.

- House Armed Services Committee chairman Les Aspin asserts: "The Reagan plan for nuclear weapons in Europe would have us eliminate the weapons we should keep and keep the weapons we should eliminate." Aspin recommends that the United States unilaterally remove battlefield nuclear weapons (those with ranges of less than 300 miles) and rely instead on the medium-range nuclear missiles this agreement would eliminate.[2]
- General Bernard Rogers, the American who has headed NATO alliance forces in Europe, opposes the contemplated agreement, claiming that it "would wipe out our opportunity to strike even the Eastern European countries" and would "guarantee that West Germany was the battlefield in a nuclear exchange."[3]
- Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn supports the proposal, but argues that "before we enter into INF, we should at least in NATO have come to the conclusion ourselves about what we want in the conventional arms control arena." He suggests that NATO insist upon the right to abrogate the agreement unless a balance of chemical and conventional forces in Europe is achieved by the time 75 percent of the medium-range forces are eliminated.[4]
- Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon join forces to oppose an agreement that "could create the most profound crisis of the NATO alliance in its forty-year history." Why? "If we eliminate the American medium- and short-range forces in Europe without redressing the conventional imbalance, the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe will remain, and the gap in deterrence to conventional attack will be reopened. . . . Removing medium- and short-range nuclear weapons would simply make Europe safe for conventional war." Moreover, they advise against any arms control agreement before there is "significant progress toward resolving key political issues, such as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet arms shipments to Nicaragua, and the Soviet-sponsored subversion in Central America."[5]

Faced with such passionate opposition from knowledgeable authorities on national security, even the most informed observers are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

left wondering: What is going on? Perhaps accepting the Soviets' *da,* even if it is to our own proposal, would be a major mistake. Perhaps the issue requires difficult, uncertain judgments, about which reasonable people can disagree. Perhaps the loose talk between Reagan and Gorbachev at last October's Reykjavík summit has been taken by the community of national security experts as a rhetorical license for this debate. If Reagan and Gorbachev could seriously discuss "getting rid of all of them" without being clear what they meant by "them," why should others be held to higher standards?

The debate over INF is symptomatic of deeper divisions and confusion about arms control. This article attempts to examine the opposing claims about intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe in order to identify the hard issues of choice. The debate about INF serves as a window through which deeper divisions can be probed; more importantly, it may allow the discovery of general guidelines and principles for approaching issues of arms control in a sensible and systematic manner.

II

The debate on INF began in 1977 when West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt called on the United States to counteract the rapid Soviet buildup of SS-20 medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. After initial hesitation by the Carter administration, NATO agreed in 1979 to pursue the dual-track strategy: beginning in 1983, a total of 572 U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) would be deployed in Western Europe; meanwhile, the United States would negotiate with the Soviets to limit the NATO deployments in return for a limitation on SS-20s. At the time, the prospects for successful deployment by NATO looked dim. Most European governments were lukewarm at best in their support of deployment; public majorities in all the countries opposed any new deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. In the final days of the Carter administration, few members of the national security community believed that the odds of NATO's deploying any medium-range missiles were better than one in three.

As the Peace Movement in Europe mounted increasing pressure against any such deployment, President Reagan countered in 1981 by proposing what came to be known as the "zero option": NATO

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would cancel deployments in exchange for the elimination of all SS-20s. The primary audience for this American proposal was the European public. The Soviets rejected the proposal out of hand. Western arms control experts dismissed it as incredible and argued instead for the acceptance of an agreement with unequal limits, allowing the Soviets to keep an INF advantage. The Geneva talks stalled. A concept was discussed in 1982 (in the spirit of the earlier Nixon–Brezhnev "Walk in the Woods") that would have reduced warheads on Soviet SS-20s to 225 while the United States cancelled the Pershing II and limited cruise missile deployment to 300 warheads. But that idea was ultimately rejected by both Washington and Moscow, and in November 1983, in the midst of extensive peace demonstrations, NATO INF deployments began. The Soviet negotiators walked out of the Geneva talks.

While NATO governments struggled to deploy despite persistent and heavy domestic opposition, the Soviets refused to bargain on INF unless NATO stopped deployment. Still, in 1985 the Soviets returned to the conference table. In January 1986 Gorbachev picked up the zero option as part of a comprehensive arms control proposal that linked INF with strategic arms reductions and limits on America's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). At the October 1986 summit in Reykjavík, agreement on the zero option appeared possible, and collapsed only when Gorbachev held the INF deal hostage for effective limits on SDI research. In subsequent negotiations the Soviets agreed to decouple INF from SDI, to extend the zero option to shorter-range nuclear missiles, making it a "double-zero" deal, and to make the deal global rather than restrict its coverage to Europe. At this writing, the bargaining continues and certain issues remain unsettled. As currently understood, the double-zero arrangement would:

- "zero out" U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles globally, eliminating 922 Soviet warheads and 316 U.S. warheads in Europe, and in addition eliminating 513 Soviet warheads targeted against Asia (for which the United States has no counterpart).[6]
- "zero out" shorter-range nuclear missiles globally, eliminating several hundred warheads deployed with Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missiles and an ongoing deployment program, and no U.S.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

launchers (since the United States has no such missiles, no current program for acquiring any, and no agreement with any European country to permit their deployment).

Several collateral features of the agreement deserve special note:

- British and French independent nuclear forces would remain unconstrained. These forces now include about 200 strategic warheads, and are being modernized and expanded to include about 1,200 by the year 1995.
- The five U.S. Poseidon submarines and 150 F-111 bombers currently assigned to Western Europe would remain in place. Together, they can deliver 850 nuclear warheads; both have ranges similar to the to-be-dismantled Pershing IIs and GLCMs. In addition, the United States has more than 500 nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, and the Europeans have about 1,300. The battlefield nuclear weapons (having ranges of less than 300 miles) of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would, of course, be unaffected by the agreement.
- Soviet SS-23 missiles would be included among the shorter-range weapons to be eliminated, even though the Soviets had previously argued that they did not belong in this category.

Imagine that the terms of this proposal were reversed: NATO was trading 922 warheads for 316 equivalent Soviet weapons; NATO was eliminating an entire category of shorter-range nuclear systems that included over 120 already deployed in return for nothing on the Soviet side; and Soviet allies were permitted to keep independent strategic forces, scheduled to expand from about 200 to about 1,200 warheads, for which NATO had no counterpart. The likelihood of such terms proving acceptable to an American president, the U.S. Senate, the leaders of the allied European nations, or the public in any of the NATO countries would be remote. Why, then, the outcry—at least in certain quarters?

III

How does one go about deciding whether or not a particular arms control agreement would serve our national interest? What principles

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are available to guide us in our attempts to map the issue, assess the costs and benefits, and evaluate the conflicting claims?

The most important initial question is this: What are we trying to do? The primary objective of any U.S. national security policy must be to protect American values, institutions, and citizens from attack or intimidation. Closely related to this is the U.S. commitment to assist its allies in providing protection for themselves. The primary strategy through which the United States seeks to provide this protection is deterrence: the deployment of forces that threaten a retaliatory response to any Soviet attack, and that would inflict costs on the Soviets vastly exceeding any benefits they might hope to achieve. This strategy, however, carries a major constraint: nuclear war must be avoided. Whatever other objectives American policymakers may have, they cannot be achieved in the wake of a catastrophic nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Any conventional war or "limited" nuclear war between the superpowers would be a tragedy in and of itself; it could also lead to an even more tragic global nuclear war. Also, because America's national fate is linked to that of its NATO allies, we must think of their protection as if it were almost indistinguishable from our own.[7]

By some combination of design, skill, good fortune, and providence, these objectives have been realized for more than four decades. Since the end of World War II, there has been no use of nuclear weapons, no global conventional war, and no armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Preservation of this fragile peace is due in part to the existence of nuclear arsenals on both sides. No rational decisionmaker, American or Soviet, could conceivably conclude that his or her country would be better off with a major nuclear war than without one. While an abstract argument can be made that the presence of nuclear weapons is unrelated to the absence of superpower war, no sensible person can deny that the risk of a nuclear holocaust is a powerful deterrent to aggression.

The arms control process and specific arms control agreements can contribute significantly to reducing the nuclear danger in various ways: reducing the very real risk of war occurring inadvertently through accident, miscalculation, or misperception; limiting the threat of deliberate attack and thereby reducing the cost of acquiring, maintaining, and modernizing nuclear and conventional forces; and alleviating public concern about the dangers inherent in the arms competition.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The same process, however, if mismanaged or misused, could produce an arms control accord that would increase the risk of nuclear war and impose other unacceptable costs—military, diplomatic, economic, and political. Because arms control is but one of many instruments by which the country seeks to improve national security, assessment of any agreement must take into account the full panoply of military and nonmilitary options for achieving the same objectives. While this greatly complicates the task, it is essential if meaningful results are to be achieved. We offer ten basic propositions and principles as navigational aids in assessing arms control agreements.

1. *Any assessment of an arms control agreement that considers only the effects on U.S. forces and ignores the effects on Soviet forces will conclude that the agreement is not in the United States' interest.* The principal military benefits to the United States of an arms control accord are the constraints that such a pact imposes on Soviet forces. If Americans wanted to stop *U.S.* nuclear testing, we could do so without a comprehensive test ban treaty; if we wanted to reduce the *U.S.* strategic nuclear arsenal by 50 percent, we could do so without a strategic arms reductions treaty; and if we wanted to withdraw *U.S.* intermediate-range nuclear forces from Europe, we could do so without an INF agreement. But from a U.S. perspective, the principal purpose of arms control agreements is not to constrain our own freedom of action, but to halt *Soviet* nuclear testing, to reduce *Soviet* strategic offensive arms, and to remove *Soviet* INF from Europe.

2. *Arms control agreements must benefit the Soviets.* Soviet leaders will enter an agreement only if they judge it to be in their interest. They would be foolish to accept an agreement that they perceive to be worse than no agreement at all.

3. *What is good for the Soviets is not necessarily bad for us.* If an arms control agreement benefits the Soviet Union, why should the United States enter into it? The answer is simple: the agreement can benefit us too. Fortunately, arms control is not a zero-sum game; each of the players can leave the table a winner.

4. *Benefits and costs of an arms control agreement are measured in multiple currencies.* The primary currencies are: (1) military implications, (2) arms control, (3) alliance cohesion, (4) U.S.–Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relations, and (5) domestic politics. Because the negotiating process involves trade-offs among these categories, it is unlikely that the preferred outcome in any currency will be achieved in an agreement acceptable to both sides. The most common failure of critics of a proposed agreement is to outline an alternative bargain that is more desirable than the original proposal in one currency but unacceptable in another. For example, many military analysts would prefer an agreement that left NATO with some shorter-range nuclear forces, even if only 100 to the 400 or more Soviet equivalents, but such a proposition would not likely prove acceptable in alliance or domestic politics. Assessing the net value of a proposed arms control accord requires weighing all the benefits against all the costs.

5. *Exchange rates among these currencies are difficult to establish.* How are costs in the military balance to be compared with benefits in U.S.–Soviet relations? Unfortunately, there are no fixed exchange rates. Every expert involved in assessing costs and benefits tends to be expert in only one currency, and to value it more highly than others.

6. *Uncertainty is unavoidable and often dominant.* Assessments of benefits and costs in a single currency are, as analysts like to say, "in principle empirical." But in most cases arising in the real world, the assessment is uncertain. In deciding whether an INF agreement would "couple" or "decouple" the United States and the other NATO countries, an uncertain judgment must be made; that is, one must place a bet on an unknown future. When the uncertainties are combined with the disparities in assumptions, perspectives, and values brought to bear on the analysis by various experts, it is not surprising that the conclusions vary so widely.

7. *Everything is connected to everything else, to some extent.* The significance of each provision of an arms control agreement depends on the other provisions. Each provision's benefits and costs, in terms of each of the principal currencies, are related to the benefits and costs of all the other provisions. Moreover, every arms control issue is linked, in fact or in perception, to numerous other domestic and international issues. The strength and importance of all these links may be amplified or attenuated to suit the bargaining purposes of political factions, allies, and adversaries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

8. *Arms control is but one instrument in the arsenal of national security.* It can play only a limited role in addressing the country's military, diplomatic, political, economic, and social problems. Any realistic arms control accord will exacerbate some of our difficulties while alleviating others.

9. *Close calls are the rule rather than the exception.* Most arms control agreements acceptable to the United States and the Soviet Union will involve close calls surrounded by uncertainties. Rarely will the advantages to either power outweigh the disadvantages by more than 60:40; sometimes they may seem as close as 51:49. Hard judgments cannot be avoided.

10. *One arms control agreement requires our success in at least three negotiations.* Accord must be reached within the U.S. government (including the executive branch and Congress), among the NATO allies, and between the United States and the Soviet Union—though not necessarily in that order.

These principles provide a framework for thinking about arms control. They also suggest the complexity of the process of assessing any proposed agreement. Confronted by such complexity, many yield to the temptation to fall back on rules of thumb that are simple and understandable, but all too often wrong. Consider the following examples.

- *If it's arms control, it's got to be good.* Many arms control advocates believe that arms control is good *per se*. Viewing weapons and the arms competition as the most likely causes of a catastrophic nuclear war, they are prepared to judge any constraint on nuclear arsenals as better than none. Others see agreements as a way to reduce tensions and conflict. They tend to support any agreement, without giving a great deal of attention to particular benefits and costs.
- *If the Soviets are for it, I'm against it.* Groucho Marx did not care to belong to any club that would accept him as a member. Similarly, some Americans believe that any agreement acceptable to the Soviets must be contrary to U.S. interests. Underlying this attitude is the notion that arms control is invariably a zero-sum game, or that American negotiators are likely to be duped.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

- *If my political opponents are for it, I'm against it.* Some take their cues from their domestic political opponents instead of from the Soviets or from the facts; they simply adopt a position contrary to that of their political rivals.
- *If my crowd was not involved in formulating or negotiating the agreement, I'm against it.* Some political actors believe that only they have the requisite skills to produce an acceptable arms control agreement. They refuse to acknowledge as successful the arms control efforts of any group from which they have been excluded.
- *If the agreement requires significant change, I'm against it.* The predominant European reaction to any proposed change in military forces or doctrine is to oppose it. Typically, more than half of the arguments marshalled against such change reflect a commitment to the status quo. Underlying most centrist Europeans' preference for the status quo over any proposed change is their sense that the dominant characteristic of the status quo is the absence of war.

Most readers will agree that none of these rules of thumb is very useful. Unfortunately, they are all regularly used, despite the fact that arms control is too important a matter to be grounded in such impoverished substitutes for thought. Commonsense application of the ten principles stated previously should facilitate more intelligent assessments.

IV

The Soviet *da* to NATO's proposed zero option troubles members of at least three significant groups: anti–arms-control diehards, national security specialists, and NATO allies (especially in Germany). Anti–arms-control diehards oppose any arms control agreement with the Soviets. They argue that (1) arms control accords lull the West into a false sense of security and lead it to lower its military and political guard; (2) differences in the governmental systems and negotiating styles of the two superpowers invariably lead to agreements favoring the U.S.S.R.; and (3) the Soviets will circumvent or violate an agreement when it suits their interests. The most articulate proponent of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

radical skepticism about the arms control process, former assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle, is nonetheless a proponent of this INF agreement.[8] Many suspect that he invented the zero option to prevent any agreement (by setting a goal so high and so favorable to the West that the Soviets would find it unacceptable). But having extracted their *da* to his proposition, he remains loyal to it.

Many national security specialists have never taken the zero option seriously; they regard it as a populist idea offered to blunt widespread opposition to INF deployment. Certain members of the national security community oppose the administration's general approach to arms control, which they view as simplistic and inconsistent; others are angry about what they see as its ignorance and arrogance in pursuing national security issues; some fear that the agreement will remove a rung in the ladder of escalation that permits NATO to make a calculated, graduated response to a Soviet attack.

America's NATO allies, in their initial reaction to the prospect of an agreement to eliminate medium-range missiles, vividly illustrate the power of the final rule of thumb ("If the agreement requires significant change, I'm against it"). Considering the initial European public opposition (some violent) to the proposal to place medium-range missiles in Europe, it is extraordinary that those weapons are now accepted as part of the landscape—part of the new status quo. Whatever the initiative, the dominant initial public reaction of our European allies is one of opposition—whether the proposal is to deploy new nuclear weapons or eliminate weapons already deployed, to increase the number of American troops stationed in Europe or decrease their number, to add new chemical weapons to Europe or eliminate old ones. The reason for their opposition is not only a desire to counter America's irrepressible penchant for problem-solving, even when dealing with insoluble problems. Rather, our European allies value the status quo precisely because it has nourished four decades without war, following four centuries in which war was more often the rule than the exception.

Other considerations intensify the attachment of many Europeans to the newly deployed Pershing II and cruise missiles. First, European governments and strategists have invested eight years of political capital in the deployment of NATO's INF. To overcome strong domestic opposition, they developed as many arguments as they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could for the support of these weapons. They maintained that the new missiles were necessary to guarantee the credibility of the American nuclear commitment, essential to assure that the Soviet Union would be deterred from any attack on Europe, required to reassure Europeans about the credibility of NATO's defense posture. Strategic analysts understood that many of the technical military arguments were thin. For example, in the early stages of the discussion, the fact that INF in Europe would allow an American president to order a missile attack against the Soviet homeland without directly involving the American central strategic systems led certain strategists to claim that this would have the effect of decoupling U.S. and European security rather than coupling it. But at this stage, having made their vehement arguments in favor of the installations, the European leaders cannot reverse course and argue the contrary without suffering cognitive dissonance and political discredit.

Second, the weapons have become symbols of reassurance. Europe's psychological security rests not on its ability to defend itself, but on the expectation that deterrence will work. Deterrence relies on the Soviet leaders' belief that the costs of an attack will vastly exceed any benefits they might hope to attain. Central to this belief is the Soviet expectation that NATO will fulfill its commitment to use nuclear weapons to meet a successful Soviet conventional attack. In the 1970s, as the Soviet nuclear arsenal reached parity with that of the United States, the credibility of America's threat to uphold that commitment despite the risk of Soviet nuclear retaliation on the American homeland began to erode. Since 1982, "no first use" advocates, including former secretary of defense Robert McNamara, have raised further doubts about the credibility of America's nuclear commitment by arguing that "it is difficult to imagine any U.S. president, under any circumstances," fulfilling that commitment in defense of Europe.[9] Europeans have convinced themselves that NATO's INF is the linchpin of all credible deterrence; who can say that Americans and Russians are not convinced of the same? Elimination of nuclear weapons could upset American perceptions, Soviet perceptions of American perceptions, and Europe's peace of mind.

Adequate assessment of the proposed agreement requires consideration of its advantages and disadvantages in terms of all five of the aforementioned currencies: military implications, arms control, alliance cohesion, U.S.–Soviet relations, and domestic politics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Military Implications

The disadvantages of the INF deal have been asserted most strongly by those concerned with its military implications. Some contend that either "the proposal would be a significant step toward denuclearizing Europe"[10] or that it would make Western Europe "safe for conventional war";[11] it is also claimed that the agreement would "guarantee that West Germany was the battlefield in a nuclear exchange,"[12] "leave a large gap in the capability for flexible response,"[13] and "[leave] our allies more vulnerable to Soviet conventional forces and chemical weapons."[14]

Each of these arguments is overstated or misleading, and misrepresents the likely direct effects of the zero–zero agreement. While eliminating NATO's medium- and shorter-range missiles would certainly leave the alliance without some of the weapons it would otherwise have, the INF arrangement would also eliminate a much larger number of weapons on the Soviet side. When one examines the proposed changes in our forces in relation to the proposed changes in Soviet forces, it appears that the net impact would be minor and uncertain, but more likely to be positive than negative.

With respect to the NATO forces, the agreement would turn back the clock to 1983, just before NATO INF deployment began. In the previous decade NATO had no medium-range missiles, nor did it feel any need for them prior to the dual-track decision of 1979. With the INF accord in effect, NATO would face about 900 fewer Soviet nuclear warheads on medium-range missiles and several hundred fewer warheads (including reloads) on 120 launchers for shorter-range missiles. In the new posture, NATO would continue to rely on a strategy of "flexible response"; that is, combined reliance on conventional weapons and nuclear forces for deterrence and defense.

It is difficult to identify any military function that could no longer be performed after the elimination of NATO's medium-range nuclear weapons; no target now vulnerable to destruction by NATO's INF missiles would be invulnerable to destruction by other European-based nuclear weapon systems. Unlike INF missiles, aircraft carrying nuclear weapons face substantial Soviet defenses. But air- and sea-launched cruise missiles are able to deliver nuclear payloads, and are not constrained by the agreement. NATO could, if it chose, increase its forces of air- and sea-launched missiles to cover any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crucial shortfall. And while the Pershing II missiles have a capacity to destroy hard (i.e., relatively resistant to nuclear explosions) targets promptly, the deployment of the Trident II (D-5) submarine-based missiles assigned to NATO will duplicate that function.

The credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent would be unaffected by the agreement. There is no reason to believe that a presidential or NATO decision to use nuclear arms would depend on whether the weapons would be delivered via land-based ballistic missile, sea-launched cruise missile, or nuclear-capable aircraft. If the location from which the warhead is launched or the ownership of the delivery vehicle were judged important, warheads would be available to meet any such requirement (e.g., from German soil or non-German Europe or sea; via aircraft or missiles belonging to the United States, Germany, or some other European nation).

The effects of these changes on Soviet incentives to strike NATO preemptively appear to be small but positive from a NATO perspective. The Soviet Union has been particularly concerned about the Pershing II missiles based in Germany because of their accuracy and short flight time. Removing those missiles would reduce the likelihood of Soviet preemption in time of crisis.

The probability of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons would be unchanged. One of the negative aspects of the proposed agreement, Congressman Les Aspin maintains, is that it would make less likely the elimination of battlefield nuclear weapons that risk unauthorized or premature use.[15] While there was little enthusiasm for the elimination of such weapons prior to proposal of the INF agreement, the zero option has intensified the debate on such limitations.

Finally, the Soviet Union has a significant advantage over NATO in its conventional weapons that should neither be forgotten nor minimized. This advantage would not be affected by the INF agreement. To the extent that NATO relies on nuclear weapons to deter a conventional Soviet attack, the reduction of NATO's nuclear arsenal by less than 10 percent will be of little significance. Moreover, the nuclear weapons being eliminated are not the ones that would be preferred for use against Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

While giving up any weapon in our arsenal, especially one invested with symbolism, would constrain some of our military actions, require some changes in our military plans, and stimulate claims that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

compensating replacements are necessary to fill defensive gaps, it appears that the objective military impact of eliminating NATO's INF would be small.

But no purpose is served by evaluating an agreement only in terms of its effects on the U.S. side of the military balance. The primary benefits for the United States derive from the agreement's effects on Soviet forces. NATO has been rightly concerned about the threat of more than 1,300 Soviet warheads on mobile, accurate SS-20 missiles. These weapons could be effective in a preemptive nuclear attack on nuclear warhead storage bunkers and airfields. Thus, elimination of these Soviet weapons would reduce an important threat to NATO. Similarly, elimination of the Soviets' shorter-range missiles, which could be armed with either nonnuclear (conventional or chemical) or nuclear warheads that would be very effective against NATO airfields, ports, storage sites, and command centers, would also reduce a significant threat to NATO. On balance, elimination of this Soviet conventional capability would marginally lessen NATO's conventional disadvantage. Finally, removal of the Pershing II missiles would undermine the public Soviet rationale for deployment of antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) systems in Soviet Europe—systems that the United States believes might be upgraded to defend against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Arms Control

Arms control is just one strand in a complex national security policy and ought never to be perceived as an independent objective. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to consider the implications of an INF accord for arms control.

In terms of arms reduction, the proposed INF agreement would eliminate an entire category of weapons in which both sides have made major investments, and which both perceive as having military and political utility. In this respect, it would be an unprecedented act in arms control.[16] Whereas the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty essentially legitimized the defense plans of each of the superpowers, the INF agreement would be the first to eliminate a category of weapons that would otherwise have been retained.

As for reducing the likelihood of weapons being used, the effects of the agreement would be small but positive. That the Soviet Union has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

greatly feared U.S. Pershing II missiles is clear. Why this is so is less apparent, but probably has much to do with the fact that these weapons could reach the Soviet Union. Their speed and accuracy pose a threat to command and communications centers. The Soviets may also fear that these weapons would be among those most favored by an American president ordering an attack. A future American administration might conceivably imagine that the use of European-based (rather than U.S.-based) nuclear weapons against Soviet territory could confine the conflict to Europe and reduce the risk of warfare in the U.S. homeland. Moreover, the fact that the Pershing II missiles are located in Germany concerns the Soviet Union. For these reasons, the INF missiles appear to be prime targets for Soviet preemption; their removal would diminish the risk of such Soviet action.

This INF agreement would demonstrate that a strategy of "arming to parlay" can be successful. To control both the Soviet threat and NATO's arms buildup, NATO armed in order to disarm. Paradoxical as it seems, this strategy appears to have worked. Appropriately presented, it could have a positive effect in sustaining public support for such an approach in the future.

Alliance Cohesion

Claims have been made that this agreement would denuclearize Europe, decouple the United States and Europe, and fuel distrust between the United States and Europe—creating, according to Nixon and Kissinger, "the most profound crisis of the NATO alliance in its forty-year history."[17] Such claims are overstated.

The small proposed reduction in NATO's nuclear forces would leave the West with over 5,000 nuclear weapons in Europe, excluding America's strategic arsenal. Whether this step would be followed by further reductions in nuclear weapons, or even by the denuclearization of Europe at some distant future date, is a reasonable question. But this step in itself would have minimal bearing on that eventual outcome.

The argument about decoupling has become almost theological. As noted previously, at the early stages of the deployment of NATO's INF, many in Europe feared that deployment would decouple American security from that of the Europeans. With U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, it was argued, some American president might imagine

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that a nuclear war could be fought in Europe alone (including Soviet Europe) without ever touching the American homeland. U.S. proponents of deployment argued that, on the contrary, the deployment of INF would serve to couple the U.S. and Europe. It would seem that at least one of these arguments is wrong.

The salient fact is that many ties bind the United States and Europe; the deployment of forces like Pershing IIs or GLCMs are thin threads in that complex web. This does not mean that changes in such forces can be made casually. Careful assessment of the military balance before and after an agreement, examination of the agreement's potential effects in particular scenarios, and review of the proposal's benefits and costs in all the relevant currencies are essential. Moreover, meaningful consultation with our European allies constitutes the only approach that will allow a change in forces to strengthen rather than undermine alliance cohesion.

The distrust sown by events leading to the current INF proposal is a serious problem. For many Europeans, including many friends of the United States, a general distrust of the Reagan administration, coupled with serious questions about the administration's competence and style in dealing with arms control issues, make the proposed INF agreement a lightning rod for more general fears. Most European leaders, especially those of a moderate to conservative stripe, see nuclear weapons as an essential element in the security of Europe. President Reagan's talk about eliminating nuclear weapons made them extremely nervous; that he engaged in such talk at Reykjavík without first consulting his NATO allies worries them even more. Germans are particularly worried that President Reagan may reach an agreement with the Soviet Union that will have important effects on their own forces and on German security, without Chancellor Kohl and his party having adequate time to formulate or offer their own views on the subject. The proposal's vitally important impact on the mutual trust between the United States and Europe has been shaped more by how the issue has been framed and handled than by the specific provisions of the agreement; this will continue to hold true in the months ahead.

Few opponents of this agreement have described a realistic alternative. Polls show that citizens in the NATO countries overwhelmingly support it. Indeed, the polls indicate that NATO's hesitancy and the alliance's clumsy diplomacy have allowed the Soviet Union to seize the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

initiative and the credit in Europe as the source of the zero proposal.[18] Suppose that NATO, at this late date, had accepted the critics' advice and said no to the Soviet *da*. How would the European publics have reacted? Would Prime Minister Thatcher have fared so well in her June election? Would the deployment of cruise missiles in Holland have continued? Imagine that President Reagan had adopted the Nixon–Kissinger approach in response to Gorbachev: instructing Gorbachev to choose again some equal number (for instance, 100 medium-range missiles on each side), and making acceptance of that number contingent on significant progress on Afghanistan and Nicaragua. Which of the critics of the current agreement would now be supporting President Reagan? After the arguments that the leaders of the NATO countries have made during the last eight years, it would be difficult to believe in the sincerity of NATO's commitment to arms control, or to sympathize with NATO's criticism of Soviet intransigence.

In hindsight, it is evident that NATO's diplomatic deftness in deploying INF has not been matched in the recent arms control negotiations. From 1981 to 1983, the zero option played an essential role in sustaining sufficient political support, and in keeping the opposition sufficiently off balance, to allow the deployment of INF in Europe. Thereafter, particularly as the investment of German politicians in the deployed missiles grew, NATO should have recognized the need to revise its proposal to allow for a low number of warheads (e.g., 100) to be deployed, some being left in Germany. Whether such a proposal would have been supported in the Netherlands (always the weak link in the deployment) and whether it could have been successfully negotiated with the Soviet Union is uncertain. In retrospect, such an attempt might have been preferable; still, its consequences might have also led to zero. In any case, the zero option played an essential role in the successful deployment of INF. Had European politics defeated deployment of NATO's INF, as seemed likely in 1981, NATO would have experienced an alliance-threatening crisis. Furthermore, no assertion about a preferred NATO alternative that fails to show how such a posture could have attracted the requisite political support deserves to be taken seriously.

U.S.–Soviet Relations

Claims about the likely effects of an INF agreement on U.S.–Soviet relations have generally been exaggerated. Congressman Jack Kemp

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

characterized the proposed agreement as a "nuclear Munich."[19] Brent Scowcroft, former assistant to the president for national security affairs, asserts that "the deal is substantially in Moscow's favor."[20] Others proclaim the deal a herald of a new era in U.S.–Soviet relations.

The most important effect of such an agreement on U.S.–Soviet relations might be to teach each government something about how to deal with the other. For the United States, it would signify that even the Reagan administration can do useful business with "the Evil Empire" and reach arms control agreements that meet appropriate standards for U.S. and allied security. Appropriately presented, the agreement might also reinforce the Reagan administration's general approach to arms control: negotiating from strength. It could also set a new and more ambitious standard for arms control that would call for even more significant arms reductions.

The implications for the Soviet Union appear to be even more important. It is clear that Gorbachev very much wants an accord, but no American analyst can say with great confidence what he and his advisors see in the impending agreement. At a minimum, any agreement that can be presented as being in the Soviets' interest would show Gorbachev to be a leader, able to deal with the United States on the international stage, capable of concluding the first ratifiable arms control treaty since 1972. Such an agreement would reconfirm and recertify American acceptance of the Soviet Union as an equal superpower, conferring upon the Soviet leaders a legitimacy that the Reagan administration did not acknowledge in its first term. Gorbachev's "new pragmatism" rejects failed policies of the past (including the Soviet policy of attempting to frighten NATO out of its INF deployment). A policy of negotiating medium-range missile elimination, if it succeeds, would count as a substantial success: Gorbachev will have traded Soviet weapons that cannot reach the United States for American weapons that threaten the Soviet homeland. Gorbachev and his analysts are undoubtedly hoping, perhaps betting, that certain of the more dire consequences predicted by Western critics of the agreement (such as dismantlement of the NATO alliance) will eventually come to pass. In the long run, Soviet prospects for weakening the ties between the United States and Europe appear at least as good with their new strategy of seduction as they did with their old strategy of intimidation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While an INF agreement would be but a single step toward improved U.S.–Soviet relations, it could encourage further developments. The opportunity for the United States to test the limits of Gorbachev's preoccupation with domestic problems and to do business on other fronts, including Afghanistan, Central America, and even strategic arms, would be enhanced by such an agreement and the summitry that would accompany it. Given his sense of timing and his frequent good luck, President Reagan might conclude his second term by making more of a contribution to improved relations than he had ever imagined possible.

Should the West reject the Soviet *da,* what would be the effects on U.S.–Soviet relations and on the credibility of U.S. promises and threats? In the Soviet Union (and elsewhere) it would be argued that the West is not really serious about arms control, and will ultimately not even accept its own proposals. The impact that this would have on the internal politics of the Soviet Union and on the nature of Gorbachev's future initiatives is uncertain, but there is no reason to believe that its results would not be disadvantageous to us.

Domestic Politics

Some of the opposition to the agreement stems from those of President Reagan's political opponents whose distaste for his administration is intense and who are offended by its strategy or style in foreign affairs. Others object to what they judge to be a fundamental lack of seriousness about the details of agreements in defense and arms control. Some worry that negotiating by threat and the buildup of arms may legitimize bargaining chips again. To others, proposing a ruse like the zero option—and even worse, winning with it—is unconscionable. Still others believe that the administration's enthusiasm for this accord stems primarily from a desire to divert attention from the Iran-*contra* scandal.

Although the potential effects of an INF agreement on American domestic politics are difficult to determine, some attempt must be made. First and perhaps most importantly, the agreement would do a great deal to legitimize arms control across the broad spectrum of American domestic politics. Those who believe that the arms control process itself is harmful to American interests are right to fear the agreement. Those interested in the arms control process over the long run should applaud it. If the Reagan administration reaches an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agreement, its right-wing supporters will lack credibility when they argue that it is impossible to bargain with the Soviet Union, that the arms control process *per se* is bad, that the Soviets can never be trusted to live up to any agreement.

Second, such an accord would force greater realism in arguments about verification. An administration that has made much of "Soviet cheating" will be forced to explain how the United States is able to reach an agreement with a government that cheats. That explanation will be a challenge to formulate. The problem, it will be said, is not with perfect verification, but with significant Soviet noncompliance. The verification provisions of the agreement, according to those who advocate it, will be represented as being sufficient to ensure that Soviet cheating would be detected before it reached a level at which the agreement would no longer serve American interests. Some will go further to argue that we must be willing to take appropriate compensating action if and when Soviet cheating is detected. Improved balance in arguments about verification, cheating, and compliance, as well as about the terms of all agreements, can only be a healthy development in the conduct of American domestic politics.

Finally, absent an agreement, one must ask what the likely terms of political debate would be in 1988. Democrats would proclaim the bankruptcy of this administration's approach to arms control. They would argue also that many other agreements were available, including an antisatellite (ASAT) agreement, a comprehensive test ban treaty, 50 percent cuts in strategic offensive weapons, and legitimate resolution of strategic defense issues. One need only look at the list of unilateral arms control constraints suggested by the Democratic House of Representatives to find a long inventory of proposals that may emerge again.

V

What are the long-term implications of the debate over an INF agreement? To what extent may the outcome shape the nuclear world of the future?

Regardless of the outcome of the current debate, nuclear weapons will still be with us in the twenty-first century, and in very large numbers. Even if an INF agreement were reached, and were followed by reductions of 50 percent in strategic offensive forces by the early 1990s, and even if that were followed by further reductions of 50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

percent in the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals, more than 10,000 nuclear warheads would remain in the combined arsenals of the superpowers. British, French, and Chinese forces together will contribute additional thousands of nuclear weapons; as we enter the next century, other nations are likely to join the nuclear club. Unilateral and cooperative efforts may reduce the numbers of nuclear warheads over time, but complete abolition is unattainable; nuclear knowledge will always be with us. Whether we like it or not, and whether political leaders admit it or not, nuclear weapons—real or potential—are part of the world's future.

Ironically, the steady growth in the capabilities of the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers has resulted in a correspondingly steady decline in the credibility of the threats to use them. The notion of intentionally committing national suicide in response to an aggressive act other than one that threatens national survival is so irrational and incredible that it is unlikely to deter a determined adversary. Moreover, as public awareness of nuclear arms issues grows in democratic countries, support for a posture that seeks to provide for their security by threatening mutual suicide will continue to erode.

For the foreseeable future, regardless of any unilateral actions that either of the superpowers might take, the number of nuclear weapons on earth will be high and their utility will be low. Arms control negotiations almost certainly will continue to be part of this nuclear picture. Prospects for further success in arms control will depend to some extent on the outcome of the current INF debate.

At this writing, two difficult issues remain as obstacles in the path of the INF negotiations: (1) whether West Germany's seventy-two Pershing I-A missiles and their U.S.-controlled nuclear warheads will be affected by the agreement, and if so, how, and (2) whether mutually acceptable verification provisions can be formulated. An agreement providing reasonable resolution of these issues would clearly serve the interests of both the United States and its allies. If, despite its beneficial character, the agreement were rejected by the West, that action would establish a threshold for future arms control agreements so high that it would probably not be met for a long time to come. Even if the short-term benefits and costs of an INF agreement appear to be more nearly in balance to others than they do to us, long-term considerations should convince at least some skeptics that, in this instance, the best Western response to *da* is yes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ENDNOTES

We thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its support of the Avoiding Nuclear War Project at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and Jonathan H. Marshall for his assistance in research and writing.

[1]"Is There Life After Iceland?" *U.S. News and World Report* 101 (17) (27 October 1987), pp. 17–18.

[2]Les Aspin, "Eliminate Battlefield Nuclear Weapons First," *Washington Post,* 27 April 1987, p. A11.

[3]General Bernard Rogers, "What's Wrong with 'Zero'," *Newsweek* (27 April 1987), p. 27.

[4]Sam Nunn quoted in George C. Wilson, "Sen. Nunn Urges Escape Clause for INF Treaty," *Washington Post,* 25 April 1987, p. 1.

[5]Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, "An Arms Agreement—On Two Conditions," *Washington Post,* 26 April 1987, p. D7.

[6]Numbers on weapons were gathered from several sources, including the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1986–87* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987); Jack Mendelsohn, "Wending our Way to Zero," *Arms Control Today* 17 (4) (May 1987), pp. 4–9; "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces," *Arms Control Today* 17 (3) (April 1987), p. 4; *Newsweek* (27 April 1987), pp. 20–28; "Nuclear Arms in Europe: Finding a Formula," *New York Times,* 23 April 1987, p. A6; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "An Acceptable Arms Control Agreement," *Washington Post,* 13 May 1987, p. A23.

[7]Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1985), pp. 3–4.

[8]Richard Perle, "In Defense of the Zero Option," *U.S. News and World Report* 102 (20) (25 May 1987), pp. 36–37.

[9]Robert McNamara, *Blundering into Disaster* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), p. 29.

[10]John Deutch, Brent Scowcroft, and R. James Woolsey, "The Danger of the Zero Option," *Washington Post,* 31 March 1987, p. A21.

[11]Rogers, "What's Wrong with 'Zero'," p. 27.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Deutch, Scowcroft, and Woolsey, "The Danger of the Zero Option." p. A21.

[14]Jeanne Kirkpatrick, "An Arms Deal We Should Refuse . . .," *Washington Post,* 3 May 1987, p. B7.

[15]Allison, Carnesale, and Nye, *Hawks, Doves, and Owls,* pp. 232–34.

[16]Albert Carnesale and Richard Haass, "Conclusions: Weighing the Evidence," *Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight,* ed. Albert Carnesale and Richard Haass (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987), p. 333.

[17]Nixon and Kissinger, "An Arms Agreement—On Two Conditions."

[18]Michael R. Gordon, "Soviet Leads U.S. in Arms-Cut Image," *New York Times,* 7 June 1987, p. 7.

[19]Jack Kemp quoted in Clifford D. May, "Kemp Assails White House on Arms Control Proposal," *New York Times,* 23 May 1987, p. 8.

[20]Brent Scowcroft quoted in Frederick Kempe, "Soviet Offer Pushes U.S. Closer to Arms Pact," *Wall Street Journal,* 16 April 1987, p. 26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

John A. Hall

Classical Liberalism and the Modern State

WHAT IS THE POSITION of classical liberalism in the modern world? What may liberals in the tradition of Adam Smith, at once favoring an increase in wealth and controls on political power, hope for in modern circumstances? What should they seek to achieve? This essay addresses these questions; ultimately, it also examines the nature of America's role in the world, today and in the future. The discussion divides into five sections:

(I) Industrialization presents philosophical problems for liberals: In achieving their economic ends, must certain of their political goals suffer?

(II) What is the proper relationship of liberalism to the state? Why is an increase in state power not necessarily inconsistent with liberal goals?

(III) What do examples of economic development in advanced capitalist democracies reveal about modern liberalism? Special attention is given to radical right governments such as that of Margaret Thatcher, which claim to be liberal.

(IV) What have been the problems of the global liberalism established in 1945 by the United States? How has the Third World fared within this system?

(V) Will the United States continue to foster its global liberalism? What are some possible alternatives for the future of the world political economy?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I

As Adam Smith realized, industrial capitalism and liberalism developed simultaneously in Europe. But Europe's industrial revolution was a unique development; all industrialization since has been imitative, forced by those in political power. This puts Smith's conjunction of commerce and liberty very much in question, and leads to the distressing generalization that *forced development in modern society entails dictatorship*.[1] It is necessary to reflect on why this is so before considering facets of late industrial social organization that may allow for a modification of the harshness of this formulation.

The nature of the social engineering involved in rapid modernization can be illustrated by a cursory analysis of structural change and nation-building, two of the principal "functional prerequisites" of modern industrial life. We know that most agrarian societies require approximately 90 percent of the work force to be agricultural producers. In contrast, most industrialized societies today have less than 10 percent of the work force involved in agricultural production; several are able to manage with less than 5 percent of the work force so engaged. While it was never the case that a majority of the work force in industrial societies labored in manufacturing industry, this does not alter the fundamental insight of Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*: under whatever political aegis, modernization involves, at a minimum, a disciplining of the peasantry; at a maximum, their forcible removal from the land.[2] As for the difficulties involved in nation-building, these can best be appreciated by considering the situation of those states that are entirely new. Citizens of a modern national society must be able to communicate with each other on an abstract level, preferably in a single language. This compels all states, including those in the old heartland of Northwest Europe, to create schooling systems that provide their people with the skills necessary for participation in a literate and technical society. But new states must do more than simply establish educational systems; they must remove tribalism, eliminate rival cultures, create a lingua franca, and establish national bureaucracies.[3]

Creating an industrial work force and nation-building justify the contention that forced development requires the use of dictatorial

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

means; that successful modernization requires massive social engineering. Peasants will be pushed from their land; customary practices of all sorts will be disrupted; a new human matériel will be created. Although some of the earliest attempts to imitate the West (notably that of the Young Turks) sought to achieve modernization by the creation of secular societies ruled by parliaments modeled on that of Westminster, Third World countries have more recently learned that successful modernization is generally impeded by democracy. People do not easily accept the loss of their land or the abandonment of their customary ways of life; such change requires force, almost always exercised in the name of a Promethean ideology. Nationalism is one such ideology; it is given a certain obeisance almost everywhere. Marxism also has considerable appeal in certain developing countries, though the extent of that appeal is sometimes exaggerated. Perhaps the most powerful ideology today in the Third World is that of Islam, which shows considerable adaptability to modern circumstances.

It behooves liberals to be careful in rendering judgment on the savageries required for modernization. Karl Popper once made the dubious assertion that social engineering is only effective when executed in a piecemeal fashion; although he welcomes revolutions in science, he sees them as disastrous in social life.[4] While certain *ancien régimes* resisted piecemeal attempts at improvement, and could only be changed in a root-and-branch manner—a generalization that probably applied to Czarist Russia, and certainly to late Imperial China[5]—total social engineering is always savage and should not be romanticized. Insofar as such engineering achieves the transition to industrial society, however, it needs to be accepted by liberals: the creation of modern societies may not bring freedom, but it does relieve poverty and disease.

The forced transition to modernity will always divide liberals: inclined to endorse economic change, they will also be horror-struck at its effects. Sociological questions arise: Once the forced transition has been made, is there any chance that even in the absence of democracy, some measure of moderation will come to characterize social and political relations? Will the more widespread adoption of science and industry, for example, have positive consequences for social evolution? We cannot yet answer such questions authoritatively. Liberals may, however, derive some measure of optimism from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a consideration of the two principal versions of forced development that have been common in the modern world: state socialism and authoritarian capitalism.

The Soviet model of industrialization is well known; it generally supports the contention that forced development requires dictatorship. The strategy depends on complete central planning, the prohibition of worker-established trade unions, and the dominance of a single party armed with a Promethean ideology that is used to transform society. Adoption of this model in Russia allowed for a forcible solution to the peasant problem and for a massive investment in heavy industry that consumers would not themselves have chosen.[6]

What judgments can be made about the Soviet model of industrialization? Its greatest weakness was surely demonstrated by Stalinism: when uncontrolled power is concentrated in a single person, the consequences can be disastrous, as amply revealed by the Great Purges. The crucial historical issue that has recently emerged is whether the Soviet model, as implemented by Stalin, *was* successful. In this context, much has been made of Bukharin's more sensitive approach to the peasants.[7] While it is certainly true that Bukharin had a sophisticated appreciation of Russia's economic problems, and while his economic strategy, based on encouraging peasants to produce for the consumer market, represented an alternative model for modernizing Russian society, the evidence suggests that his model was not very effective. Grain deliveries to urban workers were falling even before Stalin began his agricultural collectivization; they were clearly insufficient at a time when external pressure, most notably the attack on the Chinese communists, made it vital that industrialization be speeded up if the Soviet state was to survive. Forced collectivization resulted in the death of at least five million peasants, and in widespread famine, caused in part by peasants destroying their own cattle; the grain harvest of 1933 was five million tons less than that of 1928. However, the state's share of the grain harvest had doubled; this meant that the cities could be fed and the massive industrialization of the 1930s undertaken. The final judgment must be that Stalin's Soviet strategy worked, and that modernization could not have been achieved without a massive centralization of political power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Serious structural problems now plague the Soviet model. First, the openness of socialist societies has eroded. Peasant social mobility was caused by the communist parties' destruction of traditional elites and by industrialization, which changed the occupational structure, increasing the number of white-collar jobs. But such upheavals occur only once; the social structure established by the Communist Revolution has become firmly fixed, resulting in an increasingly rigid pattern of social stratification. Second, central planning was more efficient in boosting early Soviet industrialization than in managing a complex late industrial economy. Growth rates in socialist society have recently slowed; the exports of the Soviet Union consist largely (as do those of many Third World countries) of nonmanufactured goods. Third, it is increasingly obvious that the parties of all advanced state socialist societies face problems of legitimacy. All communist parties are now schizophrenic: while one wing continues to claim legitimacy by reference to the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism, another, aware that ideological enthusiasm is hard to sustain, argues that social cohesion can be maintained only by the creation of conspicuous economic growth through technocratic management.

The future evolution of state socialism is unclear.[8] Late industrial society, with its heavy dependence on scientific knowledge and the participation of middle-class professionals in every section of the economy, may increase the institutional importance of that sector of society which claims technical rather than ideological competence, whose way of life benefits from freedom of movement and information. If this argument is correct, then a "Hungarian solution" to the problems of state socialism—sustained economic growth combined with a significant diminution of ideological intensity—may become the rule. While various movements of liberalization have been ended by the Soviet Union, the significant liberalization of Hungary, managed with consummate skill, took place in the wake of such defeat. However, the Hungarian model emphasizes participation in the world economy, and currently suffers in tandem with it; its status as an alternative model is, in consequence, not quite as firm as it was even a few years ago.

No discussion of liberalization should fail to acknowledge that the Soviet Union remains the ultimate arbiter of the fate of liberalization in Eastern Europe as a whole. Recent events indicate that the forces

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

demanding change in Russia are as insistent as those operating elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In the final analysis, the success of liberalization in the Soviet Union probably depends on what happens in the worldwide sphere of state competition. The Soviet Union, required to compete with the advanced technology of capitalist society, may no longer be able to afford its traditional inefficiencies.

The claim being made is that liberalization may well occur within the Soviet bloc. Late industrial society increasingly depends on educated labor. This undermines official ideology because a premium is placed on politically neutral technical standards. If the importance of attaining critical levels of technical knowledge constitutes a fundamental societal pressure, the extent to which political change will result remains an open question. Where the entrenched political elite believes that a demand for softer political rule will evolve into a demand for outright democracy, it will put an end to liberalization movements. The subtlety demanded of those applying pressure from below will have to be matched by the skill of the elites; a balance must be struck between allowing too much and allowing too little if the liberalization of state socialism is to succeed.

Turning to the second type of imitative industrial development strategy, it is not surprising that various dominant classes and ruling elites, intent on retaining power by controlling modernization, have tried to combine capitalism with authoritarianism. Both Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan showed how economically successful this route to modernity could be; the traditional elites of China and Russia demonstrated how difficult it was to imitate their example.

Barrington Moore has suggested that the combination of capitalism and hierarchy is inherently unstable; that it is impossible to conserve an authoritarian social order by allying it to a force as rational and dynamic as capitalism. Moore writes:

> As they proceeded with conservative modernization, these semiparliamentary governments tried to preserve as much of the original social structure as they could, fitting large sections into the new building wherever possible. The results had some resemblance to present-day Victorian houses with modern electrical kitchens but insufficient bathrooms and leaky pipes hidden decorously behind newly plastered walls. Ultimately the makeshifts collapsed.[9]

This view is not universally accepted. Michael Mann, for example, suggests that authoritarian capitalist regimes are perfectly viable, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that this would be obvious but for the accident of their defeat in war.[10] While Mann correctly dismisses the radical potential of working classes, he fails to realize that the middle class, composed increasingly of educated labor, may force changes within authoritarian capitalism. Here too, late industrialism, ever more dependent on the growth in scientific knowledge, may encourage a softening of political rule. Still, liberalization is as perilous and as complicated in such states as it is in the Soviet bloc. If demands from below are too insistent, state elites become frightened; equally, the liberalization of such regimes depends on the initiative and skill shown by the elites.[11]

The defeat in war of Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan makes it impossible to gauge the extent to which their authoritarian capitalist regimes would have been stable over time. However, analysis of other societies of this type indicates a trend toward liberalization. Authoritarian capitalism seemed secure in Franco's Spain. However, the more the Spanish economy advanced and the greater its dependence on educated labor grew, the more powerful were the pressures on the authoritarian regime. Eventually, the capitalists came to welcome liberalization, as is apparent from the following:

> There is no natural, "ideal" fit between a given social structure and a political constitution. If anything, we have shown that the bourgeoisie may opt for forms of autocratic and anti-parliamentary rule as the most adequate solution to its continued hegemony. Yet it seems clear that at certain stages of economic development it may choose the vast negotiating process entailed by the liberal political framework as the best way for furthering its interests. In this context, it is interesting to note that in Spain, still without having switched their allegiance to a representative multi-party system, the members of the industrial bourgeoisie were already moving towards unofficial collective bargaining and negotiation with the clandestine unions at a very early stage, bypassing the official channels. This started to happen as soon as wage settlements through peaceful means began to look more attractive than outright repression, from the late fifties onward.[12]

Spanish capitalists had come to realize that accommodation was cheaper than repression. In Brazil, supporters of liberalization include the relatively new middle class of educated labor, whose role in the economy is becoming more influential than that of the old plantation capitalists.[13] South Korea is experiencing attacks on its highly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

repressive authoritarianism; these assaults come largely from students, whose importance for the future of that society is unquestioned. Perhaps Adam Smith's equation of commerce and liberty will gain a new lease on life in such societies, especially those with a tradition of parliamentary rule.[14] It is important to note, however, that pressures toward liberalization are probably heavily dependent on a hospitable international economic environment. Liberalization is often pursued when an economy falters, but it may only have a chance at success if a favorable economic climate is restored.

Evolutionary pressures toward liberalization may even affect South Africa, despite the longstanding collusion of capitalism and repression in that country. The dynamics of industrial development, depending increasingly on educated manpower, have raised citizens' expectations and helped to create a revolutionary situation similar to that of late eighteenth-century France, as interpreted by Tocqueville.[15] This is evident in the fact that Soweto, which enjoys higher levels of education than most of South Africa, gave birth to the most recent movement against apartheid. Insofar as it requires an educated labor force, capitalism will ultimately prove incompatible with apartheid.

This section must end with a warning: while forced development clearly presents a problem for modern liberalism, it is important to acknowledge that hopes for the softening of regimes after the transition to industrial society can only be held tentatively. The realization of such hopes depends on a myriad of factors, two of which, common to all cases, have been mentioned here: growth in the world economy, and the skill of political elites.

II

What, then, is the proper relationship between liberalism and the state? Distrust of the state has been endemic among liberals, especially those who believe that there is a relationship between economic growth and laissez faire: the hope of such thinkers seems to be that "the state will wither away," to use the expression of Karl Marx, himself deeply influenced by this vision. But this is far too simple a position for liberalism to take because there is a strong relationship between one type of state power and economic growth.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In order to appreciate this relationship, it is necessary to distinguish two separate dimensions of state power.[16] The first dimension is despotism—its presence or absence. This dimension of state power has long been familiar in Western thought, notably in the contrast drawn between "Asiatic despotism" and liberal constitutionalism. Liberals have tended to concentrate exclusively upon this facet of state power, as evidenced by the claim of laissez-faire philosophy that removal of despotism will "unfetter" the economy. But there is a second dimension of state power: infrastructural power, the extent to which the state can actually penetrate and tax society and hence organize it and provide it with services, from education to justice.

I have argued at length elsewhere that the very first emergence of capitalism in Northwest Europe can be neatly explained in terms of an appreciation of the distinction between these two dimensions of state power.[17] While it is true that the absence of despotism permitted the emergence of capitalism, it is equally true that capitalism came increasingly to depend on the infrastructural services provided by the state. Even in the West, the relation between economic growth and the state was by no means negative. To illustrate this point: classical liberals have traditionally contrasted the eighteenth-century French and British states as strong-absolutist and weak-constitutional, respectively. But in doing so, they fail to acknowledge the infrastructural power of the British state, which penetrated and organized society to a significant degree. The real strength that resulted can be measured by Britain's ability to win four of the five wars in which Britain and France were involved during this era.[18] Another way to emphasize this point is to demonstrate that a diminution of the state's role may not correlate with economic advance; this is the subject of the next section of this essay. It is vital to undertake such an analysis because the radical liberal right has recently made so much of the need to cut back the state's role in the economy.

The nature of forced development can be better appreciated in terms of the distinction between the two facets of state power. While the first emergence of a powerful economy was related to the absence of despotism, imitative development tends to rely on increased despotic power. But this should not be misunderstood; despotism by itself is not enough to ensure development. In fact, the Cambodia of Pol Pot and the Haiti of the Duvaliers suggest that despotic powers, socialist or capitalist, may have little interest in establishing a modern

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

society. Development requires real strength, the capacity of the state to infrastructurally mobilize and educate a whole society; simple despotisms, unable to modernize, do not deserve to be categorized as "strong" states. It is thus vital to draw a distinction between purely predatory despotisms that lead nowhere, such as the Marcos regime in the Philippines, and infrastructurally powerful despotisms such as that in South Korea, which are capable of achieving economic development.

Although this analysis has focused on the significance of the state, it is not intended to accord it complete primacy. The rise of the West involved the interaction of state and capital; if the former has grown in importance in modern times, so has the latter. Competition within the world marketplace is now so intense that a state will only prosper if it can systematically enhance the social infrastructure so that it may survive in the world economy. Third World states outside the Soviet bloc desperately need to successfully complete nation-building if they are to survive in this international arena.

Do the workings of the contemporary international political economy favor the strengthening of the state in the Third World? Some years ago, the answer to that question would have been a resounding no in many quarters; "dependency theory" held that the "core" of capitalist society controlled what happened in its "periphery."[19] This view is incorrect. Trade figures prove that the core generally does not (as dependency theory implied) need to exploit the Third World; perhaps more obvious has been the striking economic success of certain Third World countries, most recently in Southeast Asia.[20] Nonetheless, that some countries have succeeded does not mean that all will do so, or will do so easily. A large part of the change necessary for modernization must be generated internally. But questions still arise as to whether the international environment is best designed to encourage development, and these are addressed in a later section of this essay. Development is clearly desirable in its own right, at least for liberals. But more is involved here than a question of preferences. Third World states in the Middle East may gain the capacity to disrupt geopolitical order, and they may want to do so if they feel that the workings of the international political economy ignore their interests. Development is not a matter of human kindness, but one of brute self-interest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

A brief discussion of economic development in advanced capitalist societies further illustrates the proper relationship between the state and liberalism. Should we accept the claim of the radical right, so strongly made by the Thatcher government, that its policies are necessary if the goals of classical liberalism are to be achieved in modern circumstances? Will the policies of such governments, pursued to the fullest, result in the achievement of liberal ends? The evidence suggests that they will not.

It is useful to contrast two phases of the postwar situation of advanced capitalist societies. The first, lasting until the late 1960s, was a period of extraordinary economic growth. The productive energies of capitalism dramatically improved the standard of living; social citizenship rights (i.e., health and unemployment insurance) were extended to the working class, eliminating the worst rigors of capitalist society and increasing opportunities for the underprivileged. In turn, these mechanisms helped to maintain social peace. Critics have claimed that social cohesion was achieved because the working class was brainwashed through consumerism or through indoctrination by an education system; this is surely wrong. Most working people never fully endorsed the capitalist ethic, but they accepted it because the economy provided them with an ever-expanding array of benefits.[21]

The second postwar phase began when the rate of economic growth slowed in the late 1960s. Intellectuals on both the left and the right argued that organized groups, most notably the working class, freed by their citizenship rights from earlier deferential behavior, had become so aggressive that a state "overloaded" by demands faced a "rationality crisis"; it seemed impossible to plan in the long-term interest of society, to "steer the system."[22] The concurrent political development may be described as a turning away from social Keynesianism and toward social Darwinism. A radical right, represented most conspicuously by Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, tried to dismantle many citizenship rights and to restore social discipline, largely and perhaps intentionally through reintroducing the fear that accompanies large-scale unemployment. The radical right's program was proclaimed to be "liberal": first, because it was said to be necessary to make capitalism work; second, because

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

certain radical "liberal" ideologues attacked the notion of social entitlements on the grounds that individuals, rather than the state, are entitled to the profits of their labor.

Several factors undermine the claim of the radical right to be the true liberals of the contemporary world. Most obviously, their fear of ungovernability was exaggerated. Although full economic histories of the recent past are not yet available, it is evident that working-class behavior, especially in Great Britain, has largely represented a reaction to economic failure (caused in good part by the decision of an autonomous political elite to maintain sterling as an international currency); it is highly doubtful that the activities of the working class actually caused economic decline.[23]

The policies of the radical right do not encourage the development of a work force suited to late industrialism. Comparative sociology suggests that most European countries gain the cooperation of labor through some form of corporatism—that is, an arrangement that diminishes industrial conflict by integrating the working class and major capitalists in a national economic plan. Such corporatism can involve part of the work force or all of it: the former policy, adopted by Japan and Germany, integrates workers in large firms but maintains a highly competitive labor market for smaller firms; the latter policy is fostered in Scandinavia.[24] Both forms of corporatism need to be contrasted with unrestrained collective bargaining, which tends to encourage inflation when the economy declines, and to cause economic problems based on resentment when policies of the radical right are adopted. A work force intimidated by unemployment may provide the unskilled, obedient labor characteristic of the nineteenth century; however, such labor is surely not the force on which late industrialism depends. In both Scandinavian social corporatism and the microcorporatism of Germany and Japan, the state plays a cardinal role, providing a massive social infrastructure for the economy. This is evident in the exceptional importance accorded to educational services, and to a type of welfare designed to help economic dynamism (as shown in Sweden's famous schemes to enhance the geographical mobility of labor). The success of these states highlights the absurdity of the individualistic tenets of the radical right: What sense is there to the view that the individual is entitled to what he creates, if the capacities of the individual clearly result from the benefits provided by a massive social infrastructure?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Successful states manage the market pragmatically. Contemporary European states are learning to avoid the planning of basic industries and to concentrate heavily on the provision of social infrastructures that allow a skilled work force to respond speedily and flexibly to market opportunities. This may mean that the age of large-scale Fordist mass-production is now over.[25] In Germany, the state provided seed money to encourage the development of several computer firms, subsequently allowing the market to decide which of them was the best—a striking contrast to Britain's misguided attempt to develop its computer industry by investing all state funds in a single company. Italian small business was significantly helped by the Christian Democratic state through a generous loan policy.[26] The Japanese state helps its corporations by funding basic research and by helping to market manufactured products.

Contrary to the belief of the radical "liberal" right, modern political economies cannot be "left to the market"; the ability to participate in the market depends on the state's provision of a social infrastructure. Adam Smith's belief—that the market had beneficial effects in early European history because it encouraged a "general diffusion of wealth among the lower orders of men"[27]—supports the theory that the success of a national economy depends on the state's creating a high level of social skill. The most successful states have found ways to curb laissez-faire practices internally in order to act effectively in the international market. In Austria, Japan, Switzerland, and Sweden, a high level of social skill has enabled these countries to adapt rapidly to changes in the world market.[28] Smith, unalarmed by the discovery that new nations could threaten the wealth of established economic leaders, expected such leaders to abandon old industries to new countries and to adopt wholly new trades and techniques. The future of leading states must lie in a high-wage, high-productivity economy—certainly not in the cutting of wages.[29]

It seems that economic success is most assured when corporatism is combined with welfare and openness to the world market. In contrast, a country such as Britain, open to the world economy but disdainful of corporatism and welfare, cannot hope to compete.[30] For the advanced economies to work, elites must act intelligently by recognizing the need for a growing reservoir of skilled labor. In this perspective, radical "liberal" policies appear not only unpleasant but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

misconceived; they have created no new economic dynamism, despite specious and manipulated statistical claims to the contrary.

IV

In the years after 1945, an attempt was made by the United States to create a system of global liberalism, of free trade between nations, within which peace and prosperity would presumably reign. The intellectual justification for this approach lay in the claim that an advanced worldwide capitalist society needs the guidance of a hegemonic power to ensure its proper functioning. According to this "hegemonic stability theory," capitalist society is considered stable only when certain functional needs—the provision of an international currency, the outflow of capital for development, and the ability to absorb exports from developing states—have been satisfied by a leading power. In the absence of such a leading power, protectionism, trade war, and geopolitical conflict are likely to occur. This school of thought maintains that Britain once provided such hegemonic leadership, and that the miraculous boom of the Keynesian years would have been impossible without American hegemony.[31]

Does global liberalism provide a stable international framework for Third World development? In answering that question, it is important to acknowledge that hegemonic stability theory claims hegemonic leadership to be self-liquidating; that the provision of collective goods for the system as a whole inevitably undermines the economic strength of the hegemon; that small states tend to be "free riders," failing to contribute their share of costs; that the export of capital encourages, even necessitates, industrialization elsewhere. This theory, predominantly American, suggests that the United States may have lost its economic leadership, and that the world economy will consequently suffer; protectionism will increase as American industry's ability to compete with other capitalist nations diminishes.

A word of skepticism about the language of hegemonic stability theory is necessary. Some American thinkers have been eager to portray the United States as a type of Durkheimian norm-giver, stabilizing the international system in an entirely neutral manner. While few would deny that idealism is occasionally important in world politics, the United States cannot realistically be characterized

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as having been an impartial actor in the role of economic leader. At Bretton Woods, the United States refused to accept a system of world order, designed by John Maynard Keynes, that would have provided rules to govern the discipline of strong as well as weak economies. America chose to preserve its freedom of action, and established mechanisms of the international political economy that suited its own ends: the United States came to dominate such agencies as the International Monetary Fund, GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and the World Bank. The presence of the United States' own interests behind international norms became clear in the mid-1950s, when America used its leadership position to break the rules it enforced internationally by running an increasingly large budget deficit. Importantly, the allies allowed America to break these rules because its position was unique: whereas in an earlier period Britain faced Germany as a military *and* economic rival inside capitalist society, the economic rivals of the United States have not sought to challenge its military supremacy.

From 1945 to 1971, it was particularly clear that America provided leadership and services to the world economy. From 1958 on, it acted as lender of last resort, and provided investment for the economic growth of other nations. After World War II, America played a major role in effecting the recovery and democratization of Europe and Japan, and in fostering a political stability that had not been achieved after World War I.[32] Yet there were always costs to global liberalism—costs borne most heavily by the Third World. Commodity prices were kept down, and the United States intervened, covertly and overtly, to suppress regimes that threatened its view of world order.

The "American Century" apparently began to crumble in 1971. In that year the United States came off the gold standard, contending that America was being challenged in two ways.[33] First, various states within capitalist society had grown at a much faster rate than the United States, suggesting to hegemonic stability theorists that economic leadership was indeed proving to be self-liquidating. The most important of these competitors was Japan, whose balance-of-trade surplus with the United States exceeded $50 billion in 1986. Significant threats to the dominance of American industry were also made by Europe and by such newly industrializing countries as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brazil, South Korea, and Argentina. Second, the Third World challenged the liberal ordering of the world economy. Throughout the postwar period, the power of Third World states had gradually increased;[34] they learned how to strike better bargains with multinational companies and nationalized the production of many raw materials. Undoubtedly, the most spectacular example of the Third World challenge was the OPEC oil price rise. It was not surprising that the United States chose, in response, to break its own liberal norms. It ceased provision of a stable currency for world economic transactions, as is most clearly seen in its failure to control international banks in the Third World. This may yet lead to a banking collapse; it has certainly caused chaos in the Third World, particularly since American interest rates increased sharply after loans had been made.[35] The United States has also sought to protect both basic and strategic industries (steel, textiles, cars, semiconductors) from competition, largely by "voluntary" import quotas.

Further analysis of the current state of American economic power suggests, however, that there is far more continuity than had been predicted by hegemonic stability theory. There is not, at least at this point, massive protectionism; the United States has not abandoned its call for an open international economy. Indeed, the United States is today actively pressing for more liberalization in agriculture, services, and shipping—areas in which the American economy maintains a lead. Furthermore, the international success of American companies such as IBM demonstrates the continuing power of the United States in the world market. Provided that leading "core" countries continue to develop new technologies, they can abandon old industries to newly developing nations. In this context, the parallel often drawn between late–nineteenth-century Britain and the United States of today fails to take account of a crucial change in industrial organization: while British economic leadership was quickly undermined because its portfolio investment in Third World countries encouraged—indeed necessitated—their autonomous economic growth, American investment abroad is concentrated in multinational companies that buttress the structural power of the United States.[36]

Moreover, the United States retains its unique ability to control the world economy in its own interest, particularly in monetary affairs.[37] This has enabled the United States to defer the costs of the oil price rise through inflation. There is as yet no indication that its allies, most

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

importantly Germany and Japan, will refuse to bank in the American dollar. It is also becoming clear that the power of the Third World, based on oil rationing, has been considerably exaggerated; the oil price increases of 1973 and 1979 can be attributed as much to the uncertainty caused by war as to OPEC. Most importantly, not many Third World states are prospering today. Only Southeast Asian states possess a literate culture, strong nationalism, and skillful political elites not generally prone to corruption. Many other newly industrializing countries are suffering from the debt crisis; this may undermine their attempts at liberalization.

Do these circumstances refute hegemonic stability theory? Proponents of the theory do not think so. Robert Keohane has argued that international regimes matter because they encourage individual states to think in terms of long-term mutual interests; he regards this as an explanation for the general reluctance to introduce protectionism.[38] Yet the lack of concern the United States has shown its allies by breaking international rules (as when the gold window was closed) suggests that such a view, which tends to put hope above experience, should be treated skeptically.[39] Judith Goldstein has stressed that in economics, the actual facts matter less than what people believe the facts to be; since American leaders still attribute the world economic depression to the passing of the protectionist Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act of 1930, they may just possibly continue to resist protectionism.[40] Jeff Frieden has suggested that international banks and multinational corporations still profit from openness, and are more able to influence the United States than are American blue-collar workers and domestic industry.[41] David Lake has argued that total protectionism is not a rational course of action, since it is still possible to strike bilateral rather than multilateral agreements with trading partners.[42]

Nonetheless, there are two reasons to take issue with hegemonic stability theory. The first involves a judgment on the definition of "hegemony." America completely controlled the global economy in the two decades after World War II; the allies endorsed this hegemony because they stood to benefit from it. However, the period from 1971 to the present has been one of hegemony as domination—a hegemony more imposed on the global economic community than accepted by it. This is not a "pure" hegemony—that is, the leadership of a group of allies by a leading power. This necessary distinction has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been ignored by hegemonic stability theory, which blandly assumes that hegemony *per se* is desirable.

The second criticism that must be leveled at hegemonic stability theory is still more important: the theory supposedly explains the behavior of the United States in the world, but it does not do so adequately. The policies of the United States are not always dictated by capitalists;[43] the Pentagon Papers showed conclusively that capitalists were simply not present at most crucial meetings regarding the expansion of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, which was in no way necessary for the protection of America's strategic position in the global economic community.

The external behavior of the United States has been characterized by a geopolitical naiveté, and hegemonic stability theory reflects this all too faithfully. The United States' national interest came to be defined in such a way that every issue in world politics was conceptualized in East–West terms; any demand for fundamental change was seen as a challenge to the credibility of the United States. This notion is implausible; it does not acknowledge the sheer power of the United States and the international market. It is the West, rather than the Soviet bloc, that has abundant capital and significant markets; most states, perhaps even the Soviet Union and China, realize that their complete withdrawal from the world market would exact too high a price.

The dynamics of nationalism in many developing Third World countries, from Vietnam to Iran, were also seen in East–West terms. This perception was naive and inappropriate. Nationalism and concentration of political power are functional prerequisites of modernity, as argued in the first sections of this essay—not signs of a world communist plot.[44] George Kennan argued for the encouragement of nationalism on the grounds that this force would help contain the Soviet Union.[45] His view has been amply justified: the more national varieties of communism that develop, the less cohesive communism becomes. Regrettably, the lessons to be learned from Kennan's work and from U.S. involvement in Vietnam have been ignored, as current American policy in Central America attests.

In the present situation of U.S. hegemony by domination, America's geopolitical naiveté has serious consequences. Some Third World countries have been directly harmed by U.S. intervention, and all have been hindered because American-designed international institutions

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

do not favor the strengthening of state power necessary for development. While the United States regards its interventionist role as necessary for the preservation of the free world, its allies wish that it would better recognize the nature of regional political dynamics—not least the revival of Islam in the Middle East. Such differences in geopolitical perceptions now come between America and its principal allies, creating adverse economic consequences. The United States thinks that its provision of defense to allies exempts it from balancing its budget; Europe and Japan do not aid the United States greatly in matters of defense because they disagree with its geopolitical goals. The world economy suffers from the absence of monetary order resulting from the U.S. budget imbalance. At the same time, America's domestic economy suffers, and will continue to weaken as the national debt increases.

V

There are three possible scenarios for the future of the world political economy. The first is one of continued and increased American hegemony by domination. If the United States were to play out this scenario, its economy would have to recover somewhat, and this is by no means impossible. At present, Japan's economy is suffering far more than America's; U.S. industry may yet benefit from the devaluation of the dollar. Moreover, it may be possible to control defense spending. The budget deficit has only become huge under the Reagan administration; the United States may now be able to call a halt to rearmament. In any case, it is entirely conceivable that a complete revival of American economic strength may not be required for this strategy to be followed. The United States may yet profit from its geopolitical/military strength by taxing the allies to a greater degree, both formally and informally. In a sense, this has already happened: the vast loans that America took from Japan to counter its budget deficit under the Reagan administration will now be repaid in devalued dollars—a happy but unplanned outcome for the United States, made possible only because it provides for Japan's defense.

The advantage of the strategy of continued U.S. hegemony by domination is that it would keep nuclear weapons in the hands of the two great powers. The difficulties of this strategy are, however, obvious. On the one hand, it will prove difficult to gain increased tax

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the allies as long as they continue to disagree with U.S. geopolitical goals. On the other hand, the revival of the American economy may well require a major change to an industrial policy similar to those pursued in Europe and Japan. Economic decline does not result simply (as the theorists of hegemonic stability would have it) from geopolitical overcommitment. The American economy is wedded to a Fordist mass-production policy that is increasingly ill-suited to a dynamic international economy.[46]

An obvious alternative to this strategy would be a fundamental geopolitical and economic change resulting from a completely new perception of the United States' role in world affairs. Withdrawing some or even all American troops from Europe would have little effect on American global commitments, although it might motivate Europeans to contribute to their own defense. However, the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from Europe would change both geopolitical and economic rules in unpredictable ways.

Such a policy would make sense for the United States if it chose to reorient itself toward the Pacific Rim.[47] This strategy would also require an effective industrial policy that would ensure that money saved on defense were put to productive use. But the United States is not about to adopt this strategy, despite the logic that underlies it. American policymakers would not want to encourage the emergence of another defensive (and probably nuclear) power in the world, which would surely take place (at least in the best-case scenario) following an American withdrawal from Europe. America remains an imperial power, and is not yet prepared to give up its right to lead.

The third possible scenario would be one of pure hegemony; that is, leadership of a set of allies by the United States, a power whose size ensures that, unlike Great Britain, it can never slip to secondary rank. The United States could only act effectively in this role if it sought to make the transition to industrialism less painful for developing Third World nations, not least because of that transition's potentially destabilizing impact on the balance of world power. The Third World's pattern of development may determine our future. In light of this, it will be crucial to organize the world market so that it remains an engine of growth. The very minimum that this must involve is the restoration of monetary order and the retention of an open trading system. A maximalist policy would involve securing commodity

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prices and providing larger sums of capital for Third World development. This is not to say that the West has the power to create development in Third World countries; on the contrary, many necessary changes will have to be made within these nations. But the West is in a position to help create a climate conducive to development.

To create a situation of pure hegemony, the United States must learn not to see every Third World action as an East–West issue. This more objective attitude would enable the United States to better understand the nature of state power in the Third World, and to find ways to support that power.[48] America must recognize the necessity of initially strengthening the state, and of helping in the liberalization of societies, from South Korea to Brazil, that have successfully completed the transition to modernity. At the same time, America must cease supporting rulers like Marcos, whose despotism is not matched by infrastructural improvement. Refusal to perceive all Third World issues as East–West issues would allow for lower U.S. defense spending and would ease the strains put on the American economy (although genuine economic strength requires the adoption of an industrial policy). Of equal importance, such a geopolitical strategy would serve as the basis for genuine cooperation among key allies. Many problems that face the Pax Americana might be overcome through such cooperation.

ENDNOTES

[1]Ernest Gellner, "Democracy and Industrialisation," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 8 (1) (1967), pp. 47–70.

[2]Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

[3]Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

[4]Michael Freeman, "Sociology and Utopia: Some Reflections on the Social Philosophy of Karl Popper," *British Journal of Sociology* 26 (1) (1975), pp. 20–34.

[5]This argument is strikingly put by Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[6]I am drawing here upon the comparative sociology of Raymond Aron. For a summary, see John A. Hall, *Raymond Aron* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1988), chapter 3.

[7]In this paragraph, I am drawing heavily upon Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Russian Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

[8]Cf. Ernest Gellner, "From the Revolution to Liberalisation," *Government and Opposition* 11 (3) (1976), pp. 257–72. A revealing and high-powered exchange

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over this thesis was Raymond Aron, "On Liberalisation," and Ernest Gellner, "Plaidoyer pour une libéralisation manquée," both in *Government and Opposition* 14 (1) (1979), pp. 37–65.

[9]Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, p. 438.

[10]Michael Mann, "Citizenship and Ruling Class Strategies," *Sociology* 21 (forthcoming).

[11]Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986).

[12]Salvador Giner and Eduardo Sevilla, "From Despotism to Parliamentarism: Class Domination and Political Order in the Spanish State," in Richard Scase, ed., *The State in Western Europe* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 218.

[13]José G. Merquior, "Power and Identity: Politics and Ideology in Latin America," *Government and Opposition* 19 (2) (1984), pp. 239–49.

[14]Cf. Nicos Mouzelis, *The Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America* (London: Macmillan, 1986).

[15]Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Régime and the French Revolution* (New York: Anchor Books, 1955).

[16]Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in John A. Hall, ed., *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 109–36.

[17]John A. Hall, *Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

[18]Cf. John Brewer's forthcoming book on the fiscal/military strength of the eighteenth-century British state.

[19]A classic statement of this position was André Gunder Frank, "The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology," in *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution?* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 21–94.

[20]Cf. Hall, *Powers and Liberties*, chapter 8.

[21]Nicolas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Bryan Turner, *The Dominant Ideology Thesis* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981).

[22]A representative argument of this type is that of Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (London: Heinemann Education Books, 1976).

[23]I make this argument about Britain in "The State," in Gordon Causer, ed., *Inside British Society* (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf, 1987), pp. 203–22.

[24]John H. Goldthorpe, "The End of Convergence: Corporatist and Dualist Tendencies in Modern Western Societies," in Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Western European Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 315–43.

[25]Cf. Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[26]Linda Weiss, *Creating Capitalism: Small Business and the State Since 1945* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

[27]Dugald Stewart, "Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith, Ll.D," in *The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*, vol. 3, *Essays on Philosophical Subjects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 313.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[28]Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); R. Dore, *Flexible Rigidities: Industrial Policy and Structural Adjustment in the Japanese Economy, 1970–80* (London: Athlone Press, 1986).

[29]Istvan Hont, "The 'Rich Country–Poor Country' Debate in Scottish Classical Political Economy," in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., *Wealth and Virtue* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 271–316.

[30]Equally, however, industrial decline follows from embracing corporatism and welfare in tandem with leaving the world market. Cf. Carlos Waisman's treatment of the "reversal of development" in Argentina in his forthcoming book (title unavailable), to be published by Princeton University Press (Princeton, NJ) in 1987.

[31]The classic statement is Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–33* (London: Allen Lane, 1973); the most extended working-through of all of the themes involved in the theory is Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). Note that this theory is susceptible to statement in a nonliberal form, as in Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Discussion here, however, is of the liberal version.

[32]Charles Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Reconstruction in France, Germany and Italy in the Decade after World War I* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War Two," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 19–42; Maier, "The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in 20th Century Europe," *American Historical Review* 86 (2) (1981), pp. 327–52.

[33]Joanne Gowa, *Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[34]Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley, CA: University of Berkeley Press, 1985).

[35]Harold Lever and Christopher Huhne, *Debt and Danger: The World Financial Crisis* (London: Penguin, 1985); Susan Strange, *Casino Capitalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

[36]The distinction between portfolio and multinational investment is clearly made by Robert G. Gilpin, Jr., *US Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

[37]Susan Strange, "Still an Extraordinary Power: America's Role in a Global Monetary System," in Raymond E. Lombra and William E. Witte, eds., *Political Economy of International and Domestic Monetary Relations* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1982), pp. 73–93.

[38]Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

[39]Gowa, *Closing the Gold Window*.

[40]Judith Goldstein, "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: A Comparative Study of the Origins of US Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies," *International Organisation* (forthcoming).

[41]Jeff Frieden, "From Economic Nationalism to Hegemony: Social Forces and the Emergence of Modern US Economic Policy, 1914–40," *International Organisation* (forthcoming).

[42]David Lake, *Modern Mercantilism: International Economic Strategy and American Trade Strategy, 1887–1934* (forthcoming).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[43]Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and US Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); Barrington Moore, *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977), chapter 5; Raymond Aron, *Imperial Republic* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978).

[44]Interestingly, the origins of distrust toward nationalism have roots in a racism that predates anticommunism, as has been shown by Howard K. Beale in *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power* (New York: Calder Books, 1967).

[45]George Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–50* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[46]Piore and Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide*.

[47]The rationale behind this policy was spelled out for me in conversation by Robert Gilpin. Cf. his essay in this issue, and also his recent book, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).

[48]Cf. Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilites of Ethical International Politics* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981). To my knowledge, Hoffmann stands alone in trying to identify how infrastructural capacity rather than mere despotism may be encouraged in Third World states.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Anthony Downs

The Evolution of Democracy: How Its Axioms and Institutional Forms Have Been Adapted to Changing Social Forces

DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT have always differed greatly, both because their underlying societies have varied traits, and because each democracy was established through a unique historical process. However, most major democracies in existence for more than 100 years have experienced a similar, dramatic evolution in their interpretations of democracy's three central axioms: the principles of individual liberty, equality, and citizen participation in government. This evolution in interpretation has been caused by three factors: (1) inherent ambiguities in the meaning of each axiom, (2) changes in underlying social conditions, many caused by forces common to all these democracies, and (3) ongoing interactions among the three axioms themselves. The ways in which this evolution has proceeded in long-established democracies are related to the particular institutional forms adopted by each democracy. This essay first examines the evolution of democracy's axioms, and then discusses how the institutional structure of each democracy is related to the underlying traits of its culture and population.

THE EVOLUTION OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Most of the democracies established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not initially permit all adult citizens to vote; they restricted the franchise to propertied adult men. As time passed,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, this interpretation of the principle of citizen participation gradually broadened. Property restrictions were slowly eliminated, permitting large groups of relatively poor male workers to vote. Then women were enfranchised.

But ending legal barriers to voting did not allow all groups in society to become politically active. In the United States, black political participation in the South was effectively inhibited for two centuries—first by slavery, then by various devices like the poll tax and threats of retaliation against freed blacks who voted. Blacks' participation in politics became relatively unconstrained only after the civil rights disturbances of the 1960s.

Recent extensions of citizen participation have gone beyond the exercise of voting rights to widespread direct political action by more groups than in the past. These include groups representing special interests, specific neighborhoods, single issues, corporations, and population segments such as homosexuals. The ability of a small number of people to obtain broad publicity for their cause by staging media events has contributed to this expansion. It has opened the way for more groups to gain power—at least the power to be consulted in government decisionmaking.

In fact, some political scientists believe citizen participation in government decisionmaking has become too widespread.[1] Greater citizen participation often causes long delays in decisionmaking because many affected groups are consulted and must take time to arrive at a mutual agreement. Because of both inflation and interest payments on committed funds, these delays can add immensely to the costs of building such proposed projects as nuclear power plants, highways, and shopping centers. In some cases, each involved group can veto any change in the status quo by withholding its approval; hence, broad citizen participation may lead to virtual paralysis. Even so, the current trend in most democracies is toward including more citizens in many decisionmaking processes.

Nevertheless, large numbers of citizens in modern democracies do not participate in governing themselves. In the United States, close to half of all eligible citizens fail to vote in major elections. Even larger fractions do not participate in politics in other ways. This situation has generated two different reactions among political observers.

One is cynicism concerning the possibility of "government with the consent of the governed." Persons with this attitude believe "citizen

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

participation" is a fiction that disguises actual control of the governing process by one or more small elites; they cite data concerning the low level of political information held by most citizens in democracies to prove that most people do not want to participate intensively in politics.

The other attitude is that more and more people should be directly incorporated in the governing process. Proponents of this view hope that greater leisure time resulting from higher productivity, shorter work weeks, and a more equal distribution of income will enable more citizens to participate in politics. They believe that people will do so because of the inherent joys of political involvement and a desire to exert greater influence on government policies. Advocates of increased participation believe that it would greatly improve the character and the civic responsibility of those citizens who became more active. This change would also represent a further step toward true "government by the people."

This view of "proper" citizen participation encompasses far more direct political activity than what now occurs. Michael Walzer recognizes that expecting greatly intensified citizen participation may be unrealistic. Recalling Oscar Wilde's remark that socialism would take too many evenings, he expresses his skepticism regarding its success:

> Radical politics radically increases the amount and intensity of political participation, but it does not (and probably ought not) break through the limits imposed on republican virtue by the inevitable pluralism of commitments, the terrible shortage of time, and the day-to-day hedonism of ordinary men and women. . . . Participatory democracy means the sharing of power among the activists. Socialism means the rule of the people with the most evenings to spare.[2]

Yet even this modified view of future citizen participation calls for much more widespread personal involvement in government affairs than now occurs in most democratic societies. Whether citizen participation in democracies will evolve in this direction remains to be seen.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE WELFARE STATE FROM THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE

Broadening the scope of citizen participation had a strong impact on the interpretation of the principle of equality. As more nonpropertied

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and poor persons gained potential political influence, elected politicians created more ways for national governments to improve their welfare. Eventually, a whole set of government programs emerged; together, they comprise the "welfare state." Its basic goal is to provide publicly-financed assistance to those without the means to remedy their problems of unemployment, poor health, physical disabilities, old age, or property losses caused by natural disasters.

The welfare state is an application of democracy's equality axiom. Most of its programs involve taxing people in the middle and upper portions of society's income distribution to help people in the middle and lower portions. The welfare state came into being because providing every citizen with one vote gave large numbers of lower-income people the political power to benefit themselves by heavily taxing smaller numbers of more affluent citizens. The net result has been greater equality of post-tax, post-transfer incomes among all households. In reality, much of this redistribution shifts resources from one part of the middle class to another, rather than to the lower classes. Nevertheless, considered in the aggregate within each democracy, welfare state programs—including the taxes that support them—clearly shift resources downward, thereby increasing economic equality.[3]

TENSIONS BETWEEN THE AXIOM OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY'S OTHER AXIOMS

The evolution of the equality principle's manifestations has created increased disparity between this principle and that of individual liberty. Because of inherent inequalities in abilities among individuals, operating a nation's economy through relatively free markets generally results in large income inequalities.[4] Thus, giving relatively free rein to individual liberty economically may reduce economic equality, in contrast to what obtains in more restrictive economic regimes. Conversely, increasing economic equality through development of a welfare state tends to restrict certain individual liberties. By imposing heavy taxes on high-income households, the welfare state reduces their freedom to use pre-tax resources. It also restricts freedom of entrepreneurial action by regulating minimum wage, working hours, required vacations and holidays, pensions, working conditions, and environmental pollution.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Encouragement of citizen participation, leading ever-larger shares of the population to become politically active, is not always consistent with the principle of individual liberty. On the one hand, increased citizen participation has increased the liberties of groups whose members formerly considered themselves politically powerless, such as blacks and Hispanics in the United States, and working-class residents in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, because relatively affluent citizens were the first to attain political power in early democracies, every broadening of citizen participation has weakened their power; hence their complaints that these extensions have "interfered with their liberties." Robert Moss expressed this view when he wrote:

> The apparatus of the Welfare State has extended far beyond its original goals, which were accepted by all parties: the creation of real equality of opportunity and the provision for the basic necessities of people who are unable (because of age, or infirmity, or the hazards of economic life) to fend for themselves. The Welfare State has instead become a means of shielding its beneficiaries from every risk that is likely to confront them between cradle and coffin.[5]

Moss believes these extensions of government power are detrimental; he states that "there no longer appear to be accepted or enforceable limits to government action, which is steadily cutting away the social and economic basis for a free society."[6] Yet studies of the distribution of incomes and wealth in most democratic societies show conclusively that households in the upper 20 percent of every such society still control disproportionately large shares of economic resources, while those in the lower 20 percent have disproportionately small shares.[7] The welfare state's "interference" with the individual liberties of the affluent has not resulted in anything like the establishment of economic equality.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

The meaning of individual liberty has evolved in conflicting directions. Individual rights to use private property have been increasingly restricted in the twentieth century by expanding government powers and regulations, including adoption of a progressive income tax and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

passage of laws limiting entrepreneurial actions. Most of these restrictions have been justified as necessary for the protection of citizens from adverse consequences of individual or corporate actions. For example, laws require businesses to clean up harmful environmental spills to protect innocent bystanders from pollution.

At the same time, the rights of individuals at the bottom of society have been expanded in two ways. The welfare state is designed to reduce the inherent risks of life by providing basic benefits to those who cannot afford them. Some of these benefits, such as health care and food stamps, have become "rights" in the sense that everyone in society with certain attributes is entitled to receive them.

In the United States, the noneconomic rights of individuals have been notably expanded in the past few decades. The civil rights of ethnic minorities are now given greater legislative and administrative protection than in the past. In addition, persons accused of crimes must be informed of their rights upon arrest, provided with counsel, protected from searches without warrants, and given decent living conditions if jailed. In general, the evolution of individual rights in democracies during the past century has moved toward their expansion rather than their contraction, in spite of greater restrictions on the use of property.

THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF EQUALITY IN SOCIETY

The principle of equality is hard to define because the situations and capabilities of individuals within every society are diverse and hence unequal.[8] As Douglas Rae has said, "Specific notions of equality are spawned from the general idea of equality, and come into conflict with one another. Perhaps indeed the idea against which equality must struggle most heroically is equality itself."[9] A few examples of the paradox revealed in Rae's analysis are worth considering.

Should equality be conceived of as person-regarding or lot-regarding? The former means providing conditions that are equally well tailored to the varied and subjective needs, conditions, and capabilities of every individual. Policies designed to achieve this must treat each person differently, in accordance with his or her specific circumstances. In contrast, lot-regarding equality provides each person with equal, objective allocations. In education, for example, person-regarding equality would involve many different

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

educational programs tailored to suit the talents and interests of each child; lot-regarding equality would provide each child with exactly the same courses and materials.

Lot-regarding equality has the advantage of being publicly demonstrable while requiring no attention to the traits of individual subjects. The achievement of person-regarding equality requires comparing immeasurable subjective mental states of individual satisfaction, or at least taking the varying traits of individuals into account. Some public policies, such as paying for health care, do respond to individuals' specific needs for aid by treating those with different perceived needs differently (but treating those with the same perceived needs equally). Yet while person-regarding equality is what matters most to human beings, public policies usually focus on lot-regarding equality because it is much easier to administer.

To whom should equality apply? Within a given population, should it be inclusionary (applying to everyone in the population) or exclusionary (applying only to subgroups of the entire population)? A common example of exclusionary application involves dividing society into segments according to certain traits, treating all individuals within each segment equally, but treating people within different segments differently. For instance, low-income women who head households with children are eligible for federal aid for families with dependent children; presumably, women within this group have equal access to such aid. But women who head households with children and have higher incomes are not eligible; nor are single men. Any intensive division of labor creates multiple grounds for social segmentation of this type, which is almost universal.

Trying to achieve inclusionary equality throughout a large society—in respect, for example, to education or incomes—has a negative effect on individual liberties in the sense that it usually requires strong centralization of power. If power is decentralized, however, and given to subgroups, no one can ensure that members of different subgroups are treated equally. Therefore, the more traits one believes should be equalized for everyone in society, the more one is committed to supporting centralized government power. Clearly, the principle of equality can conflict with the principle of individual liberty.

Finally, to what domains should equality apply, and what specific elements of a given domain should be equalized? Consider the broad domain of economic resources. In all large societies, both total wealth

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and pre-tax incomes are unequal. Should income tax rates be made equal for all to achieve marginal equality? That policy would cover only a narrow portion of all economic resources; it would fail to produce equality in the broader domain of after-tax incomes. Persons with high pre-tax incomes would still have much greater after-tax incomes than persons with low pre-tax incomes. Should after-tax incomes be made equal for all? Even if that were done (through unequal marginal tax rates), great inequality would remain within a still broader domain: total wealth. Should total wealth be made equal for all, to create a "global equality" of economic resources? That would require massively unequal redistributions of wealth through government coercion. Yet these redistributions could be considered compensatory inequality: distributing a good unequally in order to offset a preexisting inequality.[10]

Broadening the domain within which equality is sought increases the need for centralized government power to attain it. Choosing how narrow or how broad that domain should be is a major issue in most democracies today. An additional complication is that different domains may be linked causally; equalizing (or failing to equalize) in one domain can affect how equal things will be in another. For example, while capitalist economic theory advocates rewarding people equally in relation to their individual productivity, that productivity is influenced by unequally distributed factors such as education and inherited talents.

Other complexities concerning applications of the principle of equality include the following:

- Most egalitarian public policies try to attain greater relative equality rather than absolute equality. The former implies that one allocation of resources will be closer to complete equality than another, but neither will ever achieve it. The latter implies that there will be complete equality among individuals in the overall distribution of the resource concerned.
- Should public policies aim at equality of opportunity or equality of result? The former implies that every individual will have an equal chance of attaining some outcome, but doing so will depend on individual ability or effort. The latter implies that every individual involved will attain exactly the same outcome regardless of personal traits.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Applying the principle of equality in practice involves grappling with difficult issues, not the least being the conflicts among individuals who subscribe to different meanings of that principle. It is scarcely surprising that great inequalities continue to exist within societies that sincerely espouse the principle of equality.

WHICH SPECIFIC RIGHTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED "INALIENABLE"?

There is no widespread agreement as to which specific rights should be considered inalienable in a democracy. The Declaration of Independence identified such rights as including (but not necessarily limited to) "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The Bill of Rights enumerated more specific rights, including the right to freedom of speech, religion, and assembly, to a jury trial by one's peers, and to private property.[11] More recently, the American Roman Catholic bishops declared that such rights should include decent housing, adequate health care, and a minimum-wage job.[12]

Most of the specific rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution were designed to allow individuals to act on their own behalf, or as they see fit, without undue interference from the government. Those rights do not entitle individuals to specific outcomes—only to the opportunity to act. The Declaration of Independence does not say that individuals have the right to "happiness" (something that no government can guarantee), but only to "the pursuit of happiness." The responsibility for achieving specific outcomes is left to each individual; this approach assumes that every citizen possesses some degree of self-reliance.

In contrast, some people today argue that every citizen has an inalienable right to certain material outcomes, such as decent housing and adequate health care. They contend that if an individual cannot achieve those outcomes (as many cannot), society should provide them. This approach raises four key issues:

- *Exactly how should these material outcomes be defined?* For example, what constitutes "decent" housing? To be considered decent, just how big must a housing unit be, how well-built must it be, what specific amenities (such as heating, plumbing, water, electricity, garage, air-conditioning) must it contain, how crowded can it be, and in what kind of a neighborhood must it be located? At present,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

answers to these questions vary immensely throughout the world. Should everyone in the world nevertheless be entitled to the same result? Or should acceptable standards of housing decency vary from one society to another, or even within different parts of a society?

- *Who should pay for provision of material outcomes to those who cannot achieve them on their own?* The financial resources required may be very large indeed, especially if such rights are to be provided for every human being in the world. But who must sacrifice resources they would otherwise control in order to achieve these rights on behalf of those who lack self-reliance?
- *How much authority and power should be given to governments to provide those material outcomes? And would the resulting concentration of power in governments excessively inhibit the freedom of individuals?* Experience proves that the voluntary efforts of private citizens are insufficient to provide material outcomes to all persons who cannot achieve such outcomes themselves. Instead, governments typically must assume much of that responsibility; they must use either explicit or implicit coercion (usually through taxes) to take resources away from some people to provide others with these outcomes. This process expands the power of government at the expense of the rights and material well-being of many citizens. How far can such expansion of government power go without endangering other elements of democracy?
- *Should receipt of these material outcomes be an inalienable right of all human beings on earth, or just of citizens within the society thus defining such rights?* Individual rights are meaningless in practice unless institutions exist that are both capable of carrying them out and willing to do so. At present, nation-states are the major institutions that fill this role, and they tend to pay more attention to the rights of their own citizens than to those of citizens in other nation-states. This is true in both defining individual rights and in enforcing them. What moral obligation does each society have to extend the material outcomes implied by "inalienable rights" to all other persons elsewhere? And how could it do so without infringing on the powers of governments in other nation-states?

There are no unequivocal answers to these questions that are equally applicable in all times, places, and societies. The achievement

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and definition of humanity's "inalienable" individual rights appear to be the results of gradual historical processes. Three dimensions of individual rights are still evolving: (1) recognition of the basic idea of their inalienability; (2) specific definition of what rights should be considered inalienable; and (3) extension of their actual achievement to more and more people.

Throughout most of human history, governments have not maintained that every individual possesses inalienable rights. While certain individual rights were accorded citizens in ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and other societies, these rights were not considered inalienable, and many people were denied them. The concept of inalienability of individual rights owes something to the Christian belief that all people are created by God with immortal souls and opportunity for personal salvation. But the concept of inalienable rights became widely recognized in practice only after the Declaration of Independence, and even the Founding Fathers did not extend such rights to slaves or women. To achieve that took over 130 years, requiring both a bloody civil war and several constitutional amendments. In certain respects, the achievement of basic political rights for most American citizens, regardless of race or sex, is still not fully guaranteed.

The current attempt to extend the concept of inalienable rights from the mainly political rights conceived of by the Founding Fathers to the economic rights espoused by the Catholic bishops (but not yet accepted by the U.S. Congress) can be seen as part of this process of evolution. This is also true of the U.S. government's attempts to make human rights issues part of its foreign policy, and of certain private groups' efforts to pressure governments throughout the world to end torture and arbitrary imprisonment.[13] In each of these cases, some group is trying to extend the currently accepted boundaries of one of the three dimensions of individual rights. There is likely to be a never-ending struggle between those who seek to extend those boundaries and those who wish to maintain them or constrict them to narrower areas of application.

TWO PROTOTYPES FOR THE FORMS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS

While democratic governments are compelled to deal with such issues, how they do so will be fundamentally affected by the kinds of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political institutions they have adopted. The multitude of democratic forms can be analyzed in relationship to two basic prototypes.[14] Both embody all the central axioms of democracy, but each emphasizes a different one. These two prototypes represent two different answers to the question: What is meant by *the people* in the fundamental definition of democracy as "government by the people"? As Arend Lijphart asked, "Who will do the governing and to whose interests should the government be responsive when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences?" He goes on to say:

> One answer is: the majority of the people. Its great merit is that any other answer, such as the requirement of unanimity or a qualified majority, entails minority rule—or at least a minority veto—and that government by the majority and in accordance with the majority's wishes comes closer to the democratic ideal than government by and responsive to a minority.[15]

This answer leads to the *majoritarian model* of democracy. Its institutions emphasize majority rule, which is derived from the central principle of equality.

But there is another equally compelling answer: government should be responsive to as many people as possible. W. Arthur Lewis has argued that the primary meaning of democracy is that "all who are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in making that decision, either directly or through chosen representatives."[16] If a majority wins office in a democracy and does not allow the minority to exercise any power in government, then those excluded are not truly participating in self-government.

The merit of the latter answer is that a government that responds to nearly all sizable groups in society to some degree does not leave any minorities feeling left out or neglected. Hence it is less likely to spawn resentment and disloyalty from minority groups than a government that serves only a majority. This idea leads to the *consensual model* of democracy, whose institutions emphasize citizen participation, one of the central principles of democracy.

The majoritarian and consensual prototypes can be viewed as two contrasting models in a broad spectrum of possible democratic institutions. Analysis of these models illuminates possible underlying relationships between the democratic institutions in a society and its key social and cultural conditions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Majoritarian Prototype

Majoritarian institutional forms concentrate governmental powers in the hands of whatever party wins the most votes, excluding other parties from any exercise of power whatsoever. They also concentrate government powers in the national legislature and especially in the executive derived from that legislature. Little power is delegated to lower-level bodies such as state, province, or local governments. Moreover, there are no external checks on the power of the legislature, such as judicial review of its actions.

As developed by Lijphart, the majoritarian prototype in its purest form contains the following basic elements:

- Concentration of executive power through one-party and bare-majority cabinets in the government.
- Fusion of power within the executive cabinet through strong cabinet dominance of government.
- A two-house legislature in which one house has most of the power.
- A two-party system.
- A largely one-dimensional party system in which political contests and governmental issues focus on a single major dimension (e.g., socioeconomic policies in the United Kingdom).
- A plurality system of election in which the party with the most votes wins office, and all others are excluded from office. This is usually accompanied by single-member electoral districts in which the individual candidate with the most votes is the sole person elected from each district.
- Unitary and centralized government, with dominant power exercised at the national level rather than at lower levels (i.e., state, province, or local governments).
- No written constitution.
- Parliamentary sovereignty: all final power is vested in the legislature, with no formal judicial review of its decisions.
- Exclusively representative democracy: no direct votes on issues by the citizenry.

Only a few governments actually exhibit all these characteristics. Lijphart cites New Zealand and the United Kingdom as coming closest to this prototype; many others have most of these traits.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There are big differences between the presidential and parliamentary forms of the majoritarian model. In the presidential system, used in the United States, the executive and legislature are separately elected. In the parliamentary system, only the legislature is elected; its members then select key members of the executive. The executive is more powerful in the parliamentary system because its members can normally count on support from a majority in the legislature. But the executive is more stable in the presidential system because the legislature cannot dismiss it from office.

The concentration of power in majoritarian systems usually gives the government the ability to act decisively. It also permits relatively strong coordination of governmental policies throughout the society. But the exclusion of minority groups from exercising governmental power may alienate them from the government or even from the whole political system. Whether this occurs depends greatly on how strongly differences among social groups influence their thinking and behavior.

If the society's population is relatively homogeneous in its major traits, the beliefs and policy preferences of all sizable segments do not differ dramatically; therefore, no segment fears governmental dominance by any other. Similar confidence is encouraged if the society's key political controversies involve a single "issue dimension." For example, the biggest perennial political battles in the United Kingdom concern economic issues: how incomes should be taxed and redistributed, how many government resources should be devoted to social services, and whether or not the government should own any of the major means of production. Little political energy is devoted to religious or cultural–ethnic questions, urban–rural conflicts, and other issues that are divisive in other democratic societies.

The Consensual Prototype

Many societies are sharply divided into subgroups with widely varying beliefs about what society ought to be like and what policies governments ought to adopt. Such social cleavages can occur in respect to many issues, including those of a socioeconomic, religious, cultural–ethnic, and urban–rural nature; degrees of loyalty or hostility to democracy; attitudes about foreign policy; and attitudes about political participation and environmentalism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In cleavage-ridden societies, exclusion of large groups from governmental power may represent a threat to those groups. They may fear that permitting another group to exercise great governmental power could result in policies harmful to their preferred way of life or even to their survival as a group. Such fears can weaken their allegiance to democratic forms of government. As Robert Dahl has pointed out, "Any dispute in which a large section of the population of a country feels that its way of life or its highest values are severely menaced by another segment of the population creates a crisis in a competitive system."[17] For example, in parts of India, many Sikhs appear to be rejecting democracy because the government is dominated by Hindus, who they fear will not allow them sufficient religious freedom. Such outcomes can be avoided by permitting sizable minority groups to share enough governmental power so that they do not fear that the government will harm their vital interests. This requires that minorities have both (1) a significant voice in shaping current government policies and (2) enough power to prevent major changes in existing policies to which they had agreed at the outset of democratic government. These objectives can be achieved through institutional forms designed to restrain the majority's governmental powers. Such forms comprise the consensual prototype of democracy, which requires the majority to share, fairly distribute, disperse, delegate, and limit its exercise of governmental powers. Its basic elements are as follows:

- Sharing of executive power in grand coalitions containing members of all major political parties, including those with minority shares of the total vote. At least some positions are thus assigned to every party with any significant percentage of the total vote, except for extremist parties (those opposed to democracy itself).
- Separation of powers within different parts of the government (legislative, executive, and judicial), both formally and informally.
- A two-house legislature in which both houses exercise about-equal powers, but one gives minorities special representation disproportionate to their absolute numbers in society.
- A multiparty system in which each party is usually identified with specific subgroups in society.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

- A multiple-dimension party system in which political contests and government policies are not focused on a single set of issues, but involve several dimensions (such as the distribution of income among different socioeconomic groups, and linkages of public policies to specific religious or ethnic viewpoints).
- Proportional representation, in which each party (either at the national or district level) elects persons to office roughly in proportion to its share of the overall vote, rather than by winning a plurality of votes.
- Territorial and nonterritorial federalism and decentralization, in which significant governmental powers are formally vested in bodies below the national level, such as provinces, states, or localities.
- A written constitution that provides a minority with the ability to veto changes in it.

In contrast to the majoritarian prototype, the consensual model is designed to concentrate less power in the hands of the majority. Minority members can hold office within the national executive branch, win office and exercise significant power at lower levels of government, be represented in the legislature in proportion to their share of the total vote, and veto changes in the written constitution. Thus, within a consensual system, groups too small to form a majority can nevertheless participate meaningfully in the processes of government, and can even block major changes in existing governmental policies. The consensual prototype may be a far more effective form of democracy than the majoritarian prototype in pluralistic societies containing major social or other cleavages.

Lijphart believes that Switzerland is the only government that embodies nearly every element of the pure form of consensual government. Belgium, Finland, and the Netherlands, however, also have governments dominated by consensual elements.

FACTORS AFFECTING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND DEMOCRATIC FORMS

The above discussion indicates that—at least in theory—there ought to be important relationships between the basic conditions prevalent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in any democratic society and the specific forms of its governmental institutions. Societies with relatively homogeneous populations seem best suited for majoritarian institutions, whereas pluralistic societies containing many subgroups with diverse but intensely-held beliefs seem best suited for consensual institutions. But an examination of actual relationships between fundamental social conditions and democratic institutional forms shows these generalizations to be oversimplified. What variable social conditions are most relevant to determining which democratic forms might work best in each society?

Different Levels of Intensity Concerning Political Issues

Nearly all societies contain sizable subgroups with different characteristics and viewpoints. One factor determining the importance of these differences to democratic government is the intensity with which specific subgroups hold certain views or beliefs. This can be illustrated by a comparison of different levels of intensity concerning socioeconomic and religious issues—just two of several possible issue dimensions.

Socioeconomic issues relate to how much the government regulates, modifies, or controls economic markets. Specifically, they concern the following policy questions:[18]

- Governmental (versus private) ownership of the means of production.
- A strong (versus weak) governmental role in economic planning.
- Support of (versus opposition to) the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.
- Expansion of (versus resistance to) governmental social welfare programs.

Two expert observers have reached seemingly opposite conclusions about the saliency of these questions in democratic politics. Lijphart found that the socioeconomic dimension was present in all twenty-two democratic governments he analyzed, and was a central political issue in nineteen of them (all but Canada, Iceland, and the United States).* The second most common issue dimension was

*Lijphart analyzed twenty-one democratic *nations*, but twenty-two democratic *governments*, since he counted the Fourth and Fifth Republics in France separately. In most cases, I will refer to twenty-two democracies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

religion, present in eleven democracies and a high-saliency issue in nine of them. No other issue dimensions were nearly as important within these democracies.[19]

But Robert Dahl argues that socioeconomic differences, in contrast to religious differences, have almost never fragmented societies into "warring groups":

> For over a century, reflections about polarizations and civil war have been dominated, even among non-Marxists, by Marx's conception of polarization around the node of economic classes—working class and bourgeoisie. Yet . . . since the Communist Manifesto was published, no country has developed according to the Marxist model of conflict, nor has any regime, whether hegemonic or competitive, fallen or been transformed because of a clear-cut polarization of working class and bourgeoisie.[20]

Dahl concludes that major social cleavages are more likely to be based on differences in religion, language, race or ethnic group, and region than on economic class conflicts. These bases of fragmentation are more profound and longer-lasting than economic issues:

> Presumably because an ethnic or religious identity is incorporated so early and so deeply into one's personality, conflicts among ethnic or religious sub-cultures are specially fraught with danger, particularly if they are also tied to region. . . . Conflicts among ethnic and religious sub-cultures are so easily seen as threats to one's fundamental self.[21]

The seemingly contradictory conclusions of Lijphart and Dahl are not inconsistent if a society can deal with controversial issues on two separate levels.[22] One level is the arena of electoral political conflict, in which decisions are made through the voting process and subsequent government action. The losing parties in this arena must accept policy changes made by the winners (who may be just a bare majority) through normal legislative and executive action.

Another, deeper level is in the society's fundamental political constitution, whether written or unwritten. The constitution embodies institutional and policy arrangements considered too important to be dealt with in the normal electoral manner. A social consensus exists (usually explicit in written constitutions) that society cannot change these constitutional structures without going through extraordinary processes that are deliberately made difficult to carry out. More than a bare majority of voters is almost always required to approve of proposed constitutional changes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These two levels are related to what Bruce Berkowitz has called "pivotal issues" in his theory of political stability.[23] In many societies, certain groups—often minorities—consider key existing social arrangements critically important to their welfare. They do not want changes in those arrangements to be possible through normal electoral processes that might be controlled by a bare majority. In fact, many members of such groups are willing to remain peaceful citizens of the existing democracy only as long as these key arrangements remain unchanged. To gain their support in the initial formation of the political order, framers of the basic constitution embed these arrangements in the constitution itself, outside the arena of common political controversy.

Berkowitz believes that slavery was a pivotal issue in the development of the American Constitution. To gain the support of southern states, the Constitution of 1789 did not challenge the continuation of slavery, in spite of sweeping rhetoric about the sanctity of human rights that appears in both the Constitution and the preceding Declaration of Independence. Later, American public opinion changed enough to make slavery's continuance a major issue in the normal political arena. As a result, the South quit the Union rather than accept the antislavery policies that seemed imminent. It took the bloodiest war in American history to restore southern membership to the Union under the revised Constitution.

In considering how powerfully an issue causing social cleavage may affect democracy, it is necessary to examine at what level of intensity or profundity that issue exists in the minds of its proponents. Lijphart found that "socioeconomic status, or social class, is of universal importance in virtually all industrialized countries, and . . . religion is often not important at all, such as in religiously homogeneous societies; however, *when both factors play a role, religion tends to have a stronger influence on party choice* [on voting behavior].[24] (Italics added.)

This observation indicates that when voters regard religion as politically important, they view it as more profoundly important than socioeconomic issues. Yet Lijphart also found that when both socioeconomic and religious issues were present in a democratic system, socioeconomic factors were far more important in determining how political parties combined to form coalition governments.[25] But coalition governments function mainly at the level of normal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

electoral politics, whereas religious issues are more likely to be dealt with at the deeper constitutional level. Taking the two levels into account reconciles these seemingly conflicting findings.

Intensity of Group Loyalties

How strongly members of a given group feel loyal to that group or to its principles can greatly influence their political behavior. This introduces potentially powerful nonrational elements into that behavior.[26] The intensity of such loyalties can change markedly over time, and varies tremendously from one place to another. For example, religious conflicts between Catholics and Protestants stimulated centuries of bitter warfare throughout Europe after the Reformation. But the growth of secularism and the development of religious freedom within Western societies have greatly diminished the influence of Christian religious beliefs on politics. Such beliefs no longer engender much political and social conflict (except in a few locations, such as Ireland). On the other hand, religious beliefs remain strong political forces in much of the Islamic world; their importance has increased dramatically during the past two decades in Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, and other parts of the Middle East.

Whether Divisive Factors are "Reinforcing" or "Crosscutting"[27]

Different divisive factors, such as religion and economic status, are reinforcing if most members of one group concerning one factor (e.g., Protestants concerning religion) are also members of one group concerning another factor (e.g., wealthy or middle-class individuals concerning economic status), while most members of some other group concerning the first factor (Catholics) are also members of some other group concerning the second factor (poor). In such cases, the separateness and possible antipathy of each group vis-à-vis the other concerning religion is strengthened by their matching separateness concerning economic status.

Divisive factors are crosscutting if members of one group concerning one factor (e.g., Protestants) are divided among several different groups concerning a second factor (e.g., wealthy, middle-class, poor) rather than all similar in regard to that factor, while members of a second group (Catholics) are also divided among several groups concerning that second factor. In this example, the separateness of Protestants and Catholics concerning religion is partly offset by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fact that both Protestants and Catholics belong to several different economic status groups, each such group containing both Protestant and Catholic members who presumably share similar viewpoints concerning economic status.

Societies in which many divisive factors are reinforcing are likely to have more severe social cleavages than those in which most divisive factors are crosscutting. As Seymour Martin Lipset explains, "Multiple and politically inconsistent affiliations, loyalties, and stimuli reduce the emotion and aggressiveness involved in political choice. . . . The chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations."[28] For example, in the United States, Catholics and Protestants generally have similar educational attainments and income and occupational distributions, and belong to many of the same groups concerning nonreligious factors. Any likely political impacts of their religious differences are muted by their joint membership in these other groups. In contrast, most Chinese citizens in Malaysia are also Buddhist and relatively well-off economically; most Malays are also Moslem and relatively poor. These triply-reinforcing divisions have created a deep cleavage between the two groups.

The Balance of Power Among Divided Groups

The political impact of deep cleavages among social subgroups is immensely influenced by the relative overall strength of each subgroup. In societies where one subgroup is much larger than all others and commands more resources, the distribution of political power will be quite different from that in societies where several major subgroups have roughly the same size and resources. For example, in Singapore, persons of Chinese ancestry account for most of the population, although members of many other ethnic groups are present. Hence the Chinese are politically dominant, even though they permit three other languages to be used in Singapore schools. But in Lebanon, dozens of different religious sects (often with ethnically homogeneous members) are present, and none of them is able to dominate all the others. Their relative parity has aggravated the amount of conflict in that society.

Robert Dahl contends that societies containing just two major social groups are more likely to be gripped by intense political conflict

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than those containing many social groups, none of which constitutes a majority. In a society with only two major social groups, one group is a majority and the other a minority; the latter may feel threatened by a government dominated by the former, especially if the minority seems perpetually condemned to being out of power. Northern Ireland exemplifies this situation. But in a multigroup society in which no one group can completely dominate, groups are more likely to cooperate in order to aggregate enough power to accomplish common goals. Dahl cites India as an example of this situation.[29]

The Geographic Location of Different Subgroups

If most members of a certain group are concentrated in a single area of a nation, and if that area's population consists primarily of those members, the area is likely to press for considerable autonomy in its own affairs. Members of the concentrated group may even seek independence from the nation. Such pressure is clearly visible today among the Basques in Spain, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Sikhs in parts of India. However, geographic concentration of a minority also makes it possible to create a federal system of government in which considerable power is delegated to local residents. Such strong federalism is difficult or impossible when members of each minority are scattered geographically, with members of many different groups commingled in each area.

Total Size of the Nation

The larger a nation's population, the harder it is to achieve unity among its members. Large nations are more likely to contain heterogeneous ethnic groups than small nations are. Moreover, differing regional perspectives are more likely to have developed over time within big nations. Consequently, large countries are more likely to adopt federal systems that decentralize power. Also, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., found population size positively related to political rioting and deaths.[30] Perhaps the remoteness from government felt by average citizens in a large nation predisposes them to seek meaningful participation through violence rather than through more legitimate channels.

Prior Traditional Relationships Among Elites

Democracy requires a certain degree of trust among leaders of all major social groups. Leaders must not fear that other groups, if they

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gain power, will act in a hostile manner toward them or their groups. Whether such attitudes of reciprocal trust and tolerance exist among leadership elites in a society is determined by their past relationships. For example, in some African nations, neighboring tribes have long histories of bitter warfare in which each tribe has murdered thousands of the other tribe's members. Such relationships are hardly a foundation for stable democracy in a newly-independent nation.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL AND ELECTORAL FORMS IN DEMOCRACY

Recent empirical studies prove that specific constitutional and electoral forms are not the only major determinants of government behavior in democracies. Moreover, causality often flows two ways: a society's specific institutional forms influence its political behavior, but its underlying social traits may also influence its initial choice of institutional forms. The latter relationship is vital in considering what forms might be best suited to presently nondemocratic societies if and when they consider becoming democracies.

Electoral and Party Systems

Two key aspects of democratic institutions are how governments are elected and how many major parties the political system contains. These aspects are closely related because each type of electoral system generates a specific type of party system.

One of the two commonly used methods of choosing a government is electing a single representative from each geographic district. The candidate who gets the most votes is chosen; all others are rejected. Use of such single-member district representation emphasizes winning a plurality of votes in each area; the only sure way to do that is to win a majority. Therefore, in the nation as a whole, small interest groups have a powerful incentive to merge into parties large enough and broad enough in appeal that they have the potential to capture a majority of votes in each district. This is why nations that elect candidates from single-member districts usually have two-party systems. Six of the twenty-two democracies analyzed by Lijphart used some type of majority or plurality electoral system; he calculated an average of 2.4 effective parties in each of these nations.[31]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This electoral system is philosophically congruent with the majoritarian approach to democracy, as it awards all governmental power to whichever candidate wins the most votes. But the majority party tends to be overrepresented in the national legislature in relation to its share of the total popular vote. This occurs because the losing minority voters in each district are, in effect, not represented at all in the legislature, even though they may comprise a significant fraction of the district's total popular vote. This electoral arrangement is found in most majoritarian systems of government. For example, in the recent British election, the Conservatives won only 42 percent of the popular vote, but they have a large majority in the House of Commons.

The other widely used method of choosing a government is electing several representatives from each district and dividing them among major parties in rough proportion to their shares of the popular vote there. Such proportional representation can be carried out in several ways.[32] All tend to generate multiparty systems because minority parties can gain representation in the national legislature even if they do not win a majority or plurality of votes in any district. Proportional representation is most often associated with parliamentary governments rather than presidential ones.[33] Fifteen of the twenty-two democracies analyzed by Lijphart used proportional representation; they averaged 3.8 effective parties per nation.[34]

Proportional representation and multiparty systems are philosophically congruent with the consensual approach to democracy because they provide means for nonmajority groups to participate directly in government. Such participation can occur through representation in the legislature and representation in the executive when coalition governments are formed.

HOW CLOSE ARE ACTUAL DEMOCRACIES TO THE TWO MAJOR PROTOTYPES?

To answer this question, Lijphart studied the twenty-one societies he considered to be reasonably stable democracies as of 1980. His factor analysis revealed that their characteristics clustered around two factors: (1) the effective number of parties,[35] and (2) attributes of federalism, including bicameralism, decentralization, and rigid constitutions. He divided the twenty-one democracies into three groups

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

according to their traits related to each factor: those with clearly majoritarian traits, those with clearly consensual traits, and those with traits intermediate between majoritarian and consensual. He then developed a nine-cell matrix based on relationships between these two factors, as shown below. Societies he considered basically pluralist (as opposed to homogeneous) are shown in italics.

Classification of Democratic Systems by Arend Lijphart

Number-of-Parties Dimension	Federalism Dimension		
	Majoritarian (Centralized)	Intermediate	Consensual (Decentralized)
Majoritarian (Two Parties)	New Zealand United Kingdom	Ireland	Australia *Austria* *Canada* *Germany* *United States*
Intermediate	Iceland *Luxembourg*	*France V* Norway Sweden	*Italy* Japan
Consensual (Many Parties)	Denmark *Israel*	*Belgium* *Finland* *France IV* *Netherlands*	*Switzerland*

NOTE: France appears twice, for the Fourth and Fifth Republics.
Copyright © 1984 by Yale University Press. Reprinted by permission.[36]

Societies embodying the "purest" majoritarian traits are in the upper left-hand corner; those with the "purest" consensual traits are in the lower right-hand corner. Thus, only three of the twenty-one societies exhibit "pure" traits of either prototype. The largest group in any cell consists of the five societies in the upper right-hand corner. They combine consensual traits concerning federalism (that is, decentralized power structures) with majoritarian traits concerning elections (that is, less than three effective parties). Another large group (in the lowest central cell) combines intermediate decentralization of power with consensual party systems.

Actual democratic practice does not conform closely to the two "pure" prototypes; most societies mix either intermediate or opposite

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

traits. Yet there is a notable association of pluralist societies with consensual traits. Of the thirteen societies Lijphart considered pluralist, eleven have consensual traits concerning at least one factor, and none are "purely" majoritarian. Also, all of the democracies with Anglo-American heritage have strongly majoritarian electoral systems, whereas most Continental European democracies (eleven out of thirteen) have either consensual or intermediate electoral systems.

IS "POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT INTO NATIONHOOD" A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE TO DEMOCRACY?

Many nondemocratic societies—especially those created from former European colonies—have highly heterogeneous populations marked by deep cleavages among hostile subgroups. Some political scientists believe these societies must go through a process of "political development into nationhood" before they can possibly become effective democracies. This process has been described as follows:

> Democratization and other dimensions of [political] development are usually thought to be dependent upon national integration. . . . Nation-building must be accorded priority and must be the first task of the leaders of the developing states. . . . The usual view is that nation-building entails the eradication of primordial subnational attachments and their replacement with national loyalty.[37]

Thus, greater homogeneity of views, values, and loyalties must be created among the diverse citizens of these societies before democracy can work there. Meanwhile, say some observers, such societies must remain under nondemocratic governments.

Lijphart disputes this conclusion. He argues that diverse and heterogeneous societies can become successful democracies if they adopt consensual forms designed to involve diverse groups in active government participation. Moreover, says Lijphart, it is both difficult and undesirable to end or even reduce people's loyalties to various subgroups in many societies, as these loyalties are deeply rooted in individuals' personalities and identities. Even in the United States, which has been a democracy for over 200 years, some subgroup loyalties are amazingly persistent. Despite the metaphor of the "melting pot," many American ethnic and religious groups (e.g.,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jews, blacks, and Chinese) have maintained strong group identities over long periods.

Lijphart believes that leaders in many nondemocratic societies err in waiting until they have created a socially homogeneous population before trying democracy. They should instead design democratic institutions along consensual lines, building on strong subgroup identities rather than attempting to minimize or eliminate them.

While Lijphart is correct in contending that some pluralistic nations could erect successful democracies without destroying their social and cultural diversity, his analysis overlooks another crucial factor: the self-interest of the government elites in these nations. Most former European colonies that became independent states after World War II have abandoned their initial democratic institutional forms in favor of some type of one-party government. A key reason is that the elites who assumed power at the end of colonialism—or others who replaced them—found it advantageous to end democracy. By doing so, they consolidated their power and reduced the probability that they would be replaced in a popular election.

If these elites had tried to retain democratic institutions, they would have found themselves in a serious dilemma. Many had gained power through independence movements that generated high citizen expectations of rapid economic development, yet their societies had extremely limited capability to achieve those expectations. As the passage of time has clearly proved, these leaders were almost certain to disappoint their followers in terms of economic development. A disgruntled democratic electorate would most likely have voted them out of office, no matter how competently they had governed. To avoid that outcome, most leaders of emerging nations transformed their systems from nascent democracies into one-party states in which voters had no choice about who was running the government.

CONCLUSION

All human societies constantly change over time, and their average rate of change has accelerated dramatically during the past 200 years. Yet this period has also been the only one in human history during which democracy was widely adopted as a basic form of government. Therefore, its supporters have had to be flexible in two ways in order for democracy to survive.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One is by greatly altering the ways in which the three basic axioms of democracy have been interpreted over time as social conditions have evolved (partly in response to democracy itself). Those interpretations are still changing today.

The other is by designing specific institutional forms for democracy that vary greatly from one society to another. That permits democracy's forms to be well adapted to the particular social and geographic conditions of each society.

Both types of flexibility have been accomplished without destroying the basic nature of democracy. In fact, they can be seen as striving over time to achieve its basic ideals more fully, in a greater variety of circumstances.

This proves that democracy is a dynamic process of governance and even of living in general, not a static institutional construct. Supporters of democracy must continue to change its specific meanings and forms, without destroying its fundamental nature, if they want it to survive another 200 years.

ENDNOTES

This paper is adapted, with permission, from part of an untitled manuscript slated for future publication by The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Copyright © by the Brookings Institution.

[1]For example, Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee wrote as follows: "Lack of interest by some people is not without its benefits. . . . Extreme interest goes with extreme partisanship and might culminate in rigid fanaticism that could destroy democratic processes if generalized throughout the community. . . . Only the doctrinaire would deprecate the moderate indifference that facilitates compromise." From Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, "Democratic Practice and Political Theory," in *Political Elites in a Democracy*, ed. Peter Bachrach (New York: Atherton Press, 1971), p. 38. However, every past extension of citizen participation has also been opposed as likely to undermine good government.

[2]Michael Walzer, *Radical Principles* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1980), p. 134.

[3]Morgan Reynolds and Eugene Smolensky, *Public Expenditures, Taxes, and the Distribution of Income* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), pp. 91–96.

[4]This does not imply that inequalities are smaller under the economies that operated prior to free-enterprise economies. However, many economic development experts believe the first stages of economic modernization involve increased inequalities if relatively free markets dominate during those initial stages. See Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 75.

[5]Robert Moss, *The Collapse of Democracy* (London: Temple Smith, 1975), p. 48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[6]Ibid., p. 55.

[7]In the United States in 1982–1983, average annual pre-tax income was $4,097 for the lowest-income 20 percent of all urban consumer units, but was $52,267 (12.75 times higher) for the highest-income 20 percent, according to *U.S. Statistical Abstract: 1986*, p. 443. In 1984, the 26 percent of U.S. households with the lowest incomes owned 10 percent of total household net worth, whereas the 12 percent of households with the highest incomes owned 38 percent of total household net worth. Thus, the wealthiest group had 8.2 times as great an average household net worth as the poorest one. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Household Wealth and Asset Ownership: 1984* (Washington, D.C.: Current Population Reports, P-70, No. 7, July 1986), p. 2.

[8]This discussion is based largely on Douglas Rae, *Equalities* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). It also draws upon R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (London: Unwin Books, 1952).

[9]Rae, *Equalities*, p. 5.

[10]An example of compensatory inequality is any affirmative action program that gives preferred access to jobs to minority-group members rather than majority group members. However, such programs involve marginal equalization of employment opportunities, not total equalization.

[11]"Amendments to the Constitution," in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, *The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States* (New York: The Modern Library), pp. 598–99.

[12]National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *Second Draft: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy* (Washington, D.C.: National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 7 October 1985), p. 25.

[13]A notable example of this is the work of Amnesty International, which received a Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts in 1977.

[14]Arend Lijphart presents the most comprehensive analysis of these two prototypes in *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). This essay draws heavily upon that book and three others: Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

[15]Lijphart, *Democracies*, p. 4.

[16]W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965), pp. 64–65.

[17]Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 105.

[18]These four points are quoted from Lijphart, *Democracies*, p. 129.

[19]Lijphart, *Democracies*, pp. 127–35.

[20]Dahl, *Polyarchy*, p. 106.

[21]Ibid., p. 108.

[22]Conceiving of different levels of political controversy and action is not a new idea. Political theorists since John Locke have differentiated between the normal level and the constitutional level. Contemporary examples of this distinction are found in (among others) John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); and Anthony

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1967), chapter XIV.

[23]Bruce D. Berkowitz, *Stability in Political Systems: The Decision to Be Governed* (Unpublished, undated mimeographed manuscript).

[24]Lijphart, *Democracies*, p. 143.

[25]Ibid., p. 146.

[26]The term "nonrational" does not mean *irrational*; it has no pejorative connotation. Rather, as used here, it refers to motivations derived from goals that are not themselves rationally derivable from the broad human ends that most social scientists regard as universal, such as needs for food, shelter, and personal security.

[27]This concept was developed by Seymour Martin Lipset in *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

[28]Ibid., p. 77.

[29]Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 115–18. Lebanon does not conform to this generalization—but then, Middle Eastern politics belie nearly all rational principles!

[30]Powell, *Contemporary Democracies*, p. 154.

[31]The *effective number of parties* is a measure that weighs the actual number of different political parties in a system by their relative electoral strength. Thus, a system with two parties that each get 50 percent of the vote has 2.0 effective parties. But if one party averages 70 percent of the vote, the effective number is 1.7. Lijphart calculated that the average effective number of parties in twenty-two democracies from 1945 to 1980 was highest in Finland (5.0) and lowest in the United States (1.9). See Lijphart, *Democracies*, pp. 116–23.

[32]These specific arrangements are described in Lijphart, *Democracies*, pp. 150–59.

[33]Only three of the twenty-two democracies studied by Lijphart had presidential systems: the United States, Finland, and the French Fifth Republic. Eighteen had parliaments in which the executive was dependent on the confidence of the legislature; one (Switzerland) had a parliament in which the executive was not dependent on the legislature's confidence, but it was a multiple executive. Thus, the parliamentary form is clearly dominant among existing democracies. See Lijphart, *Democracies*, p. 70.

[34]Ibid.

[35]The *effective number of parties* is defined in endnote 31.

[36]Lijphart, *Democracies*, p. 219.

[37]Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 19–20. As proponents of this view, Lijphart cites M. G. Smith, Leonard Binder, Lucien W. Pye, and Samuel P. Huntington.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Merry White

The Virtue of Japanese Mothers: Cultural Definitions of Women's Lives

MASAKO KANAZAWA is thirty years old and has two children, a boy age six and a girl age three. Her husband Tadao, age thirty-three, works for a bank. They live in an apartment in a large complex of buildings in Senri New Town, near Osaka.

Masako went to a two-year junior college, a good one with a stiff entrance examination (though that test was not as demanding as those taken by the few of her female high school friends who went on to four-year colleges). But neither the two-year nor the four-year college women devoted their time to serious study, for they, like their male counterparts, knew that what counted for their future success was the name of the college they attended, not the grades they earned. Most of the women considered their success to depend even more on the status of their future husband's university.

Masako met Tadao, who had gone to Osaka University, a prestigious national university, when she was twenty-three. She was a teller at the bank where he was (and still is) employed. Tadao's supervisor, a friend of Masako's uncle, acted as go-between for the *o-miai,* or formal introduction of the prospective bride and groom. Masako had already had one *o-miai* with an older man of thirty-three during her first year at the bank, but she turned him down. She told herself at the time that she was "just practicing" and had no strong interest in the man, who she thought was too old for her anyway. She wanted to put off marriage for a while, but when the *o-miai* with Tadao was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suggested, she agreed to it; she had already noticed him and found him attractive.

They hit it off immediately, and were married within six months. Nine months after the wedding, their first child was born. Masako's friends are all married now, but most have only one child, either because they chose to continue working after marriage or because they married later than Masako. She quit her job before she married Tadao, even though he encouraged her to keep it. Although she liked her work, she was uncomfortable working at the same bank as Tadao, and felt a certain amount of pressure to leave "on time." Her cohort of women staff was already significantly eroded by marriage dropouts.

Today Masako spends her time with the children, especially her daughter, as her son is in first grade. Her mornings are devoted to cleaning and shopping; her afternoons are spent at the playground if it is fair, inside if it is not, helping her son with his homework. Tadao is rarely home before ten o'clock and works half the day each Saturday. Sunday is the day for family excursions, or, when his work has been particularly draining, for Tadao to sleep most of the day while Masako takes the children out or tiptoes around him.

Masako's mother, age fifty, has quite a different life. Sumiko Tanaka's children are all grown and married, and her husband will retire in a few years. Meanwhile, she has thrown herself into community work, takes several classes in literature, flower arrangement, and cooking at the Cultural Center, and goes on excursions of several days' duration with her former classmates. Now more than ever before in her life, she indulges in shopping trips and beauty parlor sessions; she belongs to a health club and sees movies regularly. With no children to care for, she cares for herself.

She usually comes home at the same time as her husband, or minutes before, and often picks up prepared foods in the basement food hall of the local department store for supper. As her husband never brings colleagues to the house and the couple rarely entertains guests, Sumiko has little to do at home. She has, however, taken up cooking as a hobby; the kitchen is filled with new appliances, gadgets, and a wide selection of European-style cookbooks.

She realizes that her life will change when her husband retires, and she will have to focus her enormous energy on caring for him as she once did for their children. But for now, the aphoristic sentiment that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"the good husband is healthy and absent" applies, so Sumiko joins a committee involved in the campaign for safer playgrounds.

These portraits do not reveal all aspects of the two women's lives, but they provide a basis for considering some of the environments in which Japanese women live. While some aspects of Masako's and Sumiko's lives may seem familiar to their middle-class counterparts in America, their own interpretations of their lives may be quite alien, especially to American feminists. Can either of these women be seen as "liberated," or can neither be seen as independent, fulfilled?

A cross-cultural examination of women's lives shows the variety of possibilities for satisfaction and value in life that exists in the world. Japan in particular provides us with a fascinating, even shocking corrective to the Western ethnocentric bias and the "convergence" model of modernization popular twenty years ago. Although convergence theory (which maintains that all societies, as they industrialize, become alike) has been dismissed from the litanies of scholarship, extensions of it remain alive in certain quarters. In fact, Americans—even though we are more cautious (or less confident) than we used to be in exporting our way of life—continue to believe that there must exist *some* model for everyone in the world.

Thus we have become importers of life plans and philosophies along with the material goods that have upset our trade balance. Having looked at Japanese education and Japanese automobiles, we hasten to copy their schools, curricula, and pedagogies—to do battle in what Torsten Husen calls the "cognitive Olympics."[1]

Japan is undeniably a successful, modern, fully industrialized country. A walk on Tokyo's Ginza may confirm the newly-arrived Western visitor's preconception that reinforced concrete and neon, polished marble and halogen lamps have drawn us all closer. But when the visitor becomes a long-term resident and discovers that life in this environment is unfamiliar, that family patterns, career paths, personal goals and values are different, a new idea emerges: one can be modern and not be Western. This concept is a basis for understanding Masako and Sumiko.

It must be emphasized that the shapes of lives, the sources of satisfaction and meaning for men and women, differ throughout the world and thus have no one ideal model. Investigation of the relationship between values and social contexts, between ideals and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the functional consciousness that shapes how people live and experience their lives, reveals that diversity is the rule and outcome. Diversity does not mean exotic glosses on a universally understandable life experience, but deep differences in the motive forces in societies and communities. Culture is more than flavor, and the cultural values that shape lives create patterns that are far from universal. This is not to say that an American feminist perspective on a satisfying life is wrong, but that women's lives are different everywhere and require a variety of culture-specific analyses to be understood. Values shape not only personal interpretations of experience but also the structures of society, and differences in values are the very stuff of culture.[2]

We may refer to "family" or "women's roles" as if they were fixed and knowable entities, forgetting in the heat of argument that they are only categories. Just as the American factory and the Japanese factory are not two versions of one ideal model, so the American family and the Japanese family are deeply distinctive. This simple statement ignores further distinctions of religion, race, class, and other factors, which, if we attended to them, would make the phrase "the American family" nearly meaningless as a category. Even in a world we call "modern," values assert themselves; the Japanese woman's sense of her life and its satisfactions cannot be dismissed as a problem in false consciousness.

These satisfactions often cannot be seen by observers, or may be rejected by observers because they are embedded in cultural and structural conditions alien to Western values. In a society such as ours—in which "equality" means that men and women have equal access to the same kind of life, the same employment opportunities—the idea of women's lives being fulfilled in a "separate sphere" seems merely to be a subtle way of oppressing them. What is ignored, of course, is that where there exists only one occupational track that offers value and benefits for both sexes, that track may be seen as restrictive and oppressive to both men and women. A society in which women's work and values differ from men's is not necessarily one in which women receive less social credit for their work. Similarly, in a society such as ours, in which mobility and autonomy are valued, it is hard to see merit in a culture whose highest value is on predictable behavior, stability, and relationships—the ties that bind. In fact, women in such societies have as much access to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

benefits of permanent relationships as men do, and thus to what their cultures define as the satisfactions of life.[3]

I have just described, in capsule form, the cultural context of Japanese women. It is characterized by the separation of spheres of work and authority between men and women, the social value and credit associated with the work women do, and the satisfaction and benefits derived from carefully maintained relationships.

In early childhood and throughout their schooling, Japanese girls do not experience structural differentiation from boys, nor are expectations for achievement different for girls; however, life opportunities and roles in occupational and domestic environments are clearly gender-specific. Separate spheres especially characterize middle-class ("salaryman") marriages, as the husband works outside the home and the wife runs the household. This distinction may not be as clear in shopkeeping, farming, or artisan families, in which the demarcations of work and domestic activity are blurred spatially and temporally, and all adult members participate in household economic activity.

But in most families, the wife has more or less full charge of the family domain. Customarily, the wife manages the husband's salary, out of which she dispenses his allowance. Besides the household budget, she manages the children's daily life, the purchase of all clothing and equipment, the cleaning and cooking. She represents the family in local activities, on neighborhood committees, and at P.T.A. meetings. She is proud of her children, deeply engaged in her community, and confident that her work is important.[4] Rarely do you hear a Japanese woman say, "I'm *just* a housewife."

Japanese women perceive their work as wives and mothers as important because it is socially valued. When a Japanese girl says she wants a college education in order to be a better mother to her future children, her American counterpart might snort in disbelief or condescension. But Japanese women do generally feel that their lives are fulfilled by raising successful children in the best possible environment; the old chestnut *ryosai kembo* (good wife and wise mother), while used as a mocking phrase by some, still encapsulates the virtues of women.

It is important to realize that the socially valued role of the Japanese housewife does not match that of the sometimes extolled

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and sometimes denigrated American housewife. The Japanese *oku-san* is not the Norman Rockwell suburban housewife of the 1950s, the "total woman" of the 1970s, or the traditional housewife of the backlash 1980s. Her role is neither identified by kitchen, laundry, and neighborhood nor by obedience, subservience, and sexual availability to her husband. It is by her mothering that she is known and valued.

The value placed on the role of women in Japan derives directly from the national consensus that Japan's most important resource is its children, and the nation's most important job is their education. Childrearing is not a discrete task, like preparing dinner or scrubbing floors: it is meaningful, diffuse, constant resource development, and confers great importance on the women who undertake it.[5]

The "good wife" thus has yielded to the "wise mother" dedicated to the care and education of the children. The average family has two children (actually 1.7), and mothers have ample time, what with absent husbands[6] and mechanical aids in the small house, to provide nurturance and enhancement in the youngsters' daily lives. Few women work outside the home during their children's early childhood, although many do take part-time jobs during school hours, and many more return to the full-time work force later. The model for middle-class mothers, however, demands their presence at home when children return from school, and the least sign of a problem will signify to many women that they should quit their jobs. So even in this thoroughly modern society, where their chores are minimized by technology and their husbands' absence gives them autonomy, women's attentions focus on their children.

Caring for children, and a strong focus on the family, have not sufficiently weakened in Japan as social values to bear out the warnings of nineteenth-century Western social theorists, who saw the demise of the family as a necessary consequence of industrialization. Just as Weber's analysis of capitalism needs adjustment for the case of the Japanese economy, so does Schumpeter's for the family; although the operational unit may indeed have dwindled from extended family to mother and child, the values supporting the intense, family-focused care of children have not changed.

There are several factors in contemporary Japanese culture and society that encourage mothers to focus on their children. As children are believed to be born with no innate abilities or disabilities, and are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seen to succeed solely through effort and engagement, it is the mother's job to motivate them to commit themselves to getting ahead in the meritocracy. Further, since college entrance examinations determine one's future occupational status, there is enormous pressure on children to work hard to get into the right schools. The support and encouragement of mothers during the preceding months and years of study is seen as crucial to the child's success. This is well symbolized by a popular desk sold for children's home study, in which the workspace is enclosed by a high back and sides that afford womblike protection from distraction. There is a dashboardlike panel with electric calculator, pencil sharpener, clock, shelves, and a button that, when pushed, rings a bell in the kitchen to summon mother for a snack or for help.

Japanese mothers do not plan brief daily sessions of what American parenting manuals would call "quality time"; their methods are long-term and time-consuming. The basic principle is never to go against the child, and the first order of business is to know one's child thoroughly—his or her strong and weak points, inclinations, how he or she might best be motivated. Ideally, encouragement is quiet, not exhortatory or highly pressured. The Japanese mother believes that there are no shortcuts; hers is a full-time job. Masako, like most Japanese mothers (over 76 percent in a recent poll) says that her *ikigai* (reason for living) is her children, who provide her with a lifelong relationship as well as the satisfactions their successes bring.

This *ikigai* is both encouraged and discouraged by the media in Japan. In one edition of a daily paper, a woman might read articles advising her on the latest toddler-training methods for reading readiness or the preparation of exam-appropriate meals for the studying child, and then come upon the diatribes of social critics who denounce the pressure-induced pathologies inflicted by "education mamas." But the Japanese mother understands that both the encouragement and the criticism represent efforts toward the improvement of her children's lives, and does not consider her role as primary supporter and nurturer to be in question.

Observers might expect that the Japanese mother's deep commitment to her children and her sense of identity and fulfillment derived from mothering would produce a profound and severe "empty nest" effect when the children leave home. Actually, although a woman typically has forty years of life remaining after her youngest child

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enters full-time school, these years are not at all empty. Whether a woman returns to the work force or not, she is active outside the home and (like Sumiko) enjoys this period of freedom before she is constrained again by a dependent, retired husband.

One high-ranking Japanese government official has carefully calibrated her work and home lives so that she accepts overseas assignments only when she is not needed at home, and she always manages to be home "one minute before [her] husband"—not because he needs her there, but because it makes her feel better. She sees no conflict between her highly demanding and prestigious government role and activities and her perception of her role at home.

Japanese middle-aged women generally seem to have less conflict and strain in their lives than do their Western counterparts. They may also have a psycho-physiological advantage. According to Margaret Lock,[7] very few Japanese women experience the physiological or psychological symptoms associated with menopause in the West. This suggests that our Western midlife transition is not a universal experience, but a culturally and socially conditioned one.

But the image of Japanese women as fulfilled and unstressed, even in relative terms, is grossly oversimplified. Whether or not they experience menopause and the empty nest syndrome, whether their roles of housewife and mother are socially valued or not, there are unhappy women. Japanese women experience some problems that cannot be analyzed in American terms; nor are these problems characteristic of American women.

One particularly Japanese problem is the development of an extreme version of the *kyoiku mama* (education mother)—a woman so neurotically overinvested in her children's education that she may become obsessed, paranoid, or even homicidal in her desperation to see her child succeed. As mentioned earlier, the *kyoiku mama* has been excoriated, encouraged, and probably created by the media, and she contributes to the formation of the exaggerated stereotypes of Japanese women held by the Western media today.[8]

The traditional stereotype of Japanese women as gentle, obedient, and enduring has not entirely disappeared from view; many women do suffer quietly. Divorce is still rare (1.09 divorces per 1,000 population) but is increasing.[9] It is still a social stigma for the divorcée, on whom the blame may fall for the marriage's failure, and who usually has difficulty remarrying. If the woman who divorces

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

returns to her natal home, she may be referred to as the *demodori* (a derogatory term meaning "the divorced and returned one").

The woman whose husband neglects his family or refuses to give up a mistress may choose to exercise the ultimate form of protest and expression of her pain, *oyako shinju* (parent–child suicide). A recent case of attempted *oyako shinju* took place off the coast of Long Beach, California, when a Japanese woman, abandoned by her husband, tried to drown herself and her two children. She alone survived, but was acquitted of murder when it was revealed that according to Japanese beliefs, a child is part of the mother and cannot survive without her; thus, *oyako shinju* is seen as an honorable act.

There is some awareness in Japan that there are problems unique to women; there are family counselors, and even television shows that advise women on marital problems. One such program shows each guest in shadowy profile to hide her identity as she presents her problem to a panel of experts. She is usually told not to confront or leave her husband, but rather to *gambaru* (persist, "bite the bullet"), and that her patience will reward her in the end.

Women most often experience problems as women in the workplace. Given permanently lower-status jobs than men, paid lower salaries, rarely given the opportunity to return to the same job after time out for childcare, and discouraged, for social and personal reasons, from joining their male colleagues for after-work business and socializing, women are definitely at a disadvantage. However, a new Equal Employment Opportunity Act, passed in 1986, gives hope. From a Western perspective, the rhetoric of the Act is not too encouraging, as it merely asks businesses to "endeavor to give women equal opportunity." But a female Labor Ministry official says that this Act was passed, after many years of negotiation, with the understanding that a consensus now exists throughout Japanese society to support women. In a poll conducted just before the Act was passed, only 3 percent of companies polled responded that they would not favor employing women on an equal basis with men, whereas several years ago that figure was 75 percent. At this time, however, women hold few management-level positions. Those who are managers have had to eschew motherhood or find a way to take only minimal maternity leave; in the latter case, these women often live in three-generation households where the grandmother (unlike Masako's mother) prefers or is willing to babysit.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Various indigenous feminist organizations have grown up over the years, attempting to redress personal and social wrongs. The most colorful was Chupiren (now disbanded), which organized to punish offending men by publicly shaming them. A strike force in pink hard hats would storm a man's office and loudly denounce him for mistreating his wife—a very Japanese punishment.

Other voluntary associations work on a range of issues, from lobbying the medical profession and pharmaceutical industry on birth control to confronting sexism in television commercials. But the housewives' organizations have the largest memberships, totaling over six million women. These organizations (a typical example being the playground safety committee on which Masako's mother serves) were created to extend maternal concern for children to the public arena. These groups are also concerned with pollution, product safety, and other consumer issues. Their goal is to improve conditions for children; they mobilize in ways not available to men, and do not operate within the male power structure. Women who belong to such organizations "believe more strongly in the importance and power of the housewife's role in society."[10] As one comments, "We are housewives, not activists. We preserve our households to the extent that we participate in the movement. If we stop being housewives, we will not have a movement."[11]

Among the factors contributing to the Japanese woman's relative satisfaction with her role are the seniority-based social system of benefits and rewards and the strong normative value placed on the virtue of patience. Both apply equally to men and women. You can get ahead within the seniority-based structure, but only if you do it according to schedule. If you are ambitious for a higher status and its accompanying obligations and responsibilities (relationships and the duties they incur do not diminish as your status rises), you will need much patience.

For women, waiting one's turn used to require even more forbearance than it does today. In a three-generation household, the mother-in-law ran the home, and the daughter-in-law was its lowest-ranking member. She was supposed to be the first up in the morning (to make the breakfast rice) and the last asleep at night, as well as the last to bathe in the family's shared bath. Her housework was done under the guidance, stern or friendly, of her mother-in-law, with whom she often had a much closer relationship than with her husband, who had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no power to intervene in any case. If it was a difficult relationship there could be great suffering, and the daughter-in-law had to endure the years until the symbolic passing of the rice paddle marked her mother-in-law's retirement and her own accession to the ranking role. She then was ready to manage the household and to rule over the next daughter-in-law herself.

Even in a nuclear family, where the new wife is instantly in charge of the home (often lonely at first, and longing for the direction and support of another adult, even a mother-in-law), she must wait her turn at independence. In this case, the impediment is her obligation to provide child care, but only rarely does a women feel she is sacrificing herself to her children. The years spent exclusively at mothering are often seen as very rewarding—rich in both the immediate rewards of love and the ongoing sense of self-worth derived from doing a valued job well. The satisfaction of watching her children grow instills a confidence in the Japanese woman that endures long after the children have grown.

What, then, are the cross-cultural lessons to be learned from Masako's and her mother's lives? What do we learn of virtue, satisfaction, and progress for women by examining the lives of Japanese women? One lesson is obvious: we must refrain from imposing our values on the lives of women in other cultures. What represents limited opportunity in the views of one society—the apparent restriction of women to the sphere of the home—may actually represent a source of self-enhancing productivity in another.

Another lesson, more subtle and more global, is that we must acknowledge the diversity of lives in the world. The existence of markedly different industrial societies, which are based on unique social institutions and cultural values, should not inspire us to select one as a universal ideal for development. Yet social experiments and improvements, even transferable "lessons," are not to be utterly discouraged. What is needed is the mutual observation and perspective-building that different societies engage in today, using each other as mirrors for their own models rather than as blueprints.

There are, however, some cultural translations needed before perspective-building can begin. For example, the idea of separate spheres of influence and action in Japan implies to Westerners a hierarchy of virtues and statuses. Despite our egalitarian ideology, it is difficult for us to understand a *variety* of paths without assuming

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that variety implies ranking, and that being denied (or even choosing) narrows one's options. And what if there is a hierarchy—does this necessarily mean that inequality and oppression must exist? Ronald Dore, in discussing the Japanese "Confucian" management system, says that "to equate hierarchy with domination and exploitation . . . is clearly illegitimate."[12] In place of the stereotyped characterization of Japanese workers as "docile," Dore prefers "cooperative"; the Japanese woman may also be described in this way. Again, Americans have a translation problem: while "cooperative" sounds a little better to our ears, a little more voluntary than "docile," it is still a compromise word, implying that one who cooperates gives up something to get along with a group or system. But cooperativeness in Japan is a virtue: in Japanese terms, a person who cooperates doesn't give up autonomy, but enhances the self.[13] Along with the virtue of patience, cooperation is trained early and reinforced often, and the rewards are palpable for most people.

Other translations relevant to this discussion take us into deeper waters: What about freedom of choice and individualism? Can we really yield to divergent views on matters so basic to our ideology?

As Japanese postwar democracy took its contemporary shape, the flags that were raised were equality and meritocracy. Equality meant what Hayao Kawai calls "maternal egalitarianism," in which everyone is seen as having the same starting point and innate equality; maternal nurture and personal effort are all that one needs to succeed.[14] The meritocracy depends on equality of opportunity, not entitlement to equal outcomes; Horatio Alger stories are alive and well in Japan. But effort must be appropriate—at the right time and place—and one must combine ambition with patience.

American emphasis on freedom of choice baffles many Japanese, who watch us indulge in midlife crises, exercising freedom but having trouble making commitments to our choices. While many Japanese do chafe at the narrow range of choices available in their mainstream society, they ultimately tend to value their commitment over freedom. Similarly, individualism, while promoted by school reformers in Japan, usually connotes selfishness rather than self-development. Whereas we might perceive individuals as coopted in service to the Japanese system, they might see working for the greater good of the group as a way to develop the self and one's future. It is thus legitimate to work for someone else's fulfillment, particularly your

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

children's; in any case, the fulfillment is never regarded as the individual's alone, but is enjoyed by the family or group. Personal gain does not enter into the Japanese model of satisfaction and benefit to the individual.

What I have described here as normal, predictable roles, experiences, and understandings available to Japanese women today may not always obtain. Culture is not the same as tradition, and even the ideal model of the housewife has undergone much change. Before the middle class dominated the demographics, before incomes and culture spread evenly across the population, and before technology changed the nature of women's work, Japanese women's lives were very different from what they are today. Even as recently as the 1940s, before the democracy embodied in the postwar constitution established priorities and models for equality, most women did not regard the home in its current narrow sense as their only sphere.

Because most women were not of the urban middle class, and because fewer people worked in large corporate organizations, more women were directly involved in agriculture, family business, or trade, with a close relationship to the means of production. Women worked with men and with each other, and the notion of separate and isolated spheres was not as categorical as it is today. Moreover, for rural women especially, there was a freedom of expression not publicly evident today. As Ella Wiswell reports, middle-aged women in farming villages were wonderfully ribald, held lewd and drunken dancing parties, usually divorced and remarried several times, and in general dominated village social life in the 1930s.[15]

But now a uniform set of cultural norms, applicable to a broader section of the population, has developed. Something like this happened in the Tokugawa era when a growing merchant class aped the manners of warriors and aristocrats. Then, the "samuraization" of townspeople had a strong effect on women because aristocratic norms tended to seclude women within the household, and a townsman would demonstrate his affluence and sophistication by keeping wife and daughters confined at home.

The developments of recent years differ from Tokugawa upper-class emulation, but they are similar in the sense that to achieve the ideal, families need to be affluent enough not to need a woman's income or labor. And the aristocrats are no longer the cultural

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pacesetters; today a generalized, diffuse consensus creates the normative frame for people's lives.

Of course, it is hard to predict whether or not change will continue to be as rapid in Japanese society as it has been in the past forty years, or how future change will affect women's lives. Some conjectures, however, are reasonable: Japan is experiencing economic change, both as a result of internal development and external pressure, and the ability of the Japanese economy to sustain growth and security for the labor force is in question. The compartmentalization of both men's and women's lives relies on the particular kind of social and economic stability existing in Japan today; this stability cannot be assumed for the future. It is probable that women will not just increase their numbers in the labor force, but will stay in the labor force in greater numbers or return to work after brief maternity leaves. If this happens, Japanese women are likely to demand (and get) greater support from society than American working mothers. Japanese women's ability to mobilize—as shown in their work in the consumer movement—will eventually gain them the kind of support available to European women. As Sylvia Hewlett notes, public policy and services support European women as mothers,[16] and there is ample evidence to suggest that Japanese women will continue to find support for *their* central role as mothers.

In sum, understanding Japanese women's lives means understanding a great range of meanings for modern lives. Further, we must see culture and its variety as changing over time, and understand that the virtue of one generation may become the burden of the next. The premises of satisfaction cannot be dictated from culture to culture, and the concept of virtue is complicated. Women lead lives of joy and desperation in Nairobi, Boston, and Tokyo, but neither the satisfactions nor the pains can be universally recognized; it is unlikely that equality, individualism, freedom of choice, and personal autonomy can universally represent the cornerstones of satisfying modern lives.

ENDNOTES

I would like to thank my colleagues who have read drafts and made suggestions for this article. Leslie Swartz, Robert LeVine, Jean Jackson, and Ronald Dore were very helpful; the responsibility for perspective and content remains mine.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[1]Torsten Husen, in public address delivered to Harvard Graduate School of Education, 11 May 1987.

[2]James Scott, in *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), makes the point that peasants cannot be seen only as oppressed, but also as having long-range perspective and viable ways of giving meaning to their lives.

[3]Robert LeVine and Merry I. White, *Human Conditions: The Cultural Basis of Educational Development* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 189–204.

[4]Suzanne Vogel, "The Professional Housewife," in *The Japan Interpreter* 12 (1) (Autumn 1978), pp. 16–43.

[5]Sylvia Hewlett, *A Lesser Life: The Myth of Women's Liberation in America* (New York: Warner, 1986), describes the dilemma of Americans as follows: "American superwomen are meant to have children on the side, on their own time, and the less said about it the better . . . . In this country there is little appreciation of the fact that having children is a societal imperative as well as a private choice, that children are a nation's collective future." (Quoted in *Time*, 31 March 1986), p. 63.

[6]Hiroshi Wagatsuma, "Some Aspects of the Contemporary Japanese Family: Once Confucian, Now Fatherless?" *Dædalus* 106(2) (Spring 1977), pp. 181–210.

[7]Margaret Lock, "Gentle Aging in Japan," unpublished paper presented at Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting (Boston, 11 April 1987).

[8]Carol Simons, "They Get by With a Lot of Help from Their Kyoiku Mamas," *Smithsonian* (March 1987), pp. 44–52.

[9]Sumiko Iwao, "The Japanese Woman in the 1980s," *Look Japan*, 10 February 1983, pp. 12–13.

[10]Catherine Lewis, "Women in the Consumer Movement," in *Proceedings* of Tokyo Symposium on Women (International Group for the Study of Women, Tokyo, 1978), p. 86.

[11]Ibid., p. 87.

[12]Ronald Dore, "Authority and Benevolence: The Confucian Recipe for Industrial Success," *Government and Opposition: A Journal of Comparative Politics* 20 (2) (Spring 1985), p. 197.

[13]Merry White, *The Japanese Educational Challenge: A Commitment to Children* (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 28.

[14]Hayao Kawai, "Egalitarianism in Japanese Education," *Japan Echo*, 2 (4) (October 1975), pp. 27–35.

[15]Robert J. Smith and Ella Lury Wiswell, *The Women of Suye Mura* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

[16]Hewlett, *A Lesser Life*, pp. 14–15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jacob T. Schwartz

Dreamworld

THE CONTINUING INCREASE of computer speeds and the falling costs of computer processing and data storage are creating remarkable new possibilities for enriching the informational environment of daily life through a fusion of microcomputers and electronic home entertainment devices. To envision what is possible, imagine a computerized environment with a large wrap-around screen on which one can display many high-resolution images, both computer-generated and retrieved from videodisk, simultaneously or separately, in various sizes and tempos. Imagine that it is possible to access all of the world's books (scientific treatises, journals, novels, works of criticism, archives) within this environment, and that elaborate indexes, cross-references, and illustrations are instantly available. Suppose that images of all the world's great works of art are also available, along with images of all notable buildings, landscapes, and other scenes, the whole providing a "universal museum" of art, architecture, culture, and landscape. Within the virtual concert and performance halls of this museum, all the world's concerts, operas, and dramas are continually in performance. Imagine that the museum visitor, seated at a console that gives unlimited access to this universal library and museum, can soar freely through any part of it simply by moving a joystick; can summon up any work of literature, any existing audio or video dramatization of a literary work, any photograph or film relevant to a scientific or historical text, simply by touching the screen. Imagine that moderately personalized cost-free tutoring is available to any student wishing to master some part of this immense edifice of knowledge

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and information. Finally, imagine that artists and scientists continually contribute to the content of this universal library and museum, and that scholars, critics, and educators constantly add to the fabric of cross-reference, comparison, and explanation that ties it all together.

TECHNOLOGIES

The present and prospective technologies basic to these dazzling possibilities are as follows. Computation rates of 10 MIPS (millions of instructions per second) will soon be available on a single chip. Current laser videodisks can store up to 54,000 frames of video information, or the equivalent of 6,000 books of 500 pages each. (Currently available digital videodisks have a capacity slightly above 10 percent of this potential.) Eighty hours of recorded sound can be held on a single disk in the same space occupied by thirty minutes of video.

These already large storage capacities can be further expanded through statistical encoding techniques. Huffman-coding of text affords roughly a 4:1 storage density advantage (four times the storage capacity normally available), potentially allowing a single disk to hold 24,000 volumes of printed information. Huffman-coding of recorded audio might allow approximately 640 hours of audio to be stored on one disk. Coding can make it possible to store 220,000 still-frame images on a videodisk. For moving video, assuming that encoding techniques will eventually attain an 8:1 storage density advantage, it might become possible to store four hours (rather than thirty minutes) of material on a single disk.

These capacities can be enlarged still further, and by very large factors, by using "animations" rather than simple "excerpts" (i.e., generating audio and video information dynamically from a higher-level symbolic representation rather than simply playing it back from a recording). Music, for example, can be represented by coded scores for a highly sophisticated synthesizer. In such scores, each "note" indicates frequency, intensity, and duration, as well as "attack," "decay," and the overtone structure required to produce any desired instrument sound. One disk can represent up to 3,200 hours of very high quality synthesized music.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Corresponding possibilities exist for video. Suppose, for example, that we want to record high-resolution images of paintings. Assuming that two-dimensional predictive encoding can gain an 8:1 storage density advantage for images of this sort, roughly fifty video frames will be required to store a single ultra–high-quality image, and thus 1,000 such images can be held on a disk. Suitable sampling and reconstruction hardware might then reconstruct views of each image from dynamically varying viewpoints.

A more advanced technology of this kind might allow arbitrary views of three-dimensional objects such as sculpture to be reconstructed from prestored stereo images. Such a technology might allow a single disk to hold all the information needed to reconstruct views of up to 500 solid objects, urban scenes, or architectural interiors.

Many of the devices necessary to realize such multimedia electronic environments already exist, though not always in ideal form. Besides basic computational and storage devices, the list of desirable devices includes:

(i) A surround screen, or multiscreen, on which multiple high-resolution moving images can be presented at all points of a viewer's visual field.

(ii) High-fidelity digital audio output with variable apparent source.

(iii) High-quality computer-generated voice.

(iv) Voice recognition, at least for input of simple commands.

(v) Touchscreen.

(vi) Electronic audio output devices (e.g., high-quality digitally-sampled audio synthesizers with multi-instrument/voice capabilities).

(vii) Powerful computer graphic capabilities, allowing decoded video images to be fused with graphic images, text overlays, and moving images produced by animation of high-resolution still images of natural objects. These fused images should be displayable in arbitrary sizes and combinations.

The image display capabilities of present videodisk-based systems can easily be improved by furnishing the disk player with eight read-heads so that stills, moving images, audio, and text information can all be read simultaneously from a single disk, thus preventing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unwanted pauses during searches. An advanced multidisk storage technology could accelerate access to the images, sound, or text required for a particular educational or artistic purpose and enlarge the amount of material accessible at any one time to 600,000 volumes of text, 80,000 hours of synthesized music, 8,000 hours of recorded sound, 5 million still frames, or 100 hours of video.

THE COMPUTERIZED ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT AS A MEDIUM

The basic technology thus far reviewed provides the underpinnings for an astonishing new artistic and educational medium. The inspired and sustained efforts of gifted artists, educators, and scholars will be needed to explore the potential of this new medium adequately. The basic elements that such a technology puts at the disposal of a creative artist/educator for integration into high-level educational structures (described in the next section) can be outlined as follows:

(i) An *excerpt* is a particular segment of text, audio, or video, displayed with or without motion, for a fixed or variable interval of time. Examples: a screenful of information presented as text; a sequence of phrases produced by a computer-generated voice or spoken by a recorded voice; a musical passage; a still-frame image displayed as an illustration; a video passage played back from videodisk as a moving illustration.

(ii) A *parametrized excerpt* is an excerpt dependent on parameters that can be varied to achieve educational or aesthetic aims. Examples: text visually highlighted in a variety of ways; computer-generated voice with variable stress, rate, intonation, and timbre; images viewed in a variety of lightings or from a controllable vantage point.

(iii) An *animation* is a dynamic (and thus inherently modifiable) excerpt generated by continuous or discrete variation of the parameters of a parametrizable excerpt. Examples: moving images of works of art, generated from high-resolution still images by varying the point from which they are viewed; sound-and-light effects created by presenting still images under varied illuminations; perhaps music itself, if music is viewed as the animation of a static score.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(iv) A *mix* or *collage* is a collection of excerpts displayed together for combined effect. Examples: graphic overlays on video images; video combined with music; text combined with still-frame or moving illustrations; juxtaposition of several graphic and video images of deliberately varied sizes; crossfaded combination of multiple voices, possibly with music, to achieve dramatic or choral effects; combination of text with voice or music for emphasis.

(v) A *parametrized mix* is a mix whose elements and element interrelationships can be varied by changing one or more parameters. Examples: simultaneous video presentations of multiple images whose relative sizes can be varied to create animation-like effects; audio mixes in which the relative intensities of various sound elements are varied to train a listener to perceive sounds that might not ordinarily be noticed (e.g., training novice physicians to detect various types of heart murmurs).

Mixes and parametrized mixes allow the production of an infinite number of excerpts and animations from an initial stock of elements. Examples in the humanities might include the use of images of historic locales for sound-and-light recreations of historic events, or the combined use of multiple images and text for comparison of artistic styles across periods or national or regional schools. Examples in science might be the use of a natural scene as the starting point for an extensive lesson in biology and ecology; the use of multiple tissue images at a variety of macroscopic and microscopic scales combined with computer-generated graphics to illustrate the external appearance, histology, and physiology of a disease; the use of overlaid explanatory graphics on the filmed version of a physical experiment to relate observed phenomena to underlying principle.

EDUCATIONAL USE OF THE MULTIMEDIA ENVIRONMENT

To convey some idea of the way in which the techniques described in the previous section can be applied, presentation of several hypothetical lesson scenarios is useful. I will then comment, in general terms, on the basic content of the educational process and the manner in which multimedia computerized systems can accelerate learning.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Scenario One: A Lesson in Ancient History

The student, in a college-level world history course, is reviewing the sequence of political events surrounding the collapse of the Roman Republic and the rise of the Principate of Augustus. Some of the material is presented as text, which appears on the screen in an attractive booklike format, with still illustrations occupying roughly a quarter of the screen. The text can be enlivened by occasional (optional) audio quotations from ancient sources, such as Plutarch's *Lives of the Noble Romans*; each of these can be delivered in the voice of an actor who represents the ancient author. This material is visually announced on the screen: "Concerning Crassus, Plutarch said the following. . . . " This line appears in a color that the student recognizes as meaning that an optional audio insert is available. If he touches this line on the screen, the video illustration on the page switches to an image of a bust of Crassus, while Plutarch's remark on Crassus is read in a voice emphasizing its drama and irony. Later in the lesson, information concerning the Battle of Philippi is presented, first by text explaining its date and significance, then by five to ten minutes of filmed material taken from videodisk and introduced with a compelling musical fanfare. A map of Italy and Greece is displayed, showing the paths taken by the Republican and Antonian armies to the battle. This is followed by a more detailed map of the area of northern Greece in which the battle was fought, and by video footage of the terrain of Philippi, taken from a helicopter. After this, a brief enactment of the battle is shown, with views of its commanders in action, voice-over commentary on its main incidents, and dramatic scenes of the suicides of Cassius and Brutus. These videoclips yield to text reviewing the significance of the battle and ensuing events, with audio statements from authorities on ancient history reflecting on the battle's significance for the Roman world.

An interactive multiple-choice quiz follows the lesson. Questions answered incorrectly trigger reruns of relevant portions of text, audio, or captioned stills. The student can make abbreviated extracts of the text, audio, and video material to build up a personalized course summary for end-of-term review.

Scenario Two: An Arithmetic Lesson

A grade-school student is in the process of mastering "long" addition (addition of multidigit numbers). The student is assumed to have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

memorized the single-digit addition table, but the lesson software remains alert for errors in single-digit arithmetic, and will review this material, using visual displays and audio statements, when appropriate. It is also assumed that, in a prior lesson, the student has learned to distinguish sums like 6 + 5 (which yield a result of 10 or more) from sums like 4 + 3 (which add up to less than 10). Finally, it is assumed that the idea of "carrying," basic to multidigit addition, has been introduced in a prior lesson.

The computerized lesson begins with a brief videoclip of a teacher reviewing the concept of "carrying" at a blackboard: the teacher works several sums, points to relevant features of the numbers being added, writes *carries* on the board, and emphasizes the right-to-left nature of the addition process. Then the student enters an interactive review-and-practice sequence covering the material just presented. A practice sum (for example, 375 + 419) appears on the screen. A voice prompt tells the student to add these numbers. However, the student is only required to handle the carries; the computer will automatically handle the single-digit additions. As each column is added, it is highlighted by color, blinking, and a graphic arrow. A two-item selection menu, offering a choice of *carry* and *don't carry*, appears on the screen. The student touches one of these, causing the computer to write the associated sum-digit in the appropriate column and advance to the next column. An error triggers appropriate video and audio diagnostics, as well as a short review of earlier material.

First, the computer automatically runs through a sample problem; a graphic hand represents the student's finger, and an audio commentary explains what is expected from her at each point. Then several interactive examples requiring student response are presented. If the student handles these successfully, she is offered an opportunity to play a video game that tests problem-solving speed. In this game, moving spaceships bearing long sums move across the screen under pursuit. The student interacts by touching the *carry/don't carry* menu. Incorrect responses cause the spaceships to explode, losing a point; correct responses allow them to escape. Delayed responses cause the spaceships to slow down, making them vulnerable to demolition by their pursuers.

After this lesson subsegment, drill resumes. Now the computer handles the carries, and the student is required to supply the associated sum-digit. This is done by touching a ten-item menu of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

digits on the screen. Next, the student is asked to handle both sums and carries together, and then finally to handle digit-by-digit long addition without any computer assistance. Errors in handling either carries or single-digit addition trigger reviews of prior material. Review games are available at all skill levels.

This arithmetic-lesson scenario illustrates two principles important to courseware design:

(i) Students' attention must be drawn to the skills being taught, not to ancillary details of the computer environment. For example, use of a typewriter keyboard distracts attention from material on the screen, and should be avoided whenever possible in favor of touch-sensitive menus displayed on the screen. Similarly, having to read written instructions distracts from other screen displays, and should be avoided whenever spoken instructions or graphic emphases can be used.

(ii) Many conventional academic skills simply amount to the ability to select and apply algorithmic or near-algorithmic procedures rapidly and correctly. These skills are built on subskills (e.g., to add long numbers one must know that the process moves from right to left, must know how to add single-digit sums correctly, and must know how to carry). Computer-controlled interactive courseware can concentrate on one subskill at a time in a manner impossible for a textbook or a classroom teacher: by asking the student to handle only that part of a procedure on which pedagogical stress is to be laid, while other aspects of the same procedure are handled automatically by the computer.

Scenario Three: A Geometry Lesson

The following geometry lesson scenario emphasizes this last point, but in a more sophisticated way than the simpler arithmetic lesson. It also shows the extent to which computer-aided instruction (CAI) lessons must be backed up by complex symbol-manipulating software. Envision a high-school student working through a conventional plane geometry course that emphasizes proofs and the solution of "original" problems. The basis of many elementary proofs is the systematic use of triangle congruence to prove the equality of angles and distances in a given figure. A computer can easily apply these rules systematically and rapidly: a proof can therefore be considered

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entirely elementary if it can be achieved using the triangle congruence method repeatedly, and if no other idea is required. However, if this one tool is insufficient, a less elementary proof must be given. Often the key to such a proof is to add a few lines or curves (e.g., circles) to the original figure: the proof is then elementary in the expanded figure.

An interactive lesson can exploit this concept, which is crucial to mastery of high-school geometry. Several problems requiring proof can be presented with a figure on the computer's display screen. The computer reasons as far as possible using congruent triangles only. It lists its conclusions, and, if the student so requests, reviews the inferences that led to each conclusion. Such review combines graphic emphasis of the figure elements involved in each step with audio commentary. The student can retrieve displayed or spoken statements of any prior theorems used in the computer's inferences. However, for problems too difficult to yield to such elementary reasoning, the student must determine the line, lines, or curves that will make elementary proof possible when added to the figure. As a hint, the computer offers a multi-item touch-sensitive menu: *Shall I add a line? Shall I add a circle?* Suppose, for example, that the student chooses to add a line. Then a menu of possible lines is offered: *line between two points*, *angle bisector*, *line perpendicular to specified line through specified point.* When the student chooses one of these by touching it on the screen, labels appear in the figure being analyzed, and by touching these labels the student indicates what new item should be added to the figure; this element appears immediately in the figure. (It can be erased just as easily if the student decides that it is not wanted.) The computer then applies elementary reasoning-by-congruence to the expanded figure. If the proper lines or curves have been added, the proof will succeed; if not, the student must continue to wrestle with the problem.

This scheme, which combines student interaction with sophisticated computer assistance, focuses attention on the key strategic and conceptual decisions needed to solve a problem, while lower-level, assumed skills are automatically supplied. This approach is applicable to many other situations in mathematics and science. For example, a student learning to deal with word problems in algebra may only be required to read English-language problem statements and convert them to algebraic equations; the computer can then solve

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

these algebraic equations automatically. Similarily, a calculus student learning how to evaluate indefinite integrals can be offered a menu of standard manipulations: *integrate by parts*, *substitute for a variable*, *decompose the integral as a sum*, *add and subtract a term to the integrand*, *factor*. Once an alternative has been chosen and its parameters supplied, the necessary manipulations can be performed automatically. By easing the learner's burden of low-level arithmetic and algebraic details, the computer can allow him to focus attention on the conceptual content of the material, thus promoting deeper comprehension. This helps both the strong student, whose progress the computer can accelerate, and the weaker student, whose inaccuracy in applying the auxiliary manipulations that support higher-level skills is compensated for by the computer. Hopefully, as weaker students learn how their skill deficiencies impede their ability to handle interesting problems, and as interactive experience pinpoints these deficiencies, they will be motivated to overcome their shortcomings by systematic review and practice.

Many equally compelling scenarios illustrating the combined use of video, sound, and computer graphics could be provided. In courses such as physics or chemistry (which traditionally involve laboratory demonstrations), videoclips of demonstration experiments, highlighted appropriately by dynamically evolving graphs and charts, can be effective. Significant aspects of a demonstration can be emphasized using audio effects. For example, the notion of acceleration in elementary physics can be emphasized by emitting clicks at a rate proportional to the velocity of an accelerating body. When quiz questions on the significance of an experiment are answered incorrectly, specially highlighted video reruns of key moments in the experiment can be called up. Experiments in genetics or biology can be presented in time-lapse video representations that demonstrate principles of growth. Videoclips can show a much wider variety of experimental equipment than could conveniently be shown in a university laboratory.

Simulations are also effective educational tools. For example, a student in an organic chemistry course, asked to design molecules, could connect carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and other atoms in various patterns using a graphic editor. The actual properties of the molecules suggested can then be retrieved from an on-disk chemical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

encyclopedia and compared to desired molecular properties. Three-dimensional representations of these molecules could also be displayed to enhance the student's understanding of their chemistry.

Similar uses of videodisk for social science training are possible. For example, extended psychotherapeutic interviews with cooperating patients can be segmented into question–response pairs and stored on videodisk. Student therapists, presented with a menu of possible interview questions and asked to decide what sort of responses they would expect such questions to elicit, could subsequently retrieve and play back a patient's actual responses.

These scenarios exemplify our expectations concerning educational use of an electronic environment. Having presented them, we shall now reflect, in more abstract terms, on the basic educational process and the manner in which multimedia computerized systems can support and enhance it. What does one learn when one learns? Though no finite statement can capture all aspects of this process, which is as elusive as human psychology itself, perhaps a few abstract phrases can establish a useful conceptual framework. Learning can be regarded as the acquisition of *facts* (and their interrelationships); *procedures* (for reaching significant goals); *methods* through which procedures are composed; and *criteria* for the applicability of particular methods. To go beyond rote study to creativity, one must become aware of many *examples* illustrating the use of specific methods and procedures, and come to perceive *analogies* between situations in which particular methods can be applied, and between methods themselves. The multimedia electronic environment can be a powerful aid for conveying all these basic elements of education.

Its capabilities for processing and storing *facts* are superb. As already indicated, an electronic environment can make an exhaustive mass of facts available, and provide extensive audio, graphic, and visual materials to enhance the user's comprehension of these facts. The universal library and museum within an electronic environment can be available in fully cross-referenced, readily "browsable" form. Emphasis and drama can be added in a great variety of ways to highlight significance. Sophisticated summaries, cross-indexes, and semantic links—not only connecting text to text, but also linking text to video and audio, video to text, text to simulations—can be constantly available. At any point in any of the textbooks, journals, novels, or treatises available in the universal electronic library, screen

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

touch can be used to access extensive indexes listing every significant term that appears in the text, as well as many supplementary volumes of more detailed information. To appreciate this, consider again the history student (or casual reader of a historical novel) whose exploration starts with a reference to *Louis XII*, but who then can summon up the following:

- *biography, Encyclopædia Brittanica*
- *artworks of period of Louis XII on view in museums*
- *major composers of period, trigger performances if desired*
- *wars of*
- *role of Louis XII in development of the French monarchy*

For yet another illustration, imagine a computerized "nature walk" that begins with a moving image of a hillside path, along which various trees and shrubs are seen, and along which the presence of various animals is evident through sounds (e.g., bird-calls), fleeting glimpses, tracks, and openings of burrows. By touching the screen to indicate interest, a browser can access detailed closeups of fauna, on the ground or in their subterranean habitats; encyclopedic information concerning plants, including time-lapse images of their diurnal and seasonal cycles.

The system user's browsing activities can be supervised by a programmed *exploration supervisor*, which maintains a history of all informational nodes traversed by a user, thereby facilitating backtracking and exploration of collateral branches. This exploration supervisor can also collect information on a user's interests, and can employ this information to optimize the order and selection of items presented subsequently. It is also easy to allow definition of personalized information subcollections (favorite art items, or items having special significance to a student preparing for an examination, or items important to a professional who needs a "desktop summary" of an extensive mass of information).

Exploration and concentrated study can both be assisted through semantic (as distinct from "index" or "keyword") links in the universe of facts available within an electronic environment. Among such links, which one might traverse at a touch, are the following:

WHY? Justify an assertion made in a text.

WHAT? Explain a term or concept occurring in a text, or an element appearing in a graphic display or video image.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SO WHAT? Explain the importance of a fact, concept, or method.

HOW? Explain or illustrate a method or activity mentioned in a text.

CRITICIZE. Provide material refuting an assertion or denying its importance.

SHOW. Display pictures or audio representations of items mentioned.

DESCRIBE OTHER SIMILAR THINGS. Summon up facts and concepts generalizing, specializing, or analogizing an item mentioned in a text or appearing in the universal museum or one of its attached concert halls.

As an example of the application of semantic links, imagine that a student, perusing a text on the U.S. Civil War, encounters the remark that "Shortly after this crucial battle, Lincoln visited its site and delivered a brief memorial address that has become one of the most famous in American oratory." Touch-invocation of a *SHOW* semantic link to this sentence could produce a spoken dramatic recreation of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address.

Procedures are normally learned together with batteries of more general *methods*, through which specific procedures are composed. For example, the student of cooking learns complete procedures for producing specific dishes (e.g., baklava or Szechuan-style dry-fried pork) as well as underlying methods such as mincing, fine slicing, dicing, stir-frying, hot-oil crisping, and characteristics of ingredients such as phyllo, broth, ginger, hot peppers, and cornstarch. The student of algebra learns not only specific formulas, but also general techniques such as substitution, transposition, and graphic estimation of root position. Since procedures generally exist within a larger environment of applicable methods (and since they must often be applied to partly unpredictable and refractory materials), the three essential parts of a craftsmanlike knowledge of procedures are (1) the ability to recognize situations in which particular methods should be used as elements of a composite procedure; (2) the ability to recognize positive signs that a method is having a desired effect, or danger signals that indicate it is starting to fail; and (3) knowledge of methods for recovering from situations in which some step of a procedure (perhaps a step applied erroneously) has produced an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unwanted effect. Moreover, if complex, initially invisible internal states control the behavior of an object being manipulated, one must learn to think in terms of those states, and one must acquire diagnostic procedures for determining the state of a system when that is unknown and important. In technical environments in which procedures are applied in a partly automated fashion, mastery of subprocedures for calculating the setup parameters that control automated procedure runs (e.g., baking times and temperatures) is an important aspect of procedural learning. Computerized systems can aid in this activity by providing computational help in determining required parameter values and by displaying the consequences of suboptimal parameter setups.

These general remarks apply with equal force to electronic equipment repair, to the baking of breads and cakes, and to the acquisition of expert knowledge in physics, mathematics, and chemistry.

Used artfully, the computerized multimedia environment can accelerate the acquisition of all these aspects of procedural knowledge. It allows procedures to be studied in a simulated environment over which the learner can have relatively complete control. Systematic comprehension of a battery of applicable methods can be aided by computer menus of methods—perhaps just those methods that apply to a particular stage of a procedural simulation, or perhaps a longer list including other methods that the student might (wrongly) imagine to be applicable. Images of the state of a procedurally manipulated system can be displayed as the procedure progresses. This display can include both ordinary macroscopic information and normally invisible microscopic information if such information is significant or controlling. Timescales can be accelerated to allow rapid exploration of protracted phenomena, or slowed down to allow observation of phenomena that normally proceed too rapidly for comprehension.

Consider how a computerized multimedia environment could be used to teach the art of baking. In baking, one begins by selecting ingredients that may have to be carefully chosen (high-gluten flour behaves differently from very starchy flour) or specially prepared (sifted, perhaps), and then proceeds through a series of intermediate stages (mixing, stirring, folding, rising) that have interesting and crucial rheological effects, to final stages of baking and decoration. This is an art requiring time to master, particularly because the number of experiments that one can perform in a single day is limited. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

electronic environment can ease and accelerate this process in many ways. The characteristic external appearances of flours and doughs of various grades and qualities can be displayed, together with their internal rheology, using a combination of macroscopic images, microscopic views, and schematized graphics. For example, the manner in which dough reacts to pounding or pulling can be correlated with the average length and orientation of the gluten strands within the dough, or the proportion of oil or saturated fat. All this can in turn be related to flow quality, mixing proportions, and amount of hand or food-processor kneading. Techniques can be explained or illustrated for determining such things as whether dough has been kneaded sufficiently or excessively, or contains too much or not enough oil or water. Actual or graphic cross-sectional images can be used to explain the process of rising as driven by yeast or baking powder, and to clarify the manner in which the average "gassiness" of a lump of dough can be deduced from its external appearance and reaction to standard bakers' tests. The reactions of doughs of various consistencies and thicknesses to baking at several temperatures for different periods of time can be shown by time-lapse photography of both loaf externals and cross-sections, and by graphics describing salient aspects of internal molecular state. Techniques for creating special qualities (crustiness, chewiness, or crispness) or special geometries (pretzels or braided loaves) can be demonstrated. All this information can be presented in an environment that allows the student to make mistakes and observe their consequences, backtrack to the point of an error and try something else, vary proportions or processing times to achieve special results. Recipes and comments by master bakers can be accessed at any point. If the procedure-exploration environment is well-constructed, it should enable its user to gain an understanding of many aspects of baking much more rapidly than would be possible in an actual bakery, in part by greatly compressing the time needed to apply a multitude of essential processes.

This example can easily be modified to apply to processes in many areas of science and engineering, such as chemical and medical laboratory procedures, processing of silicon wafers, and metallurgical processes. The basic idea of using visual/graphic/textual exploration and observation to find a specific procedural path within a tree-structured environment of methods and intermediate states is applicable to a wide range of practical and intellectual activities.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As noted in our earlier geometry lesson scenario, much of the difficulty of learning procedures that are more intellectually demanding (e.g., symbolic integration in calculus, or solution of small systems of algebraic equations by formation of resultants) stems from the fact that the procedure to be learned requires the use of various subprocedures (e.g., differentiation, trigonometric substitution, algebraic simplification, determinant evaluation), which the student may not have mastered fully; struggles with these subskills may impede progress and erode confidence. A computerized system can deal effectively with this common pedagogical difficulty by performing subprocedures automatically. This enables the student to focus attention on the battery of new methods to be acquired, and allows her to compose programs that automatically apply those methods in sensible sequence.

Criteria for determining when particular methods should or should not be employed can be taught by showing the typical physical appearances or abstract structures of materials or situations that call for application of these methods. *Examples* can be displayed and comparisons can be visually or graphically highlighted; *analogies* can be conveyed in the same way or demonstrated through coupled animations that emphasize abstract similarities between the workings of related methods.

LINES OF DEVELOPMENT FOR THE MAJOR NEW INDUSTRY OF MULTIMEDIA ELECTRONIC MATERIALS PRODUCTION

Developers of truly effective computerized commercial and educational systems will draw upon many ideas, ranging from recent developments in cognitive science to the informal but essential wisdom of the skilled teacher. But the core of the present opportunity is technological and developmental: to build a hardware/software environment within which attractive, exciting, carefully directed, smoothly flowing, and richly informative material can be brought to the individual viewer/auditor; to create initial demonstrations from which a broader commercial activity can grow; and to assess and refine this experimental material by observing the ways in which typical users interact with it. A necessary initial step is organization of several production facilities within which multimedia electronic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

workstations, supported by software systems that facilitate their use, are available. A core staff will be needed to provide first-class hardware, software, graphics, and image-processing support to teams of subject-matter specialists, experienced teachers, and visual artists with creative ideas for composing individual presentations. The key persons directing the activities of such studios are likely to be individuals who possess integrative and organizational skills in addition to scholarly and artistic interests and abilities.

The degree to which electronic multimedia environments and related courseware and entertainment materials will move from small-scale laboratory use to general public acceptance and attract the broad involvement of scholars, educators, and artists will depend on the rate at which profitable business opportunities surrounding this development materialize. Although the necessary technological developments are proceeding rapidly, one crucial need—wide availability of standardized systems on which expensive multimedia materials can be delivered to very large audiences—remains to be filled before the production of such materials can attain film-industry proportions. This will not be an easy requirement to fill. It poses a troublesome chicken-and-egg problem: without standardized delivery systems there will be no broad audience, and hence few high-quality materials; without attractive materials, there will be little incentive to purchase, and hence less incentive to manufacture, the standardized delivery systems. This knot can most readily be cut by a corporation powerful enough to drive the market, or by government involvement; otherwise these developments will proceed only haltingly.

It is useful to contrast the current situation regarding electronic multimedia environments with the situation of the film industry, whose productions are regularly budgeted at costs of $20 million or more per hour of finished product. The high costs of motion pictures can be borne because a standardized delivery device (the projector) is available, making it possible to collect viewing fees ranging from twenty-five cents to five dollars per person from a worldwide audience of millions. There is every reason to expect that interactive material (e.g., history lessons like those described earlier) involving images that share the quality and production values of first-class films will be just as expensive to produce. At $10 million per hour of finished product, a one-semester course (in world history, biology, or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

physics, for example) could run as high as $600 million. Though presently unsustainable, such costs begin to appear reasonable if one considers that some years hence, standardized delivery systems, available in every school, could create an annual per-course U.S. audience of roughly 500,000. Leased at a fee of fifty dollars per student, a course might generate $25 million annually in U.S. royalties, plus European and Japanese royalties amounting to perhaps four times as much (approximately $100 million annually worldwide)—about the same income generated by a single "blockbuster" film. An initial $600-million investment might thus be recouped in a six-year period, with substantial outyear profits forecast.

At present, wildly imaginative projections of this sort serve only to emphasize the formidable obstacles that must be overcome before the envisioned developments can be realized. In spite of this, matters are moving forward. Relatively inexpensive (roughly $1,000) interactive computerized multimedia systems for wide use (the compact disk [CD]-interactive system announced by Sony and Phillips) will become available this year. Even if these systems penetrate a wide market, they will not quite attain the technical capabilities assumed in the preceding pages; they will support first-rate still images, but not video-quality moving images. Nevertheless, many interesting "illustrated electronic encyclopedias" should appear over the next few years. Current bellwether projects include the *Video Encyclopedia of the Twentieth Century*, published by the Corporation for Education and Learning. At a cost of roughly $10,000 per copy, this encyclopedia comprises about seventy hours of carefully edited historic newsreel material. The BBC's "Domesday" project will survey contemporary Britain in awesomely comprehensive fashion.

Higher levels of technical capability remain unstandardized, as attested by the current debate over the acceptability of RCA's proposed DVI system (for recording full-motion video images on CD) vis-à-vis the proposed Phillips-Sony standard. Of course, technical standardization is meaningless and market penetration unlikely (witness slow public acceptance of CD players) until attractive end products materialize. Moreover, hundred-million dollar investments in images and text go far beyond anything conceived by the present publishing industry. Projects of this super-Hollywood scale will be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

feasible only if a broad social vision of technology's potential contribution to education becomes widely accepted, if compelling smaller-scale successes buttress this vision, and if protracted multilateral negotiations between federal and state education authorities and major corporations succeed. International use of educational materials involves even more elaborate and more doubtful negotiations.

Even though interactive electronic images create exciting possibilities that transcend the classic world of print, educators generally are neither enthusiastic about new technologies nor immediately successful at using them. We cannot predict the point at which the interactive videodisk will attract the D.W. Griffiths and Charlie Chaplins capable of creating fundamentally new views of its communicative possibilities. Widespread use of the technologies outlined in this essay will only be realized gradually, through a complex social–technical–economic development that will take years.

However, smaller-scale opportunities that could expedite this process are already visible. CD/ROM (read-only memory) technology will rapidly enter home use and become a standard delivery vehicle for encyclopedias and other text databases for which extensive indexing is strongly advantageous (e.g., major collections of scientific abstracts, back series of archival journals, product and manufacturer catalogs such as the well-known *Thomas Register*.) Immediately profitable opportunities also exist in publication of training materials for "salaried students"—corporation employees (such as airline pilots or bank tellers) who are trained at employers' expense. Similar opportunities exist in production of military training materials.

A second immediately profitable possibility lies in the development of a line of videodisk-based "commercial kiosks" (somewhat reduced versions of the deluxe multimedia environments described earlier). Such kiosks can effectively deliver information on goods and services to customers in large department stores, discount houses, and other commercial enterprises. Information presented in video, audio, and text formats can include locations of departments and services, images of items on sale (with advertisements), daily or weekly specials, and catalogs of additional items or services available by mail order. These same commercial kiosks can also handle direct credit-card purchases. A store could install a sidewalk kiosk in front of a competing shop to alert customers to its lower prices or superior products.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Much of the cost of video materials production is apt to be borne by the manufacturers of featured products, who will presumably be as eager to compete for on-disk display space as they presently are to compete for shelf and rack space. Once commercial kiosks of this kind come into widespread use, the videodisks used on them will become available for home viewing; this will create an electronic version of the familiar "Sears catalog" type of merchandising.

The travel industry offers additional opportunities for early introduction of delivery systems similar to the proposed commercial kiosks, and of home equivalents of such systems. Once very high-resolution displays become available, travel agents should find it advantageous to let prospective clients examine scenes of travel destinations, including such features as hotel and casino interiors, museum and palace settings, or beaches. Individuals planning tours might find semi-instructional disks of the "Visit Paris and Learn French" sort appealing, especially if these include useful "guidebook" information (e.g., rates of inexpensive hotels, train schedules, driving distances). Tourism promotion agencies and major airlines should be willing to subsidize production of such materials.

Computer-aided commercial and training activities can be expected to spur development of a variety of systems that will generally not be more advanced than what is already available, but will be more functional, better integrated, and much easier to apply in commercial environments. These items fall into two principal classes: relatively inexpensive equipment intended for use in commercial, school, and home information-delivery stations, and substantially more elaborate and expensive items of studio equipment to be used for production of commercial-grade audio and video materials.

Aside from basic delivery systems, computing engines, and storage devices, the list of studio-related items likely to be in commercial demand includes:

(i) Audio and video compressors and encoders.

(ii) Video mixers and special effects hardware; digital animation stands.

(iii) High-speed hardware for composition of computer graphics and for manipulation of natural images, especially three-dimensional images.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(iv) Hardware for acquisition and encoding of natural images.

(v) Very high-capacity storage systems for easy access to major image archives.

(vi) Writing hardware that enables individuals to make their own videodisks.

On the software side, much-improved authoring languages will certainly be required to support the composition and maintenance of highly sophisticated educational and other information-delivery systems. Besides such basic capabilities as first-class response analysis, these languages must possess powerful facilities for creating and reviewing large lesson structures, and for defining dynamic multimedia effects such as animation. Encyclopedic browsing capabilities will require various forms of specialized software, including indexing and database software capable of adding large masses of information to already extensive preexisting systems.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brian Winston

A Mirror for Brunelleschi

THE ISSUE OF THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY on the arts is more than a question for cultural historians and aestheticians. It has direct and particularly vexing implications for all who support the arts, particularly patrons. It poses a central problem for the development of arts policy because technological applications constantly strike at the fundamental idea of artistic creation, at least as that is traditionally conceived. Our basic confusion about the definition and history of technology is perhaps nowhere better examined than in this context.

Paul Klee's *Angelus Novus*, as interpreted by Walter Benjamin, perfectly illustrates the ambiguities that we experience in the contemplation of technology. Benjamin writes:

> A Klee painting named *Angelus Novus* shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the Angel of History. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed, but a storm is blowing from Paradise. It has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call Progress.[1]

There are two views that one can take of technological progress in our contemporary culture. One can assume that technology, like History in Benjamin's description, is a catastrophe; or one can believe

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that it is an ever-growing pile of discrete and wonderful events moving society toward some sort of utopia. Of course, lesser variants on either of these positions are possible. Cognitive dissonance allows one to hold to both positions simultaneously.

TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACTS

Looking at the world of technology as it affects the arts reveals that recent developments in electronic media (computing and videotape) have made it possible for artists to develop forms of expression that were previously inconceivable. To see the matter in this way is to take the optimistic view of technology. This optimism is perhaps best expressed in the work of Nam June Paik, who can reasonably claim to be the father of video art. His *Lake Placid 80,* for example, a video commissioned by the National Fine Arts Committee of the Lake Placid Winter Olympics in 1980, illustrates the range of possibilities that video has made available.

Nam June Paik's frenetic deconstructionalist mode reveals the old truth that yesterday's avant-garde filters down endlessly into more general currency. Today, there is a whole television channel of music videos that look as if, on one level at least, they have been composed either by Nam June Paik or by his close disciples. This filtering effect should not be forgotten when assessing the impact of new technologies any more than when new art in general is considered.

Beyond such pleas for openmindedness, video art in particular suggests how our vision as human beings is being expanded by the impact of new technology. A piece by Woody Vasulka, an impressionistic vision of the relationship between Berlioz and Paganini, has images whose effect is achieved by digitalization, by breaking the picture up in ways that would have been inconceivable before the advent of electrical signaling systems involving computerized information processing. Televisions and computers may be cross-fertilized to create absolutely new visions of the world.

At one level, such new media are just that: new media. They create new ways of seeing and hearing; more than that, they have a direct impact on traditional forms, and that impact may be amazingly enhancing. This is not to make the clearly erroneous, McLuhanite point that in some mysterious way they replace older forms. Rather,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it is to emphasize the different dimension that a new medium can give to an older form.

Consider *Locale,* for example, a film about the Merce Cunningham Dance Company made by Charles Atlas in 1979. Atlas, the camera operator, wears a Steadicam, a device that requires little high-level technology. It simply involves mounting a camera on a human being and using gyroscopes so that the camera remains absolutely steady, no matter what the body does. The Steadicam, in Atlas's capable hands, allows him to join the dance in ways that are clearly impossible with traditional large camera tripods and mobile mounts.

But there is another point to all such work. Film and video have an important retrieval use—especially video, which artists find more accessible. These media allow for the preservation of previously unrecordable performances of dance and other performing arts. In other words, the medium is not only being used as a medium, but also as a means of creating archives of unprecedented richness. Those who point to this archival enrichment are also able to claim that in music, at least, technology has borne equally lush fruit, and not only in the matter of recordings.

We tend to look at things that are familiar to us as being in some way natural, whether it be the way that news is presented nightly on television, or the instruments used by the classical orchestra. In fact, there is not much that is natural about either. The instruments, for example, all have histories. They were invented by people and have developed over time. If there is great hesitation today about electronic instruments, synthesizers, and the like, one wonders where that leaves us when we come to contemplate the contribution of Dr. Sax to the benefit and joy of mankind. Computers are simply helping us to create today's saxophones.

Computers are found everywhere in the arts. In architecture, for example, computer technology is clearly on the verge of a new age. Today a computer and video interface can create nonexistent spaces. It is possible to see what a reconstructed Times Square would look like; it is easy to project what the shadow patterns of buildings are likely to be. We appear to be on the edge of true holographic imaging, which will allow a viewer to walk through all three dimensions of a nonexistent space.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All this is intended to describe the positive vision of art and technology, the enthusiastic reception that is given everything from fabric design by computer to the creation of verse by computer. Many of these applications are unproblematic. That architects today are able to use computers to avoid the mundane task of endlessly reproducing building details on plans is clearly to be welcomed. Yet despite these unquestionable advantages, another view is possible—that implied by Benjamin's vision of the chaos building up at the angel's feet—an essentially pessimistic view.

The first element of this pessimism involves the sense of being overmastered by the machine; machines can, for instance, design things better (or, at least, with greater complexity) than people can. Without the human element, the whole sense of artistic enterprise begins to slip away. It is possible to go further, taking the view that technology is working toward the end of all live performance, and dehumanizing every process of artistic production in our culture. Technology means the end of art in any previously recognizable form; it offers instead soulless alternatives. In short, its introduction into the world of the arts must be watched very carefully.

The positive and negative visions of technological progress share many common assumptions. Both assume that modern technologies pose an unprecedented challenge to the arts; both accept the fact that technology is changing at an ever-faster pace; both see it as playing an increasingly important role in our lives.

TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACT: A NEW VIEW

It may be possible, however, to establish a new and different view of technology. Historically based, it might begin by denying the assumptions of both the utopians and the apocalyptists. Is it not possible that we are amnesiac about the pace at which technology develops and wholly ignorant of the forces that set its agendas? Is its history not largely hidden from us, scarcely qualifying as a discipline in the academy? It would probably surprise the vast majority of people on this planet, Western people especially, to learn that it has been 102 years since television was first patented;[2] that it has been 113 years since the invention of the first solid-state electronic device.[3] Technology progresses slowly; or, more accurately, technology progresses much more slowly than is commonly assumed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indeed, it is possible to take an even longer-range view. The history of television, for example, might appropriately be said to have begun with the discovery of phosphor in 1602.[4] The background of scientific understanding that made television possible developed steadily until the creation of the cathode-ray tube in 1897.[5] Cathode-ray tubes were standard equipment in all advanced physics laboratories at the turn of the century. Against this scientific achievement, the idea of television itself came from a French lawyer, M. Senlecq, in 1878.[6] The actual process of scanning a substance that gives off differing amounts of electricity in accord with the intensity of the light falling on it, the intensity of light translating into variations in a current of electricity, was developed by a German, Paul Nipkow. His patent was granted in Berlin in 1884.

In 1908, Alan Campbell-Swinton outlined the modern system of using cathode-ray tubes for scanning in a dismissive footnote to correspondence in the British scientific journal *Nature*.[7] In 1911, a Russian, Boris Rozing, managed to transmit the first actual television picture to a cathode-ray tube.[8] Vladimir Zworokin, a pupil of Rozing's, came to the United States at the end of the First World War, after the Russian Revolution, and went to work for Westinghouse and RCA. By 1923, he had translated Campbell-Swinton's basic idea into a working prototype of modern television.[9] This was refined by Philo T. Farnsworth and others during the next decade.[10]

All this work took place while corporate interests were paying little attention to television, principally because radio and sound films, the latter only recently diffused, were then being effectively exploited. Indeed, in the early 1920s, when Campbell-Swinton was asked how long he thought it would take to construct his television, he replied that if one of the industrial giants (such as General Electric) invested some money in it, perhaps six months.[11] But television researchers did not have money thrown at them.

Thus we come to that curious period in the television history of the United States that begins in 1936 and does not end until 1945. While standard histories suggest that television was not introduced earlier because of World War II, the war in fact occupied less than four years of that period. The classic histories also suggest that television was not ready to be diffused, at least in the opinion of the Federal Communications Commission. According to some, it did not work well enough yet. There is, however, one major problem with all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such accounts: American RCA-style television was then working in Berlin, and indeed in London, throughout these years.

So, while the FCC was arguing that television did not work, 20,000 sets were operating in Britain[12] and 180,000 people saw television images of the Berlin Olympics in 1936.[13] The constraints on the introduction of television into the United States were social, not technological. Such social constraints are associated with "the 'law' of suppression of radical potential."

This "law" implies that technologies are introduced into society only when they do not disturb preexisting arrangements of all kinds. We waited forty years for a baby computer, though the first computer in the world was exactly that. The "Baby Mark I" ran a factoring program for forty-five minutes at the University of Manchester in 1948. Its builders were testing a memory system, and since it worked, they set about building a "proper" computer.[14] What was a "proper" computer in 1948? One that American scientists, led by John von Neumann, declared to be a proper computer—a room full of tubes.[15] So, for forty years, we have waited for the smaller machine. That, in my view, is the "law" of suppression of radical potential at work.

The historical record does not support the proposition that technological change is at all fast. Nor is it possible to sustain the contention that it is getting faster. In consequence, the supposed effects of technology become much less obvious.[16] Indeed, it becomes possible to reenvision our relationship with technology: to abandon a philosophy of technological determinism, and to develop wholly new attitudes toward—and plans for—technological development. When it comes to the arts, it should be possible to establish an agenda to assess the impact of technology. This is a purpose worth pursuing.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE: SIX SLOGANS

I would suggest that six slogans ought to condition the establishment of such an agenda. The first slogan: "A bird in hand is worth two in the bush." In this context, it means that it is always important to look at the society at hand, rather than at the "birds," or technologies, that exist in some species of utopian bush.

For example, 40 percent or more of the people in the United States own videocassette recorders (VCRs); these are being sold at the rate

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of over a million each month. All forms of serious film and video (including archival materials relating to the other arts) are difficult to access, especially for people living outside metropolitan areas. The pervasive presence of VCRs, however, and the ease with which cassettes can be shipped, allow us for the first time to conceive of a truly national audience for all these arts. The VCR is clearly "a bird in hand."

Conversely, various systems of writing on the television screen must still be considered "birds in the bush." These systems are either called videotext or teletext, depending on the techniques employed. There is a major problem with writing on a screen: the screen is filled with too many words, and it is difficult for the viewer to read them. For example, if a firm like Sears, Roebuck, and Co. uses teletext as a method of electronically delivering all its catalog material, each double spread of the book represents dozens of "pages" of teletext. The electronic "catalog" is thus many thousands of "pages" long. While an individual can look at the traditional printed catalog in one room and then carry it to another room to place a telephone order, he cannot do the same with the electronic version of the catalog. So for a company like Sears, Roebuck, the old-fashioned catalog remains a better system of information delivery than anything produced by writing on a screen. It is pointless, in my view, to begin from a position that says, "the technology makes this possible." Whether or not one is able to write on the screen is not the issue.

However, from the standpoint of an agenda for the arts, it is wrong to bury one's head in the sand. In the arts, there are cutting-edge issues involving expression and the creation of meaning that wait to be explored. To continue with the example of writing on the screen, the Center for Visual History, under Lawrence Pitkethly, is today involved in making a series of public television films about American poets called "Voices and Visions." In the series' film on Ezra Pound, the words of poems are often visible on the screen. The technology is a straightforward application of film superimposition and animation; it is used, however, in a novel way, to reveal both the structures of the poems and their other less obvious aspects. Thus, on the one hand, one may look at an attempt to replace print on the catalog page and correctly hypothesize that it will not work. On the other hand, one can see that technology is able to expand our appreciation of an art form such as poetry.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now, for a second slogan: "Fear the Greeks." Technologists often tend, for marketing or other reasons, to take too little cognizance of whether the already existing mousetrap is sufficient for our needs. We are constantly being given better mousetraps, whether we want them or not. The "standards war" in the videocassette market is a perfect example of this. Perhaps 8 mm Video is superior to VHS or BETA, or perhaps it is not; that is almost beside the point. The question is how it meshes into a market already dominated by other formats.

In regard to this issue, the history of the videodisk provides a significant warning. RCA virtually bankrupted itself trying to market a disk that was clearly an inferior mousetrap from every point of view.[17] The laser-driven disk, by comparison, is a very different device from RCA's and is better in several ways. The laser disk allows instant access to any single frame, and has superior sound and picture quality. Above all, it is the most durable audiovisual format, with the promise of six centuries of perfect preservation. But societal and economic forces were such as to constrain its introduction. The laser disk struggles for acceptance, having already disappeared in one consumer format, though it is alive and well as the compact audio disk (CD).

Proponents of the laser disk had argued that it provides both a better picture and better sound. But this was irrelevant if the consumer had already spent four or five hundred dollars on a VCR. Though it is true that the VCR records and the disk does not, the disk's other advantages are incontestable. This does not prevent it from floundering. A similar scenario appears to be in store for 8 mm Video. The fact that a new device can do the job better means nothing if social uses and the market have already combined to close off new options.

Slogan number three: *"Festina lente."* "Hurry slowly" suggests, as I have already indicated, that the pace of change is generally not very fast. The history of holography may be offered as an example. The scientific knowledge needed to make holograms had its origins in 1801 with Thomas Young's interference hypothesis, which allowed him to measure the wavelengths of different colored lights accurately. The idea for the hologram was in the mind of Nobel Prize winner Dennis Gabor by 1947. Lasers were suggested for the process in a paper written in 1958.[18] Holography should mesh easily into a society addicted to realism. We appear to be waiting for the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"smellies" and the "feelies,"[19] and so there is good reason to believe that a three-dimensional moving-image hologram will be accepted. The question, however, is when.

The first commercially available moving hologram was produced in 1975.[20] If money were now thrown at the project, we could almost certainly solve many of the remaining technological problems in a short time. These are mostly engineering problems; they have little to do with basic concepts. Will we actually do this? In my view, not immediately. If we glance at the agenda that the worldwide electronics industry has developed for the near future of this field, we first see television monitors with stereophonic sound. That market will have to be saturated. Digital television will come next, and then cathode-ray tubes will be abandoned in favor of flat screens. After that, we will start discussing changes in the pictures we look at, which are currently made up of 525 or 625 lines—the world's major standards. NHK, the Japanese state broadcasting company, has developed with Sony a 1,125-line picture known as high-definition television, or HDTV.

This HDTV proposal offers a perfect example of McLuhan's notion that we drive into the future with our eyes firmly fixed on the rearview mirror. The current television picture duplicates the resolution of 16-millimeter film. Why? Because in the twenties, television researchers wanted to deliver home movies; they felt they could hope for no better film than 16-millimeter,[21] which translates into the general range of lines of contemporary standards. Fifty years later, we are still tied to that standard. Today there is talk of a new standard, but will we leap to the electronic equivalent of 70-millimeter film and beyond? No, instead 1,125 lines are being proposed—the equivalent of the 35-millimeter film image.

HDTV will come, but almost certainly only after a time span of decades—a decade, probably, for stereophonic sound on monitors, another decade for digital sets, a decade or longer for the flat screen. HDTV or any other new, incompatible standard may well take two or three decades simply to diffuse. After all this, and perhaps much else, will come holographic television—possibly by the middle of the twenty-first century.

Does this mean that any contemporary artist who wishes to work in holography should be ignored? Certainly not. If artists suggest that it is vital to know how to handle this medium, and if they create

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

projects that can help us to understand its potentialities, they ought to be supported. "Hurry slowly" simply means that it is important to have a realistic overview of the technology in question, and to not be unduly influenced by the hype that too often surrounds it. Everything takes as long as it ever did.

Fourth slogan: *"Carpe diem."* There are always opportunities to be seized, as in the history of computing, when Charles Babbage was discovered in the rooms of the Analytical Society at Cambridge dozing over his logarithmic tables. In his version of the tale, he was suddenly awakened and asked what he was dreaming about. His reply: "I am thinking that all these tables [pointing to some logarithms] might be calculated by machinery."[22] In an alternate version of the story, another member of the Analytical Society, his friend the astronomer Herschel, is said to have added, "Yes, by steam."[23] The year was 1812 or 1813; who, at that time, needed a computer? It was cheaper to hire a clerk. There were armies of clerks for such work.

Today there are no clerks—certainly not for the arts—so specific technologies, especially the personal computer, ought to be put to as many uses as possible. For arts organizations, the mundane possibilities of databases ought to be transformed into better ways of reaching audiences. Artists should certainly use cheap video-editing systems or any other devices that render a mode of expression more easily accessible. Indeed, all technological possibilities might well be dealt with in this way, including the timely holographic experiment previously mentioned. *Carpe diem.*

Fifth slogan: "Fight the good fight." It is impossible to deal with technology in isolation. One has to think about society, the collective experience, which also embraces all the artistic expressions that the culture has produced. Fighting the good fight means taking advantage of appropriate technology; for instance, pushing the limits of commercial exploitation of videocassettes for education and the raising of artistic awareness in both young people and adults. This fight is occasioned by the fact that the broadcasting industry fosters passivity in its audience. Doing otherwise in such a well-entrenched situation will never be easy, but that does not mean that new responses should not be encouraged.

In the supposed rush forward, in our obsession with progress, there are certain things that must not be allowed to fall by the wayside. The use of film as an avant-garde means of expression—a perfectly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legitimate use of the medium, as old as any other—is one that will never be supported by the marketplace. But if one considers how the human experience would be impoverished if we did not have those reels of celluloid and boxes of tapes made by artists from the earliest experimenters through Maya Deren to Nam June Paik and beyond, one can understand how important it is that such work be supported and preserved.

In the rush to the future we should not forget older technologies. Audiotape, for example, has played (and continues to play) a vital role in the preservation of folk forms, spoken and musical. Radio can return such preserved material to the community. Again, the limited range of radio broadcasts produced by the industry today ought to be seen as a challenge rather than as a sign that all is lost.

Newer and more glamorous technologies can also be made to serve. While no new technology seems less appropriate for exploitation by the artistic community than satellites, which are enormously expensive and both metaphorically and literally out of reach, individuals should try to make something of them in ways that the political and commercial creators of the system never intended. The "Deep Dish" project of "Paper Tiger" (an alternative television production group), which reached community television channels all over the United States via satellite, shows what is possible.

A final slogan: "Horses for courses"—the question of appropriate technology. How does one judge the artistic quality of enterprises in terms of cutting-edge, high-tech, or low-tech appropriateness? There is a tripartite division here. The newest work that interests Bell Laboratories and others like them is largely concerned with developments on the frontiers of technological understanding. This level of technology often has a double-edged effect in the world of the arts. It is the sort of technology that often overmasters the artist in the ways suggested earlier. Then there is state-of-the-art high technology; with this, the issue is not so much a loss of a creative sense as it is one of economics. In the video area, for example, many of the image-processing systems that artists might wish to use are not available to them; they simply cost too much. Finally, there is low technology, or devices that are easily and readily accessible.

Clearly, the last level of technology poses no problem; there are even creative ways of dealing with the middle level. In New York, for example, the state's arts council, in collaboration with other bodies,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has created programs to allow video artists to gain access to extremely expensive production facilities during off-hours. These support programs have contributed to productions that fit admirably into the avant-garde tradition and reflect the highest levels of technical accomplishment, made possible with the latest developments in technology. For example, "Double Lunar Dogs" was made by Joan Jonas in 1984 at a major New York production facility. While the latest experiments in art and technology, not grounded in social (including artistic) realities, ought to be approached with caution, it is vital that we be open to all technological opportunities.

ART AND TECHNOLOGY, NOT ART VERSUS TECHNOLOGY

We should not think in terms of art versus technology. Art has always interfaced with technology, whether in the ancient techniques of casting bronze, still with us, or in lithography, now in its third century, or in photography. Wonderful cross-fertilizations are possible when the new technologies interact with the old. Some scholars argue that Monet's *Boulevard des Capucines* is an image that would not have been painted before the advent of photography. Photography rendered a similar blurring of images, especially in the early decades when shutters and film stocks were slow. It is perhaps fitting that the world's first public film show took place on the same Parisian street captured in Monet's painting.

Art and technology are twins. They divide because we choose to divide all sorts of things that were not separated before the coming of the Industrial Revolution. We divide art and artisans, artists and scientists, art and technology. But there was a time when this was not so. Think, for example, of *Trinity* by Masaccio in the Church of Santa Maria Novella in Florence. I recall listening to a guide explain that when the bishop of Florence unveiled the painting, Masaccio's perspective rendering of the vaulted roof behind the crucifix was so astonishing that people rushed outside the church to see where it had been built. Whether true or not, the anecdote attests to the power of illusionism in culture. We would know a great deal more about how we function as human beings, as artists, and as a society if we knew the substance of the conversations shared by Donatello, Masaccio,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Alberti, Ghiberti, Brunelleschi, and the philosophers and mathematicians who were part of their circle in the first decades of the fifteenth century. Something quite remarkable happened in those years.

Brunelleschi painted what is generally regarded as the first modern perspective painting in Western Europe. But it had to be viewed in a peculiar manner. One peered through a hole drilled in a wooden board. On the board, facing away from the viewer, was the painting (depicting the baptistry). Facing the board was a mirror. Thus the viewer looked through the hole at the reflection of the image in the mirror.[24]

This was an extraordinary development—one of the most important in the history of European perception. The first modern perspective painting with a single vanishing point represented a fundamental change in art that had absolutely nothing to do with technology. Apparently, the Florentines simply invented it.

The Florentines were familiar with the first Arab treatise on optics and perspective, translated from Arabic into Latin as *Perspectiva*; they had been making *trompe l'oeil* bas-reliefs and funerary images for several centuries; they had been doing work like the very doors of the baptistry that Brunelleschi had painted, which had considerable elements of three-dimensional representationalism in them. And then, suddenly, it came together: perspective without any technology involved. But the issue of perspective was at the top of what we would clearly recognize as a scientific agenda today. The Florentine artist had much to do with what we would now call scientific work.[25]

In a biography of Alberti there is a brief but telling description of a camera obscura one hundred years before della Porta, who is normally credited with this invention.[26] What, then, of the astonishing moment of the Brunelleschi painting? If Alberti knew of this device, could not Brunelleschi have shared this knowledge? What is the viewer doing but looking through a hole into another space, the exact mark of those reprographic and photographic processes we normally associate with eighteenth-century camera obscuras and the emergence of photographic processes in the nineteenth century?

The West's "discovery" or "invention" of perspective may have been a moment as technologically driven as any other. It could have been born, in part, out of knowledge of the camera obscura. Just as Nam June Paik's work (or that of any contemporary artist) is technologically derived today, Brunelleschi's work may have been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

derived from the technologies of his era. Contemplation of the relationship between art and technology leads to the realization that, as a society, we must be prepared to provide mirrors for our Brunelleschis.

ENDNOTES

This essay is based on a verbal report made to the New York State Council on the Arts (NYSCA) at the Whitney Museum of American Art, 9 September 1986. Copyright © the Whitney Museum of American Art. The author gratefully acknowledges the museum's kind permission to reprint it in this form.

The report on which this essay is based was part of a project initiated on behalf of the NYSCA by John G. Hanhardt, curator of film and video at the Whitney Museum of American Art. The purpose of the project was twofold: to examine the historical and theoretical issues of art and technology in our times, and to develop a better understanding of the practical implications of technological development for the creation and dissemination of the arts, in close relation to the policy issues raised for the council by new technology. The author wishes to thank Dr. Hanhardt, his staff, and Jacqueline Kain, the project's research officer, as well as the program directors of NYSCA, especially Dai Sil Kim-Gibson, director, Media Program, and NYSCA's executive director, Mary Hays, for their help and guidance.

[1]Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 257ff.

[2]Patented by Paul Nipkow in Berlin, 1884. See G. Shiers, ed., *Technical History of Television* (New York: Arno Press, 1977) for a collection of papers on the earliest phases of television development.

[3]Frederick Braun's rectifier, in Marburg, 1874. See Ernest Braun and Stuart McDonald, *Revolution in Miniature* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press), p. 11ff.

[4]By a Bolognese, Cascariola. See Brian Winston, *Misunderstanding Media* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 39.

[5]By K.F. Braun. Ibid.

[6]G.R.M Garratt and A.H. Mumford, "The History of Television," *Proceedings of the Institute of Electrical Engineers*, 99 (London: Institute of Electrical Engineering, 1952), p. 26.

[7]Ibid., p. 31.

[8]P.K. Gorokhov, "History of Modern Television," *Radioteckhnika (Radio Engineering)* 1961, in Shiers, *Technical History*, p. 75.

[9]F.C. Waldrop and J. Borkin, *Television: A Struggle for Power* (New York: William Morrow, 1938), p. 213.

[10]G. Everson, *The Story of Television: The Life of Philo T. Farnsworth* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1949), passim.

[11]A.G. Jensen, "The Evolution of Modern Television," *Journal of the Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers* 63 (1954), p. 176.

[12]Bruce Norman, *Here's Looking at You* (London: BBC & Royal Television Society, 1984), p. 210.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[13]William Uricchio and Brian Winston, "The Anniversary Stakes," *Sight and Sound* 55 (4) (Autumn 1986), p. 232.
[14]S.H. Lavington, *Early British Computers* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1982), passim.
[15]John von Neumann, "First Draft of a Report on EDVAC," in B. Randall, ed., *The Origins of Digital Computers* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1973), p. 359ff.
[16]See Winston, *Misunderstanding Media*, pp. 363–80.
[17]Margaret Graham, *RCA and the Video Disc* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986), passim.
[18]By Charles Townes and A.L. Shawlow. See G.W.A. Dummer, *Electronic Inventions and Discoveries* (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1983), p. 198.
[19]Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, *The Nature of Narrative* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 85ff.
[20]Paul Walton, *Space Light* (Sydney: Doubleday, 1982), p. 47.
[21]G. Schlafley, "Some Comparative Factors of Picture Resolution in Television and Film Industries," *Journal of the Society of Motion Picture and Television Technicians* (January 1951), p. 50.
[22]Herman Goldstine, *The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) p. 11.
[23]Stan Augerton, *Bit by Bit* (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1984), p. 40.
[24]John White, *The Birth and Rebirth of Pictorial Space* (London: Faber & Faber, 1957), p. 114ff. I am grateful to Julia Keydel for introducing me to this literature.
[25]Kenneth Clark, "Leon Battista Alberti on Painting," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 30 (1944), p. 6.
[26]Alberti made "demonstrations" through a tiny opening in a little "closed box." From the *Vita anonyma* in William M. Irvins, Jr., *On the Rationalization of Sight* (New York: Da Capo, 1973), p. 16. See also the references to a "veil" placed between "the eye and the thing seen, so the visual pyramid penetrates through the thinness of the veil. This veil . . . always presents to you the same unchanged plane. . . . ," in Alberti's *Della Pittura*, translated by John R. Spencer as *On Painting* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 68ff. Jean Gadol, in *Leon Battista Alberti* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969), glosses this *velo*, or "ideal frame," as a " 'glass' " (p. 38). Regarding Brunelleschi's interest in machines and his general inventiveness, see Frank D. Prager and Gustina Scagla, *Brunelleschi: Studes of His Technology and Inventions* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), passim.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Notes on Contributors

Graham Allison, born in 1940 in Charlotte, North Carolina, is dean and Don K. Price Professor of Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Dr. Allison is director of the Council on Foreign Relations, special advisor to the U.S. secretary of defense, and codirector of the Avoiding Nuclear War Project at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is the author of *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1971), *Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organizational Connection* (with Peter Szanton, 1976), and *Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War* (with Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 1985).

Daniel Bell, born in 1919 in New York, New York, is Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences at Harvard University, and in 1987–1988 will be the Pitt Professor and Fellow at King's College, Cambridge University. Among his publications are *The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (1976), *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976), and *The Winding Passage: Essays and Sociological Journeys, 1960–1980* (1980).

Albert Carnesale, born in 1936 in Bronx, New York, is academic dean and professor of public policy and administration at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, consultant to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and codirector of the Avoiding Nuclear War Project at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is a coauthor of *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (with the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, 1983) and *Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War* (with Graham Allison and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 1985), and coeditor of *Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight* (with Richard Haass, 1987).

Anthony Downs, born in 1930 in Evanston, Illinois, is senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. His works include *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), *Inside Bureaucracy* (1967), *Opening Up the Suburbs*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(1973), *Urban Decline and the Future of American Cities* (with Katherine L. Bradbury, 1982), and the *Revolution in Real Estate Finance* (1985).

Robert Gilpin, born in 1930 in Burlington, Vermont, is Eisenhower Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University. His principal books include *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy* (1962), *War and Change in World Politics* (1981), and *The Political Economy of International Relations* (1987).

John A. Hall, born in 1949 in Cheadle, England, is senior lecturer in sociology at Southampton University and associate professor of sociology and social studies at Harvard University. He is the author of *The Sociology of Literature* (1977), *Diagnoses of Our Time* (1981), *Powers and Liberties* (1985), and *Liberalism* (1987), and the editor of *States in History* (1986).

Jacob T. Schwartz, born in 1930 in New York, New York, is professor at the Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences at New York University and former chairman of the Computer Science Board at the National Research Council. His works include *Lectures on the Mathematical Method in Analytical Economics* (2 vols., 1961), *Relativity in Illustrations* (1962), and *Linear Operators* (3 vols.: 1958, 1963, and 1970).

Merry White, born in 1941 in Washington, D.C., is director of international education and administrator of East Asian Studies at Harvard University, and will be professor of Japanese sociology at Boston University starting this fall. She is the author of *Human Conditions* (with Robert LeVine, 1986), the *Japanese Educational Challenge: A Commitment to Children* (1987), and *The Japanese Overseas* (in press).

Brian Winston, born in 1941 in Worcester, England, is dean of the School of Communications at Pennsylvania State University. His works include *Bad News* (1976) and *More Bad News* (1980), both with the Glasgow Media Group; *Working with Video* (with Julia Keydel, 1986); and *Misunderstanding the Media* (1986).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED